Opinion
No. 2:00 cv 198
April 30, 2002
ORDER
The issue presently before the court is whether the court shall impose FED.R.CIV.P. 11 sanctions upon Sumbry. District courts have the discretionary authority to levy sanctions when appropriate. See Cooter Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). For the reasons set forth below, sanctions are a proper response in this case.
Sumbry is currently incarcerated at the Indiana State Prison, serving a fourteen-year term for dealing in controlled substances, and a consecutive one-year sentence for escape. It is projected that Sumbry will be a free man on July 29, 2008.
On March 14, 2000, Sumbry filed a pro se "Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983." See N.D.Ind. L.R 8.1(a) (requiring "forms supplied by the clerk of the court"). In the pre-printed section entitled "Cause of Action," Sumbry alleged "[t]his is a civil action for breach of contract, fraudulent representation, attorney deceit, collusion, breach of duty, and legal malpractice." (Compl. at 5.) He sought money damages and other relief against the Lake County Government Center, a person alleged to have been a Lake County prosecutor, and an attorney who apparently represented Sumbry in a criminal proceeding. In accordance with section 7 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), the court promptly reviewed Sumbry's complaint, accepting as true all factual allegations therein. See Pernice v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 783, 786 (7th Cir. 2001); Frederick v. Simmons Airlines, Inc., 144 F.3d 500, 502 (7th Cir. 1998). After completing this careful perusal, the court on its own motion dismissed the action because the court was satisfied the action was frivolous, malicious, and sought monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. See PLRA § 7(c) (listing grounds upon which summary dismissal is warranted). The dismissal and reasons therefor were memorialized in a written order dated March 22, 2000. After the written order of dismissal was entered and the Clerk docketed a judgment terminating the action, Sumbry relentlessly filed discovery motions (see, e.g., Docket Entries ##8, 12), as well as a motion for a more definite statement (see Docket Entry #13) even though the only pleading filed in the case was his own, and a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned dismissal (see Docket Entry #10). In a written order dated May 5, 2000, the court denied these motions, reiterating that Sumbry's action was malicious and the defendants were not amenable to suit upon the theories Sumbry was pursuing. Sumbry subsequently filed documents styled as a Summons (see Docket Entry #15), a tort claims notice under Indiana law (see id.), a motion for pretrial conference (see Docket Entry #16), and a "Motion for Relief from Order of Judgment," (Docket Entry #17), filed on December 21, 2000. The undersigned denied the latter motion in a written order dated January 4, 2001, stating "[o]nce again, because the defendants Sumbry has named are not liable to him, his motion is DENIED. This court will entertain no further filings by Sumbry." (January 4, 2001 Order at 4 (emphasis in original).)
Sumbry, apparently dissatisfied with the decisions of the district court, appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. His application to appeal in forma pauperis was denied because after careful review of the proceedings in the district court, the undersigned concluded the "appeal [was] not taken in good faith." (February 7, 2001 Order at 3.) The court of appeals apparently agreed, summarily dismissing Sumbry's appeal, see Sumbry v. Relphorde et al., No. 01-1154, unpublished order at 1 (7th Cir. May 17, 2001), and subsequently dismissed Sumbry's petition for a writ of mandamus, see In re Larriante J. Sumbry, No. 02-1298, unpublished order at 1 (7th Cir. Feb. 15, 2002). Exasperated with Sumbry's behavior, the court ordered Sumbry to show cause why he ought not be sanctioned. He responded on September 7, 2001.
Sumbry's response is a model of contradiction. In support of his position that the court ought not impose sanctions upon him, Sumbry reminds the court he is proceeding "without a legal education," and is "anxious to learn and understand the law." (Docket Entry #35 at 1-2.) Yet, Sumbry closes his response with the following diatribe:
Pursuant to statute you failed to enforce the law and follow the Constitution and valid laws of the land set forth in Article III and VI, which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Your judgment on this case was erroneous under judicial code and ethics.
(Id. at 2.)
FED.R.CIV.P. 11(b) provides that "[b]y presenting to the court . . . a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an . . . unrepresented person is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief . . ." the filing is not frivolous. "The rule is principally designed to prevent baseless filings." Brunt et al. v. Service Employees Int'l. Union, Nos. 01-2307 01-2791, slip op. at 8 (7th Cir. Mar. 21, 2002) (citing Cooter Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 392 (1990)). For violations of this rule, the court may impose appropriate sanctions. See FED.R.CIV.P. 11(c).
In this case, Sumbry commenced a frivolous action and the court informed him of that fact via written order dated March 22, 2000. If Sumbry felt the court misapplied the law of pleadings, see FED.R.CIV.P. 8, or the dismissal requirements of PLRA section 7, he was free to appeal. Instead, Sumbry engaged in a course of conduct designed to bury the district court in patently frivolous motions even after Sumbry received the order of dismissal and resulting judgment adverse to him. By forcing the district court to carefully review each and every one of his frivolous filings and respond via reasoned written orders and opinions, Sumbry caused this court to waste valuable resources. Sumbry may not appreciate the implications of his conduct; but very simply Sumbry's actions caused this court to divert attention away from meritorious lawsuits, including ones filed by his fellow inmates. Since Sumbry's conduct wasted judicial resources (and therefore taxpayer money), a monetary sanction is particularly appropriate. Moreover, a monetary sanction would operate as an effective deterrent against comparable future behavior. A sanction of $200.00 is sufficient to vindicate the interests of the judicial system, and deter future frivolity, in light of Sumbry's current financial situation.
One last piece of housekeeping. The purpose of the PLRA is to "filter out groundless claims, and foster better prepared litigation of claims aired in court." Porter v. Nussle, 122 S.Ct. 983, 990 (2002). Toward that end, PLRA "requires prisoners to prepay the filing and docketing fees of most future suits, if they have a history of frivolous litigation." Lewis v. Sullivan, Nos. 01-2251 01-2252, slip op. at 1 (7th Cir. Feb. 1, 2002). The governing provision on this subject states as follows:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds it was frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
PLRA § 804(d) (emphasis added). "When determining whether a prisoner has acquired three strikes under [PLRA § 804(d)], courts must consider prisoner actions dismissed on any of the three enumerated grounds." Evans v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 150 F.3d 810, 811 (7th Cir. 1998) (referencing PLRA § 804(d)).
Sumbry has struck out swinging. A review of the file folders in the custody of the Clerk of this court reveals at least three dismissals consistent with the grounds articulated in PLRA § 804(d). See id. at 812 ("The requirement that district courts identify the cases found to constitute strikes should not be overly burdensome given the fact that the district court must review a prisoner's litigation history prior to ruling."). In addition to the above-captioned case, the undersigned dismissed another frivolous civil action entitled Larriante' J. Sumbry v. John Buncich, et al. (Cause No. 2:00 cv 196). Those two cases combined with Judge Lozano's summary dismissal of the meritless claims in Sumbry v. Kouros, No. 99cv573 (for the order of dismissal, see Docket Entry #11) means Sumbry has "abused the forma pauperis privilege." Lewis, supra at 4. Thus, he is no longer eligible for special taxpayer-subsidies to support his litigation efforts.
The order of dismissal was entered on March 21, 2000.
The Seventh Circuit has noted that "the district court must cite specifically the case names, case docket numbers, districts in which the actions were filed, and the dates of the orders dismissing the actions." Evans, 150 F.3d at 812. See generally Randal S. Jeffrey, Restricting Prisoners' Equal Access to the Federal Courts: The Three Strikes Provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act and Substantive Equal Protection, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1099, 1105 (2001) (approving this formulation as striking the proper balance between curbing excessive meritless litigation and protection of prisoners' rights). This Order is intended to meet the requirements articulated in Evans.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Sumbry pay Rule 11 sanctions in the amount of $200.00. Sumbry shall make monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month's income credited to his inmate trust account.
The Indiana Department of Corrections is hereby DIRECTED to automatically forward payments from his inmate trust account to the Clerk of this court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00, until the $200.00 sanction is paid in full.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, DECREED, AND ADJUDGED THAT Sumbry has forfeited the privilege to proceed in forma pauperis because of his history of frivolous suits.
If Sumbry attempts to commence any future actions without tendering the applicable fee, the Clerk is hereby DIRECTED to return any such filings unless Sumbry submits an affidavit with sufficient facts to demonstrate he "is under imminent danger of serious physical injury." The Clerk is further DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Order to the Superintendent of the Indiana State Prison and the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.