Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting defendants’ motion to change venue. Plaintiff properly placed venue in New York County based upon the corporate defendant's initial certificate of incorporation designating New York County as the location of its principal office although the company has no office there (see CPLR 503[c] ; Sultana v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 187 A.D.3d 590, 591, 130 N.Y.S.3d 679 [1st Dept. 2020] ; Janis v. Janson Supermarkets LLC, 161 A.D.3d 480, 73 N.Y.S.3d 419 [1st Dept. 2018] ). While defendants annexed to their moving papers the police report for the subject motor vehicle accident indicating that defendants’ vehicle was registered to a Nassau County address on the day of the accident and an affidavit from the corporate defendant's Vice President averring that its office was in Nassau County when the action was commenced, the corporate residence designated in the initial certificate of incorporation controls for venue purposes (seeVillalba v. Brady, 162 A.D.3d 533, 80 N.Y.S.3d 220 [1st Dept. 2018] ). There was no evidence of an amended certificate of incorporation that changed the principal place of business to Nassau County.
CPLR 503(a) provides, in relevant part, that, "[e]xcept where otherwise prescribed by law, the place of trial shall be in the county in which one of the parties resided when it was commenced; [or] the county in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." CPLR 503(c) provides, in relevant part, that "[a] domestic corporation. . . shall be deemed a resident of the county in which its principal office is located." As the Appellate Division, First Department, has explained, a defendant corporation's papers filed with the Secretary of State "is controlling for venue purposes," {Janis v Janson Supermarkets LLC, 161 A.D.3d 480, 480 [1st Dept 2018]), regardless of where that defendant actually maintains its principal offices (see id.; Sultana v St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 187 A.D.3d 590, 519 [1st Dept 2020]; Shetty v Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 38 A.D.3d 202, 203, 830 [1st Dept 2007]; Job v Subaru Leasing Corp., 30 A.D.3d 159, 159 [1st Dept 2006]).
In support of its motion, defendant submits a biennial statement filed with the DOS for the year 2021 (Doc. 9) reflecting that it has an address for service of process in Albany and a principal executive office in North Carolina which, it claims, establishes that venue in New York County is improper. Plaintiff, relying on Sultana v St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 187 A.D.3d 590, 591 (1st Dept 2020), correctly responds that this argument is without merit since "[t]he 'principal executive office' noted in a corporation's biennial statement does not determine corporate residence for venue purposes, since it is not contained in either a certificate of incorporation or an amended certificate (187 A.D.3d at 591, citing Villalba v Brady, 162 A.D.3d 533, 533 [1st Dept 2018]).