Opinion
No. CV 04 0568292
November 29, 2005
On or about September 26, 2002, plaintiff John F. Sullivan and defendant William Watkins, while employed by the City of New London, were assigned to collect recyclable trash. At about 8:10 a.m. on that day defendant William Watkins was driving a garbage truck owned by the City of New London, and John F. Sullivan sustained physical injury during the process of collecting recyclables for the City of New London. In his affidavit filed in this case, John F. Sullivan describes the incident.
As William Watkins was intending to turn right from Mahan Street onto Richmond Street in New London, he brought the vehicle to a stop to accommodate a resident who brought a container of trash from her home on the corner of Richmond and Mahan Street. While the vehicle as stopped, I got out with the intention of picking up and discarding the material in the container the resident had carried from her home. While I was walking on Richmond Street, William Watkins either backed or drove the vehicle over my left foot injuring me.
Affidavit of John F. Sullivan.
Plaintiff John F. Sullivan brought this lawsuit, as amended, in two counts. The first count is against William Watkins. It asserts a cause of action in negligence against him for negligent operation of the truck. The second count is addressed to the City of New London. In the second count plaintiff John F. Sullivan asserts a claim for indemnity, under Section 7-465, from the City of New London for the "carelessness and negligence of . . . defendant employee" William Watkins.
The City of New London filed an Intervening Complaint. In its complaint the City of New London alleges that it has paid substantial sums to and on behalf of its employee, John F. Sullivan, as a result of the motor vehicle accident in this case, and "that any damages awarded and/or received . . . shall be so paid and apportioned so that the City of New London will be reimbursed for the amounts it has paid and may become obligated to pay under the Workers' Compensation Act."
In addition, the City of New London filed two motions for summary judgment. Its first motion (number 116) is addressed to its status as an intervening complainant. Its second motion (number 117) is addressed to plaintiff John F. Sullivan's complaint. Each motion is based upon its contention that the plaintiff John F. Sullivan's claim against it is barred by the Workers' Compensation Act of the State of Connecticut.
Inasmuch as it is undisputed that the time of the motor vehicle accident in this case William Watkins was driving a garbage truck owned by the City of New London and that he and plaintiff John F. Sullivan, as employees of the City, were in the process of collecting and/or disposing of recyclables on behalf of the City of New London at the time that the truck injured the plaintiff, a principal issue for this court to decide is whether the Workers' Compensation Statute is a bar to this litigation against the City of New London. The City cites, inter alia, the case of Szczapa v. United Parcel Services, Inc., 56 Conn.App 325 (2000), appeal dismissed at 267 Conn. 666 (2004), as being supportive of the statutory proposition that the Connecticut workers' compensation statute is a bar to the plaintiff's claims against it. The following quotation from that case confirms this proposition.
General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 31-284(a) provides in relevant part:
"An employer shall not be liable to any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained . . ." The purpose of the act is to compensate workers for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, without regard to fault, by imposing a form of strict liability on employers. Jett v. Dunlap, 179 Conn. 215, 217, 425 A.2d 1263 (1979); Klapproth v. Turner, 156 Conn. 276, 279, 240 A.2d 886 (1968). Under the act, an employee compromises his right to a common-law tort action against his employer for work-related injuries in exchange for relatively quick and certain compensation. Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., supra, 196 Conn. 97. Our Supreme Court has long recognized that "where a worker's personal injury is covered by the act, statutory compensation is the sole remedy and recovery in common-law tort against the employer is barred." Jett v. Dunlap, supra, 217; Mancini v. Bureau of Public Works, 167 Conn. 189, 193, 355 A.2d 32 (1974); Crisanti v. Cremo Brewing Co., 136 Conn. 529, 531, 72 A.2d 655 (1950). Emphasis added.
Szczapa v. United Parcel Svc., Inc., at 328-29.
It is apparent from the foregoing authority that the motions for summary judgment filed by the City of New London are premised upon firm authority.
Defendant William Watkins filed a motion for summary judgment (number 118) challenging plaintiff John Sullivan's claim that he is entitled to recover against him for injury due to the negligent operation of the garbage truck. Defendant cites the workers' compensation statute as protection against such a claim.
General Statutes Section 31-293a of the workers' compensation statute does state in material part that "[i]f an employee . . . has a right to benefits or compensation under this chapter on account of injury . . . caused by the negligence . . . of a fellow employee, such right shall be the exclusive remedy of such injured employee . . . and no action may be brought against such fellow employee unless . . . the action is based on the fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle . . ." However, where the negligent operation of a motor vehicle occurs where the situation is a special hazard of the workplace, such as in this case, the negligence of the fellow employee is not actionable. Cirillo v. Sardo, 41 Conn.App 664, 666-67. See also Fields v. Girun, 65 Conn.App 771, 773 (2001).
Since the action of defendant William Watkins is covered by the workers' compensation statute in this case, he is entitled to its protection. In this regard, it is noted that the complaint, as amended, does not allege that the alleged action of William Watkins in operating the truck was wilful and malicious. See Connecticut General Statutes Section 7-465(a), and Gurliacci v. Mayer. 218 Conn. 531, 541-41 (1991).
Defendant William Watkins filed a motion for summary judgment (119) addressed to the intervening complaint of the City of New London. In its intervention complaint the City, pursuant to Section 31-293(a), seeks to recover from the defendant William Watkins, monies that it has paid or become obligated to pay to John Sullivan as a result of the accident in this case. In his motion for summary judgment William Watkins argued that the legislative intendment of the workers' compensation statute as to recoupment is directed at recovery against wrong-doing third parties and not to the actions of a fellow employee. The City of New London disagreed, and contended that the plain language of the statute supports its position.
This court found that inasmuch as the granting of the previous motions for summary judgment disposes of the principal cause of action, this motion for summary judgment (number 119) should be granted on the ground of mootness.