Sullivan v. Town Council

40 Citing cases

  1. O'Meara v. Norwich

    167 Conn. 579 (Conn. 1975)   Cited 9 times

    When the council exercises its zoning powers, it acts, in effect if not in name, as a zoning commission. Sullivan v. Town Council, 143 Conn. 280, 288, 121 A.2d 630. In examining the charter as a whole, the legislative intent is apparent that the overrule provision in chapter V is to apply to ordinances of the council acting in its general legislative capacity and not to ordinances while it is sitting as a zoning commission.

  2. Campion v. Bd. of Aldermen

    278 Conn. 500 (Conn. 2006)   Cited 45 times
    Explaining that Euclidean zoning describes the early zoning concept of separating theoretically incompatible land uses through the establishment of fixed legislative rules; is designed to achieve stability in land use planning and zoning; and is a comparatively inflexible, self-executing mechanism

    Consequently, two bodies of legislation pertaining to zoning have developed over the years: the one, contained in the General Statutes; the other, conferred by special act and relevant only to the particular city or town in whose behalf the legislation was adopted." Sullivan v. Town Council, 143 Conn. 280, 282, 121 A.2d 630 (1956).The city's zoning authority, therefore, is derived from a completely separate source of power from which most other municipalities derive zoning power.

  3. West Hartford Interfaith Coalition v. Town Council

    228 Conn. 498 (Conn. 1994)   Cited 208 times
    In West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council, 228 Conn. 498, 636 A.2d 1342 (1994), we addressed whether an application "for a zone change 672and special development district designation to construct ten units of affordable housing on property located in West Hartford" was an affordable housing application, as defined by § 8-30g (a) (2). Id., at 500, 636 A.2d 1342; see id., at 506, 636 A.2d 1342.

    We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The defendant derives its zoning authority from special acts of the General Assembly. 19 Spec. Laws 934, 1 through 6 (1925); 20 Spec. Laws 188 (1927); 22 Spec. Laws 473, 172 (1935); see also Cascio v. Town Council 158 Conn. 111, 113, 256 A.2d 685 (1969); Clark v. Town Council, 145 Conn. 476, 480-81, 144 A.2d 327 (1958); Sullivan v. Town Council, 143 Conn. 280, 288, 121 A.2d 630 (1956). General Statutes 8-30g provides: "AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND USE APPEALS PROCEDURE. (a) As used in this section: (1) `Affordable housing development' means a proposed housing development (A) which is assisted housing or (B) in which not less than twenty per cent of the dwelling units will be conveyed by deeds containing covenants or restrictions which shall require that such dwelling units be sold or rented at, or below, prices which will preserve the units as affordable housing, as defined in section 8-39a, for persons and families whose income is less than or equal to eighty per cent of the area median income, for at least twenty years after the initial occupation of the proposed development; (2) `affordable housing application' means any application made to a commission in connection with an affordable housing development by a person who proposes to develop such affordable housing; (3) `assisted housing' means housing which is receiving, or will receive, financial assistance under an

  4. Manchester Sand Gravel Co. v. South Winsdor

    203 Conn. 267 (Conn. 1987)   Cited 45 times

    A review of the policy and purposes behind General Statutes 14-298, as evidenced by the legislative history of the statute, is necessary to determine whether the legislature intended to vest the ultimate authority to regulate through truck traffic in the state traffic commission. See Dwyer v. Farrell, supra, 12; Sullivan v. Town Council, 143 Conn. 280, 284, 121 A.2d 630 (1956). In the 1955 legislative session, special acts were passed which gave the cities of Hartford and New Haven the power to regulate through truck traffic on local streets.

  5. Schieffelin Co. v. Department of Liquor Control

    194 Conn. 165 (Conn. 1984)   Cited 73 times
    Holding that Section § 30-17, which prohibits out-of-state shippers from terminating a wholesaler's distributorship absent "just and sufficient cause" as determined by the Department following a hearing, "serves the equally important purpose of preventing out-of-state shippers from dominating Connecticut wholesalers"

    While these events could not control unequivocal language to the contrary, they are, under the circumstances of this case, strong indications of the legislative intent. Sullivan v. Town Council, 143 Conn. 280, 286, 121 A.2d 630 (1956). Finally, we turn back in time to 1971 when the General Assembly first passed what are now subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) of 30-17.

  6. Conto v. Zoning Commission

    186 Conn. 106 (Conn. 1982)   Cited 67 times
    In Conto v. Zoning Commission, supra, 186 Conn. 106, we held that the act of granting an application for a zoning permit for a permitted use under the applicable zoning regulations constituted an administrative act by the defendant zoning commission of the town of Washington.

    Section 8-10, originally adopted in 1953, has been construed several times by this court. We have stated that when that provision "is read in the light of its legislative history and policy it becomes abundantly clear that the legislative intent was to create a uniform right of appeal from every zoning board of appeals, zoning commission, planning and zoning commission or other final zoning authority in the state regardless of whether the commission was acting under the general enabling act or under the provisions of a special act. Sullivan v. Town Council, 143 Conn. 280, 286, 121 A.2d 630. `By adopting the provisions of 8-10 the legislature evidenced its intention to make the provisions of 8-8 and 8-9 applicable to every municipality in the state.' Puskarz v. Zoning Board of, Appeals, 155 Conn. 360, 365, 232 A.2d 109." Weigel v. Planning Zoning Commission, 160 Conn. 239, 249, 278 A.2d 766 (1971).

  7. Robinson v. Unemployment Security Board of Review

    181 Conn. 1 (Conn. 1980)   Cited 227 times

    It is recognized that the statement of the legislator who reported the bill out of committee carries particular weight and deserves careful consideration. See Sullivan v. Town Council, 143 Conn. 280, 287, 121 A.2d 630; see also New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission, 165 Conn. 687, 695, 345 A.2d 563. See generally, 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed.) 48.14.

  8. Zenga v. Zebrowski

    364 A.2d 213 (Conn. 1975)   Cited 17 times

    In approving or rejecting the action of the planning and zoning commission, the town council acts as a zoning authority and exercises its own independent judgment and discretion, and is not cabined to a judicial-type review of the commission's work. See Sullivan v. Town Council, 143 Conn. 280, 288, 121 A.2d 630; O'Meara v. Norwich, 167 Conn. 579, 583, 356 A.2d 906. Our decision in Burke v. Board of Representatives, supra, is dispositive, inasmuch as that case construed an act to which the special act in question here is identical in all key respects.

  9. Pizzola v. Planning Zoning Commission

    167 Conn. 202 (Conn. 1974)   Cited 139 times
    In Pizzolla, the applicant submitted a traffic report after the public hearing was closed, which was used in connection with the commission’s decision.

    What this court said in Raffia v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 151 Conn. 484, 486, 199 A.2d 333, is apt: "Unfortunately, the act appears to ignore the prior commendable legislative policy of effectuating uniformity and clarity amidst the confused pattern of general and special zoning legislation in Connecticut. Sullivan v. Town Council, 143 Conn. 280, 286, 121 A.2d 630." Nevertheless, the General Assembly, as it had the right to do, specifically granted to parties such as the plaintiffs appealing from the action of the Plainville zoning commission a longer time within which to bring their appeal than it allowed to appellants from zoning commissions generally.

  10. Miller v. Board of Education

    166 Conn. 189 (Conn. 1974)   Cited 40 times
    In Miller v. Board of Education, 166 Conn. 189, 191, 348 A.2d 584, where a teacher's contract of employment was terminated for cause, as is the case in the appeal now before us, we concluded that the right of appeal provided by subsection (f) [now (g)] of General Statutes 10-151 has been given by the General Assembly only "to teachers having tenure."

    " The statement of purpose appended to the bill read: "To clarify the right of tenure teachers to appeal to court for judicial review in cases of dismissal by local boards of education, and to provide for any such appeal to be heard as soon as practicable and at minimum expense by having such appeal taken in a manner similar to that prescribed in section 8-8 for zoning board decision appeals." The title of legislation When it is acted upon by the legislature is significant and often a valuable aid to construction; Sullivan v. Town Council, 143 Conn. 280, 287, 121 A.2d 630; Cedar Island Improvement Assn. v. Clinton Electric Light Power Co., 142 Conn. 359, 370, 114 A.2d 535; and the statement of purpose of a bill, on its introduction in the legislature, may be considered in determining its intent. Harris v. Planning Commission, 151 Conn. 95, 100, 193 A.2d 499.