Thus, in Matter of Bailey, 20 B.R. 906 (Bankr.W.D. Wis. 1982), an equitable lien was imposed in favor of a former wife on property set aside to the husband by an earlier divorce decree, where she had not yet quitclaimed her interest in the property when the husband filed bankruptcy still owing her a $23,100 property division payment which was a dischargeable debt. See also Sullivan v. Sullivan, 393 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. App. 1986) where a constructive trust was imposed on a lake cottage set aside to the husband after he defaulted on child support payments and the evidence "showed he had no intention of making any further support payments." Id. at 522.
The cases which have referred to these statute sections generally have been situations where a still living obligor has failed in meeting a maintenance or support obligation. Peterson v. Peterson, 304 Minn. 578, 231 N.W.2d 85 (1975); Zagar v. Zagar, 396 N.W.2d 98 (Minn.Ct.App. 1986); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 393 N.W.2d 521 (Minn.Ct.App. 1986). In those situations, the kind of "security" Steele espouses might be more appropriate.
See Kerr v. Kerr, 309 Minn. 124, 126, 243 N.W.2d 313, 314 (1976) ("property divisions are final and are not subject to modification except where they are the product of mistake or fraud"); Minn.Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2 (Supp. 1985) ("all divisions of real and personal property * * * shall be final, and may be revoked or modified only where the court finds the existence of conditions that justify reopening a judgment under the laws of this state"). Mary Coakley argues that the case of Sullivan v. Sullivan, 393 N.W.2d 521 (Minn.Ct.App. 1986) permits the reopening of a property settlement where the judgment expressly provides for it. In Sullivan, the original judgment included an order for child support and also stated that if the obligor chose to sell certain real estate he was to purchase life insurance for the child with the proceeds.
Gabrielson v. Gabrielson, 363 N.W.2d 814, 816 (Minn.Ct.App. 1985). See also Sullivan v. Sullivan, 393 N.W.2d 521 (Minn.Ct.App. 1986); Resch, 381 N.W.2d at 463. Appellant does not dispute the fact that he has failed to pay child support for a significant portion of time since the dissolution and stipulation.