Opinion
RE-2020-103
07-15-2022
MARTINA M. SULLIVAN, Plaintiff, v. OWEN HASKELL, INC., SAMUEL KILBOURN, NATHANIEL WARREN-WHITE, ELIZABETH WARREN-WHTE and SEBAGO TECHNICS, Defendants.
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS NATHANIEL AND ELIZABETH WARREN-WHITE'S RENEWED MOTION FOR SPICKLER ORDER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
MaryGay Kennedy, Justice
Before the Court is Defendants Nathaniel and Elizabeth Warren-White's ("the Warren-Whites") Renewed Motion for Spickler Order and Attorney's Fees. Plaintiff Martina Sullivan did not timely oppose the Motion. The Court previously declined to rule on the Warren-Whites' Motion pending Ms. Sullivan's appeal of the Court's June 14, 2021 Order dismissing her Complaint. On February 3, 2022, the Law Court affirmed the dismissal of Ms, Sullivan's Complaint. Sullivan v. Kilbourn, Mem-22-10 (Feb. 3, 2022). Accordingly, the Court is now prepared to rule on the Warren-Whites' Motion. For the following reasons, the Court grants the Warren-Whites' Motion.
I. Background
The history of this matter begins in 2015, when the Warren-Whites filed a complaint in a separate case to determine title to disputed property between Ms. Sullivan's and the Warren-Whites' respective homes. Judgment was entered in favor of the Warren-Whites in 2017. Ms. Sullivan appealed the 2017 judgment, and the Law Court upheld the judgment. Warren-White v. Sullivan, Mem-18-38 (May 3, 2018). Then, Ms. Sullivan filed two motions for relief from judgment, which were denied. Ms. Sullivan appealed again, and the Law Court affirmed the denial of her motion for relief from judgment. Warren-White v. Sullivan, Mem-20-27 (Mar. 5, 2020). Her subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied.
The Court may take judicial notice of its own records. See Spickler v. Key Bank of S. Me., 618 A.2d 204,207 (Me, 1992); Guardianship of Jewel M., 2010 ME 80, ¶ 24,2 A.3d 301.
In 2018, Ms. Sullivan filed a complaint against the Warren-Whites, alleging that the boundary line was mismarked in a survey completed following the 2017 judgment. Summary judgment was entered in favor of the Warren-Whites. Ms. Sullivan's first appeal was dismissed as interlocutory. After all claims were resolved, Ms. Sullivan appealed again, and the Law Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment. Sullivan v. Warren-White, Mem-21-62 (July 20, 2021). The Law Court stated:
[G]iven the history of this case, which has now come before us for decision four times in recent years, and given Sullivan's evident and expressed unwillingness to accept the settled judicial resolution of the boundary line between the parties' properties, we grant the Warren-Whites' motion for a Spickler order requiring Sullivan to obtain prior approval by a Superior Court justice for subsequent filings in the trial court relating to these parties and the subject matter of previous litigation between them.Id. It is unclear whether the Law Court intended its ruling to apply only to filings made in previously docketed cases, or whether it intended its Spickler ruling to also apply to future lawsuits, including the present case.
This action, initiated by Ms. Sullivan in 2020, is the third suit regarding the boundary between Ms. Sullivan's and the Warren-Whites' properties. Ms. Sullivan's Complaint, now dismissed, alleged that the Warren-Whites and remaining Defendants colluded to obtain Ms. Sullivan's property through fraud. On June 14, 2021, this Court dismissed the Complaint with prejudice on the basis that Ms. Sullivan's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Ms. Sullivan filed a motion for reconsideration, and, subsequently, a notice of appeal. This Court denied the motion for reconsideration.
Ms. Sullivan's appeal of the Court's June 14, 2021 Order marked her fifth appeal in these actions. Sullivan, Mem-22-10 (Feb. 3,2022). The Law Court, affirming this Court's dismissal of the Complaint, noted:
We take allegations of fraud very seriously, but this is another meritless attempt to relitigate issues that have already been fully litigated and decided. "'The law abhors fraud.... It also abhors interminable litigation.'" Bean v. Cummings, 2008 ME 18, ¶ 12, 939 A.2d 676 (quoting Cole v. Chellis, 122 Me. 262, 264,199 A. 623, 724 (1923)).Id. Indeed, the Law Court characterized the boundary issue at the center of this action as "beyond dispute." Id.
Because of Ms. Sullivan's repetitive filings and numerous attempts to relitigate long-settled issues, the Warren-Whites filed the pending motion. They request an order requiring Ms. Sullivan to obtain the Court's approval before acceptance for filing of future complaints or other filings in this or any other action relating to the boundary dispute between Ms. Sullivan and the Warren-Whites.
IL Spickler Standard
"It is well-settled that a court may enjoin a party from filing frivolous and vexatious lawsuits." Spickler, 618 A.2d at 207. Pursuant to Spickler v. Key Bank of Southern Maine, a court may grant an injunction requiring a party to obtain prior approval of the court before acceptance of a filing. Id. To obtain a Spickler injunction, the moving party "must make a detailed showing of a pattern of abusive and frivolous litigation." Id. The injunction should "sweep [] no broader than necessary to protect the [moving party] from frivolous litigation." Id.
III. Discussion
A. Jurisdiction
The Warren-Whites filed their Renewed Motion for Spickler Order after entry of final judgment and after Ms. Sullivan filed a notice of appeal. Although the parties did not raise the issue, the Court acknowledges that the entry of final judgment generates a question as to the Court's jurisdiction at this stage to grant a Spickler order.
Although entry of final judgment "closes" a case and generally divests the Court of its jurisdiction to rule on the subject matter of the case, neither the entry of final judgment nor disposition of an appeal immediately divests the Court of its authority to deal with other collateral matters. For example, the Court retains jurisdiction over the taxation of costs pursuant to M.R Civ. P. 54(e) (after appeal) and award of attorney's fees (during the pendency of or after appeal). See Cheoros v. Cheoros, 1997 ME 37, ¶ 3,690 A.2d 974 ("The rule provides that the motion for attorney fees may be filed at 'any time' after entry of the judgment, and the rule does not contain as a necessary condition that the Law Court remand the case or give the Superior Court explicit directions in order for the Superior Court to retain jurisdiction."); Flaherty v. Muther, 2011 ME 34, ¶ 10,17 A.3d 663 ("To be clear, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(3), the trial court may act on a post-judgment motion for attorney fees pursuant to Rule 37(c) after an appeal has been filed."). The Court may also hold contempt proceedings post-judgment. See M.R. Civ. P. 66.
The United States Supreme Court has concluded that federal district courts have jurisdiction to consider post-judgment motions for attorney's fees and costs because such motions are "independent" from the original proceedings and do not seek to impermissibly reopen the underlying judgment. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161,170, (1939); White v. N.H. Dep't of Emp. Sec., 455 U.S. 445,451, n.13, (1982) (discussing Sprague).
It follows that the Court retains jurisdiction to sanction parties for abuse of the litigation process by means other than an award of attorney's fees or contempt proceedings. See Town of Arundel v. Dubois Livestock, Inc., 2019 ME 104, ¶ 11, 211 A.3d 202 (suggesting that, when a vexatious litigant continues to file post-judgment motions, a court may properly enter a vexatious litigant order after entry of final judgment); Chiapetta v. LeBlond, 544 A.2d 759, 760 (Me. 1988) ("[T]he trial court does possess inherent authority to sanction parties for abuse of the litigation process."); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c) advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment ("The time when sanctions are to be imposed rests in the discretion of the trial judge. However, it is anticipated that in the case of pleadings the sanctions issue under Rule 11 normally will be determined at the end of the litigation.")
Particularly where, as here, the filing of repetitive and meritless motions and appeals continues after entry of final judgment, a post-judgment Spickler order is appropriate. See Town of Arundel, 2019 ME 104, ¶ 11, 211 A.3d 202; McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 803 F.2d 1197, 1201, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (upholding district court's post-judgment imposition of sanctions based on sanctioned party's filing of four frivolous post-judgment motions). Delaying entry of a Spickler order until the parties are once again before the Court in another case would needlessly result in further expenditure of the Court's and the Warren-Whites' resources.
B. Spickler Order
Over the span of several years, Ms. Sullivan has repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to relitigate the long-settled boundary dispute between herself and the Warren-Whites. Within three separate actions (two of which were filed by Ms. Sullivan), she has filed numerous unsuccessful and meritless complaints and counterclaims, appeals, motions for relief from judgment, and motions for reconsideration (which often did not comply with M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(5)). At several junctures, this Court and the Law Court have informed Ms. Sullivan that her claims have no legal merit, and that, if she persists in filing repetitive and groundless motions, the Court may impose sanctions.
The Warren-Whites have made a detailed showing of a pattern of abusive and frivolous filings by Ms. Sullivan. The history of the litigation between Ms. Sullivan and the Warren-Whites suggests that, if the Court does not enter a Spickler order, Ms. Sullivan will continue to attempt to relitigate the boundary dispute between the parties. Accordingly, the Court finds that injunctive relief is appropriate. Ms. Sullivan is enjoined from filing further complaints, motions, pleadings, or other filings regarding the boundary between the Warren-Whites' and Ms. Sullivan's respective properties without prior approval of the Court.
C. Attorney's Fees
The Warren-Whites also seek to recover their attorney's fees. Considering Ms. Sullivan's conduct in this case (as well as others), which necessitated the Warren-Whites' filing of this motion, the Court will award the Warren-Whites their reasonable attorney's fees incurred in filing the Renewed Motion for Spickler Order upon submission of a fee affidavit.
IV. Conclusion
The entry is:
1. Defendants Nathaniel and Elizabeth Warren-Whites' Renewed Motion for Spickler Order is GRANTED. Plaintiff Martina Sullivan is ENJOINED from filing further complaints, motions, pleadings, or other filings regarding the boundary between the Warren-Whites' and Ms. Sullivan's respective properties without prior approval of the Court. Before acceptance for filing, the Court will examine any such filing submitted by Ms. Sullivan to determine whether it is frivolous or vexatious; and
2. Ms. Sullivan shall pay the Warren-Whites their reasonable attorney's fees incurred in preparing and filing the Renewed Motion for Spickler Order in an amount to be determined by the Court upon receipt of an attorney's fee affidavit. The Warren-Whites may submit a fee affidavit within ten days of the date of this order. Ms. Sullivan will have ten days thereafter to respond only to the reasonableness of the fees in the affidavit. The Spickler Order will not apply for the purposes of Ms. Sullivan's response to the fee affidavit, only.
The Clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a).