Opinion
8:23-CV-02288-CEH-AAS
07-24-2024
CAROLINE STARR SULLIVAN, Plaintiff, v. MARTIN O'MALLEY, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,[1] Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AMANDA ARNOLD SANSONE, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Caroline Starr Sullivan requests judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denying her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB). After reviewing the record, including the transcript of the proceedings before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the administrative record, the pleadings, and the parties' memoranda, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ms. Sullivan applied for DIB on July 14, 2021, with an alleged disability onset date of February 10, 2021. (Tr. 18). Ms. Sullivan later amended her disability onset date to October 24, 2021. (Tr. 204). The Social Security Administration denied Ms. Sullivan's application initially and after reconsideration. (Tr. 57-77). At Ms. Sullivan's request, the ALJ held a hearing on May 23, 2023. (Tr. 32-56). On June 1, 2023, issued a decision finding Ms. Sullivan not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Tr. 18 26). The Appeals Council denied Ms. Sullivan's request for review, making the ALJ's decision final. (Tr. 1-3). Ms. Sullivan now requests judicial review of the Commissioner's decision. (Doc. 1).
II. NATURE OF DISABILITY CLAIM
A. Background
Ms. Sullivan was 60 years old on her amended alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 188, 375). Ms. Sullivan has a high school education and past relevant work experience as a school secretary. (Tr. 25). Ms. Sullivan alleged disability due to diabetes, arthritis, and impairments in her neck and low back. (Tr. 206).
B. Summary of the Decision
The ALJ must follow five steps when evaluating a claim for disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a). First, if a claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, if a claimant has no impairment or combination of impairments significantly limiting her physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities, she has no severe impairment and is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Third, if a claimant's impairments fail to meet or equal an impairment in the Listings, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Fourth, if a claimant's impairments do not prevent her from performing her past relevant work, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). At this fourth step, the ALJ determines the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). Fifth, if a claimant's impairments (considering her RFC, age, education, and past work experience) do not prevent her from performing work that exists in the national economy, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g).
If the ALJ determines the claimant is disabled at any step of the sequential analysis, the analysis ends. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
Substantial gainful activity is paid work that requires significant physical or mental activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572.
The ALJ determined Ms. Sullivan had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 24, 2021, the amended alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 20). The ALJ found Ms. Sullivan has the severe impairment of degenerative disc disease. (Id.). However, the ALJ concluded Ms. Sullivan's impairment or combination of impairments failed to meet or medically equal the severity of an impairment in the Listings. (Tr. 21).
The ALJ found Ms. Sullivan had an RFC to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a). (Tr. 22). Specifically,
“Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.” 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a).
[Ms. Sullivan] can lift and carry up to 10 pounds occasionally and lesser amounts frequently, sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour day, and stand and/or walk occasionally. [Ms. Sullivan] can never climb ladders, ropes of scaffolds, and she can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. [Ms. Sullivan] can have no exposure to work hazards.(Id.).
Based on these findings and the testimony of the vocational expert (VE) the ALJ determined Ms. Sullivan could perform past relevant work as a school secretary (General Clerk, according to the VE). (Tr. 25). As a result, the ALJ found Ms. Sullivan was not disabled from October 24, 2021, the amended alleged disability onset date, through June 1, 2023, the date of the decision. (Tr. 26).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Review of the ALJ's decision is limited to reviewing whether the ALJ applied correct legal standards and whether substantial evidence supports his findings. McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. Dale v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In other words, there must be sufficient evidence for a reasonable person to accept as enough to support the conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court recently explained, “whatever the meaning of ‘substantial' in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148 (2019).
A reviewing court must affirm a decision supported by substantial evidence “even if the proof preponderates against it.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The court must not make new factual determinations, reweigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for the Commissioner's decision. Id. at 1240 (citation omitted). Instead, the court must view the whole record, considering evidence favorable and unfavorable to the Commissioner's decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; see also Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) (stating that the reviewing court must scrutinize the entire record to determine the reasonableness of the Commissioner's factual determinations).
B. Issue on Appeal
Ms. Sullivan raises one issue on appeal: whether the ALJ properly considered Ms. Sullivan's subjective complaints and adequately developed the medical record in reaching Ms. Sullivan's RFC. (Doc. 12, pp. 6-11; Doc. 17, pp. 1-3). The Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly considered the record evidence in evaluating Ms. Sullivan's impairments, including her subjective complaints, and the ALJ's RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 16, pp. 6-10).
At step four of the sequential process, the ALJ evaluates a claimant's RFC and ability to return to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Courts have described an RFC as “a medical assessment of what the claimant can do in a work setting despite any mental, physical or environmental limitations caused by the claimant's impairments and related symptoms.” Watkins v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 457 Fed.Appx. 868, 870 n.5 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Limitations are divided into three categories: (1) exertional limitations that impact the ability to perform the strength demands of a job, i.e., sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing or pulling; (2) non-exertional limitations that impact the ability to meet non-strength job demands, i.e., tolerating dust and fumes, appropriately responding to supervision, co-workers and work pressure, and difficulty performing manipulative or postural functions of jobs; and (3) a combination of exertional and non-exertional limitations. Baker v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 384 Fed.Appx. 893, 894 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a(b)-(d)). When determining a claimant's RFC, the ALJ must consider “all the relevant medical and other evidence.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238.
As part of formulating the RFC, the ALJ must evaluate a claimant's subjective complaints, for which the Eleventh Circuit has established a three-part standard of evaluation. Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). Under the Eleventh Circuit's standard, the claimant must show: (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition, and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged symptoms or the restriction arising from them, or (3) that the objectively determined medical condition is such that it can reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed restriction. Id. Under the applicable regulations, the ALJ must consider “all evidence, including subjective statements about the intensity, persistence, and functionally limiting effects of pain [as well as] the objective medical evidence, laboratory findings and statements from treating or nontreating sources about how the symptoms affect the claimant in deciding the issue of disability.” Jarrell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 433 Fed.Appx. 812, 814 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4)).
The ALJ is not judging a claimant's credibility or character for truthfulness, but “whether the ‘individual's statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms are consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence of record.'” Hargress v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 883 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Social Security Ruling 16-3p, clarifies “that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual's character . . . [but rather is an evaluation of] the intensity and persistence of an individual's symptoms so we can determine how symptoms limit ability to perform work-related activities for an adult . . .” SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1020935, at *14167. A reviewing court will not disturb a clearly articulated finding on a claimant's subjective complaints supported by substantial evidence in the record. Mitchell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014).
The ALJ recognized his obligation to consider “all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence, based on the requirements of 20 C.F.R. 404.1529 and SSR 16-3p” and “the medical opinion(s) and prior administrative medical finding(s) in accordance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. 404.1520c.” (Tr. 22). After thoroughly evaluating the record, the ALJ found that while Ms. Sullivan's medically determinable impairments could “reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms,” her statements about the “intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms were not entirely consistent” with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Tr. 25). In doing so, the ALJ determined Ms. Sullivan could perform a reduced range of sedentary work. (Tr. 25).
In evaluating Ms. Sullivan's RFC, the ALJ articulated that Ms. Sullivan's reports of pain conflicted with generally benign physical examinations. (Id.). For example, in August 2021, about two months before the amended alleged disability onset date, Ms. Sullivan started a course of physical therapy for her low back pain. (Tr. 430-34). Ms. Sullivan reported “excellent benefit” from the physical therapy. (Tr. 375, 497). On discharge in October 2021, Ms. Sullivan was “able to perform ADLs [activities of daily living] without modifications or pain.” (Tr. 497). In addition, Ms. Sullivan's physical therapy discharge summary indicates she “appear[ed] motivated and completed exercises with no complaints of pain.” (Tr. 420-43).
Ms. Sullivan began a second round of physical therapy in February 2022. (Tr. 411-15). Again, Ms. Sullivan made “excellent progress” and was “much better” on discharge. (Tr. 382). Ms. Sullivan stated she was “feeling good and . . . [had] returned to her goal of walking [with] minimal limitations.” (Tr. 381). Later in the year, Ms. Sullivan's primary care physician noted her back pain had “improve[d] with [] meloxicam.” (Tr. 520). In March 2023, Ms. Sullivan reported pain in the lumbar spine, but examination findings were normal, including normal gait and neurological findings. (Tr. 585).
As the ALJ noted, “[n]one of [Ms. Sullivan's] treating providers recommended surgical intervention, and the medical record indicates that her pain has been generally managed with physical therapy and medications.” (Tr. 24). In addition, two state agency consultants reviewed Ms. Sullivan's medical records-Dr. Nick Ghaphery in October 2022 and Dr. Stacie Well in January 2023. (Tr. 66-68, 73-76). Both state agency consultants found Ms. Sullivan could perform a range of light work despite her impairments. (Id.).
The ALJ deemed the state agency consultants' opinions “partially persuasive” because the ALJ determined Ms. Sullivan's RFC was even more limited than the state agency consultants opined. (Tr. 22).
Ms. Sullivan argues her job as a school secretary/general clerk requires her to lift and carry children, a duty which she claims exceed her physical capabilities. (Tr. 44). The ALJ, however, determined the duties of a school secretary do not typically include lifting and carrying children. (Tr. 26). The VE testified Ms. Sullivan's past relevant work as a school secretary was classified under the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) as a general clerk, DOT code 209.562-010, which is categorized as light work with an SVP [Special Vocational Preparation] ¶ 3, but sedentary as actually performed by Ms. Sullivan. (Tr. 25). The ALJ considered the VE's testimony and Ms. Sullivan's own description of her job duties, which included office tasks such as answering phones, managing supplies, and maintaining records, and stated those duties were consistent with sedentary work and did not involve the physical demands claimed by Ms. Sullivan. (Tr. 298). In addition, Ms. Sullivan's written descriptions of her job did not support her hearing testimony about lifting children in the scope of her employment. (Tr. 26).
The ALJ thoroughly considered the medical evidence and Ms. Sullivan's subjective complaints and found Ms. Sullivan had the RFC to perform sedentary work with additional exertional limitations. (See Tr. 22-25). Based on the VE's testimony, the ALJ determined Ms. Sullivan could perform her past relevant work as a school secretary/general clerk as it was actually performed. (Tr. 25-26). Thus, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision that Ms. Sullivan was not disabled.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED, and the Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment for the Commissioner and close the case.
NOTICE TO PARTIES
The parties have fourteen days from the date they are served a copy of this report to file written objections to this report's proposed findings and recommendations or to seek an extension of the fourteen-day deadline to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 11th Cir. R. 3-1. A party's failure to object timely under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives that party's right to challenge on appeal the district court's order adopting this report's unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions. 11th Cir. R. 3-1.