Sullivan v. Midlothian Park Dist

72 Citing cases

  1. Poliny v. Soto

    178 Ill. App. 3d 203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 4 times

    Plaintiff contends that section 9-103 "fosters irresponsibility in government by allowing a local public entity to determine for itself whether or not it will waive its defenses and immunities on which Defendants rely," and thereby creates an unconstitutional classification of plaintiffs, i.e., "those who fortuitously find a remedy because their injury is inflicted by an employee of an insured entity, and those who, as with Plaintiff herein, find themselves facing an uninsured, and therefore, immune Defendant." Our supreme court rejected a similar argument in Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District (1972), 51 Ill.2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659. There, the court, in finding that section 9-103(b) (now section 9-103(c)) was not special legislation violative of section 22 of article IV of the Constitution of 1870, stated: "Section 9-103(b) is * * * applicable to all local public entities who elect to avail themselves of its provisions and obviously is the method selected by the General Assembly to enable the governmental units to which it applies to shift the risk of loss to an insurance carrier.

  2. Adams v. City of Peoria

    77 Ill. App. 3d 683 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 9 times
    Sustaining validity of Tort Immunity Act

    ) Further, subsequent to January 1, 1972 (the day article XIII, section 4, became effective), the courts of this State have considered numerous cases involving various provisions of the Tort Immunity Act and none have suggested that the Act might be violative of the constitutional proscription of sovereign immunity. (See, e.g., Tanari v. School Directors (1977), 69 Ill.2d 630, 373 N.E.2d 5; Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District (1972), 51 Ill.2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659; Hannon v. Counihan (1977), 54 Ill. App.3d 509, 369 N.E.2d 917.) We believe the draftees of the 1970 Constitution did not intend, nor have the courts of this State interpreted, the abolition of sovereign immunity to constitute an abolition of the protections provided local public entities and employees by the Tort Immunity Act.

  3. Hintz v. Jamison

    743 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1984)   Cited 4 times

    Finally, Section 9-103(c), which states that any insurance policy must waive the insurance company's right to refuse payment because of the "non-liability of the insured public entity . . . and its immunity from suit by reason of the defenses and immunities provided in this Act," has been interpreted by Illinois courts to provide that procuring insurance waives a public body's immunity. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District, 51 Ill.2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659 (1972). Dix Township has an insurance policy that conforms to Section 9-103's requirements.

  4. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. the County of Cook

    191 Ill. 2d 493 (Ill. 2000)   Cited 302 times
    Holding defendant waived ยง 2-202 affirmative defense

    We conclude that plaintiff's argument lacks merit. This court has previously rejected a similar argument in Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District, 51 Ill.2d 274 (1972). There, the plaintiff appealed the trial court's dismissal of its complaint on the basis of the Tort Immunity Act, arguing that the immunity afforded municipal agencies under the Act violated section 19 of article II of the Illinois Constitution of 1870, the predecessor provision to article I, section 12, of the 1970 Constitution.

  5. Best v. Taylor Machine Works

    179 Ill. 2d 367 (Ill. 1997)   Cited 410 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that statutory cap on noneconomic damages was unconstitutional, in part because cap infringed on judicial power of remittitur

    We acknowledge that the certain remedy provision has been referred to in general as a statement of philosophy rather than a guarantee of a specific remedy. See Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District, 51 Ill.2d 274, 277 (1972). Nonetheless, we believe that a statement of "constitutional philosophy" is reflective of the strong public policy that was recognized in Petrillo.

  6. Schoeberlein v. Purdue University

    129 Ill. 2d 372 (Ill. 1989)   Cited 31 times
    Holding comity was appropriate when the forum state could not be sued under its laws in similar circumstances and application of a sister state's law was consistent with Illinois policies

    Nevertheless, we have held that this constitutional provision merely expresses a philosophy, and does not mandate a certain remedy be provided in any specific form. ( Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District (1972), 51 Ill.2d 274, 277.) Consequently, it is not violative of this aspirational goal to limit or restrict available remedies.

  7. Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority

    125 Ill. 2d 230 (Ill. 1988)   Cited 59 times
    Upholding constitutionality of immunity for a transit authority for failure to protect against criminal acts of third parties

    Consistent with this, the "certain remedy" provision has been interpreted as an expression of political philosophy rather than as a specific mandate that the legislature preserve a particular remedy in its existing form. ( Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District (1972), 51 Ill.2d 274, 277.) This court has held that the "certain remedy" provision does not prevent the legislature from elevating the standard of care for tort liability from ordinary negligence to wilful and wanton negligence ( Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District (1972), 51 Ill.2d 274; Clarke v. Storchak (1943), 384 Ill. 564), or from restricting the type or amount of damages a party may recover ( Siegall v. Solomon (1960), 19 Ill.2d 145; Smith v. Hill (1958), 12 Ill.2d 588).

  8. Mega v. Holy Cross Hospital

    111 Ill. 2d 416 (Ill. 1986)   Cited 111 times
    In Mega, the legislature enacted a new four-year repose period more than four years after the events giving rise to the cause of action.

    The discovery rule is not required by the "certain remedy" provision of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 12). The corresponding provision in the previous constitution (see Ill. Const. 1870, art. II, sec. 19) was interpreted as "an expression of a philosophy and not a mandate that a `certain remedy' be provided in any specific form or that the nature of the proof necessary to the award of a judgment or decree continue without modification" ( Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District (1972), 51 Ill.2d 274, 277), and that interpretation has been given to the current provision as well ( People v. Dowery (1975), 62 Ill.2d 200, 207-08; see Pierce v. Board of Education (1977), 69 Ill.2d 89, 92-93). Although the "certain remedy" provision has been held to prohibit the abolition by the legislature of a particular cause of action ( Heck v. Schupp (1946), 394 Ill. 296 (holding unconstitutional a statute barring civil actions based on alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and breach of promise to marry)), it has not been held to prohibit statutes that restrict the amount or type of damages recoverable ( Siegall v. Solomon (1960), 19 Ill.2d 145; Smith v. Hill (1958), 12 Ill.2d 588) or that require proof of wilful and wanton misconduct rather than simple negligence ( Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District (1972), 51 Ill.2d 274, 277-78; Clarke v. Storchak (1943), 384 Ill. 564).

  9. Angelini v. Snow

    58 Ill. App. 3d 116 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)   Cited 28 times
    Indicating that state intermediate reviewing courts are bound by their supreme court

    (See Ill. Ann. Stat., 1970 Const., art. I, ยง 12, Constitutional Commentary, at 556 (Smith-Hurd 1971).) This change has had, and was meant to have, no substantive effect on Illinois law. (See People v. Dowery (1975), 62 Ill.2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529; Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District (1972), 51 Ill.2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659; Gertz, Hortatory Language in the Preamble and Bill of Rights of the 1970 Constitution, 6 J. Mar. J. of Prac. Proc. 217, 223-27 (1973).) It created no new constitutional right.

  10. Kriger v. South Oakland County Mutual Aid Pact

    49 Mich. App. 7 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 24 times
    In Kriger the Legislature, in its effort to cure the title-object defect, not only amended the title but also re-enacted and published the section of the act which had been the source of the problem.

    Courts in other jurisdictions have summarily dismissed similar equal protection claims. Cf. Hall v Powers, 6 Pa Commonwealth 544; 296 A.2d 535 (1972); Sullivan v Midlothian Park District, 51 Ill.2d 274; 281 N.E.2d 659 (1972); Lewis v City and County of San Francisco, 21 Cal.App.3d 339; 98 Cal.Rptr. 407 (1971); Flournoy v State, 230 Cal.App. 520; 41 Cal.Rptr. 190 (1964); Hayes v State, 231 Cal.App. 48; 41 Cal.Rptr. 502 (1964). Plaintiff relies on Krause v State, 28 Ohio App.2d 1; 274 N.E.2d 321 (1971), and cases cited therein.