Plaintiff contends that section 9-103 "fosters irresponsibility in government by allowing a local public entity to determine for itself whether or not it will waive its defenses and immunities on which Defendants rely," and thereby creates an unconstitutional classification of plaintiffs, i.e., "those who fortuitously find a remedy because their injury is inflicted by an employee of an insured entity, and those who, as with Plaintiff herein, find themselves facing an uninsured, and therefore, immune Defendant." Our supreme court rejected a similar argument in Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District (1972), 51 Ill.2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659. There, the court, in finding that section 9-103(b) (now section 9-103(c)) was not special legislation violative of section 22 of article IV of the Constitution of 1870, stated: "Section 9-103(b) is * * * applicable to all local public entities who elect to avail themselves of its provisions and obviously is the method selected by the General Assembly to enable the governmental units to which it applies to shift the risk of loss to an insurance carrier.

) Further, subsequent to January 1, 1972 (the day article XIII, section 4, became effective), the courts of this State have considered numerous cases involving various provisions of the Tort Immunity Act and none have suggested that the Act might be violative of the constitutional proscription of sovereign immunity. (See, e.g., Tanari v. School Directors (1977), 69 Ill.2d 630, 373 N.E.2d 5; Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District (1972), 51 Ill.2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659; Hannon v. Counihan (1977), 54 Ill. App.3d 509, 369 N.E.2d 917.) We believe the draftees of the 1970 Constitution did not intend, nor have the courts of this State interpreted, the abolition of sovereign immunity to constitute an abolition of the protections provided local public entities and employees by the Tort Immunity Act.

Finally, Section 9-103(c), which states that any insurance policy must waive the insurance company's right to refuse payment because of the "non-liability of the insured public entity . . . and its immunity from suit by reason of the defenses and immunities provided in this Act," has been interpreted by Illinois courts to provide that procuring insurance waives a public body's immunity. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District, 51 Ill.2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659 (1972). Dix Township has an insurance policy that conforms to Section 9-103's requirements.

We conclude that plaintiff's argument lacks merit. This court has previously rejected a similar argument in Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District, 51 Ill.2d 274 (1972). There, the plaintiff appealed the trial court's dismissal of its complaint on the basis of the Tort Immunity Act, arguing that the immunity afforded municipal agencies under the Act violated section 19 of article II of the Illinois Constitution of 1870, the predecessor provision to article I, section 12, of the 1970 Constitution.

We acknowledge that the certain remedy provision has been referred to in general as a statement of philosophy rather than a guarantee of a specific remedy. See Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District, 51 Ill.2d 274, 277 (1972). Nonetheless, we believe that a statement of "constitutional philosophy" is reflective of the strong public policy that was recognized in Petrillo.

Nevertheless, we have held that this constitutional provision merely expresses a philosophy, and does not mandate a certain remedy be provided in any specific form. ( Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District (1972), 51 Ill.2d 274, 277.) Consequently, it is not violative of this aspirational goal to limit or restrict available remedies.

Consistent with this, the "certain remedy" provision has been interpreted as an expression of political philosophy rather than as a specific mandate that the legislature preserve a particular remedy in its existing form. ( Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District (1972), 51 Ill.2d 274, 277.) This court has held that the "certain remedy" provision does not prevent the legislature from elevating the standard of care for tort liability from ordinary negligence to wilful and wanton negligence ( Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District (1972), 51 Ill.2d 274; Clarke v. Storchak (1943), 384 Ill. 564), or from restricting the type or amount of damages a party may recover ( Siegall v. Solomon (1960), 19 Ill.2d 145; Smith v. Hill (1958), 12 Ill.2d 588).

The discovery rule is not required by the "certain remedy" provision of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 12). The corresponding provision in the previous constitution (see Ill. Const. 1870, art. II, sec. 19) was interpreted as "an expression of a philosophy and not a mandate that a `certain remedy' be provided in any specific form or that the nature of the proof necessary to the award of a judgment or decree continue without modification" ( Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District (1972), 51 Ill.2d 274, 277), and that interpretation has been given to the current provision as well ( People v. Dowery (1975), 62 Ill.2d 200, 207-08; see Pierce v. Board of Education (1977), 69 Ill.2d 89, 92-93). Although the "certain remedy" provision has been held to prohibit the abolition by the legislature of a particular cause of action ( Heck v. Schupp (1946), 394 Ill. 296 (holding unconstitutional a statute barring civil actions based on alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and breach of promise to marry)), it has not been held to prohibit statutes that restrict the amount or type of damages recoverable ( Siegall v. Solomon (1960), 19 Ill.2d 145; Smith v. Hill (1958), 12 Ill.2d 588) or that require proof of wilful and wanton misconduct rather than simple negligence ( Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District (1972), 51 Ill.2d 274, 277-78; Clarke v. Storchak (1943), 384 Ill. 564).

(See Ill. Ann. Stat., 1970 Const., art. I, § 12, Constitutional Commentary, at 556 (Smith-Hurd 1971).) This change has had, and was meant to have, no substantive effect on Illinois law. (See People v. Dowery (1975), 62 Ill.2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529; Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District (1972), 51 Ill.2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659; Gertz, Hortatory Language in the Preamble and Bill of Rights of the 1970 Constitution, 6 J. Mar. J. of Prac. Proc. 217, 223-27 (1973).) It created no new constitutional right.

Courts in other jurisdictions have summarily dismissed similar equal protection claims. Cf. Hall v Powers, 6 Pa Commonwealth 544; 296 A.2d 535 (1972); Sullivan v Midlothian Park District, 51 Ill.2d 274; 281 N.E.2d 659 (1972); Lewis v City and County of San Francisco, 21 Cal.App.3d 339; 98 Cal.Rptr. 407 (1971); Flournoy v State, 230 Cal.App. 520; 41 Cal.Rptr. 190 (1964); Hayes v State, 231 Cal.App. 48; 41 Cal.Rptr. 502 (1964). Plaintiff relies on Krause v State, 28 Ohio App.2d 1; 274 N.E.2d 321 (1971), and cases cited therein.