Summary
In Sullivan v. Jennings, 44 N.J. Eq. 11, it was held that this court has no right to restrain by injunction a sale under execution at law on the ground that the lien of the judgment is invalid.
Summary of this case from Majewski v. GreenbergOpinion
05-16-1888
SULLIVAN et al. v. JENNINGS et al.
J. Herbert Potts, for the application. Mr. Riker, contra.
On rule to show cause why David C. Smith, a purchaser at a foreclosure sale, should not be required to pay the amount of his bid.
J. Herbert Potts, for the application. Mr. Riker, contra.
MCGILL, Ch. The defendant Ella C. Jennings owned a tract of land in Essex county, which was subject, first, to a mortgage for $1,800, held by a physician, David C. Smith; and, second, to a mortgage for $2,000, held by the complainants; and then to two judgments for amounts aggregating $400. Upon the land there was a green-house, a wind-mill, and a water-tank house, upon which the complainants held, and yet hold, a chattel mortgage for $1,050. The complainants filed their bill to foreclose their mortgage for $2,000. They made the holders of the judgments, and the owner of the land and her husband, parties to the suit. Dr. Smith was not made a party, and no reference was made to the chattel mortgage. The mortgaged premises were sold in pursuance of the decree in the suit, subject to Dr. Smith's mortgage, and to whatever claim the complainants may have under their chattel mortgage. At the time of the sale. Dr. Smith had but little knowledge of legal matters, and was so self-reliant that he failed to take advice, and concluded to bid at the sale, for the purpose, he thought, of protecting his mortgage. As the sale was postponed from time to time, and he could not spare sufficient time to attend upon it, he authorized the under-sheriff, who had the sale in charge, to bid for the property, in his name, an amount not exceeding $2,500. He had calculated that that sum would pay the expenses of the sale, and protect his mortgage. The property was struck down to him for $2,350. The sum bid will not quite satisfy the decree of the complainants, and Dr. Smith, if he shall be held to his bid, must pay nearly $4,500 for land which is proved to be worth about $1,000 less than that sum, and to take it either without the green-house, wind-mill, and water-tank house, which are covered by the chattel mortgage, or contest the lien of that mortgage, or satisfy it. The complainants seek to take advantage of the mistake that Dr. Smith so carelessly made, and claim that it is one of well-settled law, against which this court will not relieve.
I fail to perceive any ground upon which I could relieve Dr. Smith from his bid if he were the applicant before me. To use the words of the vice-chancellor in Hayes v. Stiger, 29 N. J. Eq. 198, "A purchaser at a judicial sale who voluntarily abstains from all effort to get correct information, and deliberately assumes the hazard of making a purchase ignorantly, must, as a general rule, bear the consequences of his own negligence." But the complainants are the applicants. They did not make Dr. Smith a party to their foreclosure. They are the holders of the chattel mortgage, against which the doctor may be compelled to pay more for the property than it is worth, not because of any equity in their favor, but because he has placed himself under legal obligation to pay it, and because the payment will redound to their advantage. The specific performance of an agreement rests in the sound discretion of the court. It is a matter of favor, not of right. To secure the court's favor the agreement should be just, equal, and agreeable to good conscience, and not a catching bargain. The contract here is not such an agreement. It is not conscionable, and should not be enforced in a court of equity. Crane v. Decamp, 21 N. J. Eq. 418. When Dr. Smith made his bid, he did not design to trifle with the court. I am satisfied that he intended in good faith to bid for protection of his interests, and that now he withholds the amount of his bid solely to obtain relief, if possible, from the consequences of his error. So far, then, as the element of contempt in the doctor's attitude is concerned, I fail to see that it is deserving of such punishment as the granting of this application will inflict. The parties should be left to their remedy and defense at law. I am guided to this conclusion by the action of the vice-chancellor in Twining v. Neil, 38 N. J. Eq. 471.
The order to show cause will be discharged, but without costs. The application will be denied, without costs.