Opinion
CV 02-217-BR, CV 02-224-BR
November 27, 2002
Jimmy Darl Sullivan, SID #7522238, Ontario, OR, Plaintiff Pro Se.
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Leonard Williamson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, OR, for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Snake River Correctional Institution (SRCI), brings these two civil rights actions pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
On May 15, 2002, this Court issued an Opinion and Order granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiff's claims against all but one Defendant, Captain Beacham. Currently before the Court is Captain Beacham's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Additional Evidence) — Qualified Immunity (#67). For the reasons that follow, Captain Beacham's Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This summary of facts is taken from the Opinion and Order issued by this Court on May 15, 2002, the Supplemental Materials to Defendants' Concise Statement of Facts in Support of Renewed Motion For Summary Judgment — Defendant Beacham, and Plaintiff's Affidavit submitted in response. Because the May 15, 2002, Opinion and Order included an extensive discussion of the facts underlying Plaintiff's claims, those facts will not be repeated here except as necessary.
In his Complaints, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment while Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution (EOCI). Following the May 15, 2002, Opinion and Order of this Court, the sole claim remaining is whether Captain Beacham violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect Plaintiff from an assault by fellow inmates.
Plaintiff was housed at EOCI from January 27, 1999, to November 30, 1999, and from January 26, 2000, to February 14, 2001. During those times, Captain Beacham was employed as a Correctional Captain at EOCI.
On September 20, 1999, corrections officers near a restroom in the F-3 housing unit at EOCI heard a noise. They investigated and discovered Plaintiff lying on the floor. The officers observed three other inmates in the restroom, all of whom denied any knowledge of what had occurred. One of the inmates, however, appeared nervous and later denied being in the restroom.
At the time of the incident, Plaintiff told Lt. Thomas Sampson he had fallen in the restroom and landed on the cement wall. Plaintiff repeated this version of events to the Health Services staff who responded at the restroom and again when he arrived at the infirmary for a physical examination. In fact, Plaintiff had been assaulted by another inmate. According to Defendants, however, Plaintiff did not report the assault until October 12, 1999.
Plaintiff contends he immediately complained of neck pain. The Health Services staff members' notes, however, do not reflect this. Defendants instead contend Plaintiff did not complain of neck pain until three days later.
Plaintiff alleges he talked to Captain Beacham before the assault and requested to be moved. Plaintiff states he spoke with Captain Beacham "several times" about his life being in danger, but Captain Beacham refused to move Plaintiff.
Defendants dispute Plaintiff's claims. Captain Beacham was the Officer in Charge of EOCI during the time in question, and he supervised staff and inmates throughout the facility. During his shift, he toured the entire facility. Captain Beacham recalls speaking to Plaintiff on one occasion while Plaintiff was in the Disciplinary Segregation Unit (DSU). He states Plaintiff was refusing to comply with staff orders at the time, and he encouraged Plaintiff to follow staff directives.
Captain Beacham does not recall ever speaking to Plaintiff about Plaintiff's concerns for his safety. If Plaintiff had reported his fears, Captain Beacham would have directed Plaintiff to speak to staff members who were supervising Plaintiff, including his housing unit Correctional Officer, Correctional Sergeant, or Correctional Lieutenant.
Plaintiff also alleges he filed a grievance against Captain Beacham after the incident, but Defendants dispute this as well. Captain Beacham states he does not recall Plaintiff filing a grievance against him while housed at EOCI nor does he remember responding to any grievance filed by Plaintiff.
Defendants unnecessarily provided copies of some 300 grievances filed by Plaintiff since April 23, 2000. As Defendants point out, however, grievances filed before that date have been purged and destroyed. Defendants would have no record, therefore, if Plaintiff had timely availed himself of the grievance procedure as he alleges.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) authorizes summary judgment if no genuine issue exists regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party must show an absence of an issue of material fact. Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir. 1992). In response to a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and show there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Evidence must be significantly probative to present a genuine issue of material fact. United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 809 (1989). When the nonmoving party's claims are factually implausible, that party must come forward with more persuasive evidence than otherwise would be required. Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Stanewich, 142 F.3d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
The substantive law governing a claim or defense determines whether a fact is material. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court must resolve against the moving party all reasonable doubts about whether issues of material fact exist, and the Court must view all inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. A mere disagreement about a material issue of fact does not preclude summary judgment. Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION I. Exhaustion of Remedies
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [ 42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandated regardless of the relief offered through the prison administrative procedures. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 1825 (2001). The requirement applies to all inmate actions arising from prison life whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S.Ct. 983, 988-89 (2002).
Despite Captain Beacham's argument to the contrary, § 1997e(a) does not impose a pleading requirement. Wyatt v. Terhune, 305 F.3d 1033, 1044 (9th Cir. 2002). As the Ninth Circuit recently reiterated, it "creates a defense — defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion." Id. (footnote omitted). Plaintiff asserts he pursued an administrative grievance against Captain Beacham, but he does not provide any evidence in support of his assertion. Captain Beacham, on the other hand, does not recall ever responding to a grievance from Plaintiff. Moreover, if a grievance had been filed by Plaintiff at or near the time of the September 20, 1999, assault, the institutional copies of the grievance would no longer exist.
On this record, the Court concludes a genuine issue of material fact exists as to exhaustion of administrative grievances. Accordingly, Captain Beacham is not entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
II. Relief on the Merits — Failure to Protect
"A prison official's `deliberate indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). "In particular . . . `prison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.'" Id. at 833 (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988)). In order to allege a claim under the Eighth Amendment for failure to protect, an inmate must show he is incarcerated under conditions that pose a substantial risk of serious harm and a particular defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
To demonstrate that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to the inmate's safety, the prisoner must show "the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [the official] must also draw that inference." Id. at 837. To prove knowledge of the risk, however, the prisoner may rely on circumstantial evidence. The obviousness of the risk may be sufficient to establish knowledge. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, "a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
"Nevertheless, the obviousness of a risk is not conclusive and a prison official may show that the obvious escaped him." Swan v. United States, 159 F. Supp.2d 1174, 1181-82 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842), aff'd, F.3d 2002 WL 463702 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2002).
As noted, Plaintiff asserts he "spoke to Cpt. Beacham several times about my life being in danger, and he still wouldn't move me." Plaintiff does not produce any other evidence of the content of his conversations with Defendant Beacham. Notably, Plaintiff does not allege he informed Defendant Beacham of specific threats to his safety nor identified any individual inmates who threatened him. There also is not any evidence from which the Court could find the existence of the risk should have been obvious to Captain Beacham: Captain Beacham denies any conversations with Plaintiff concerning fears for his safety and recalls only one conversation with Plaintiff in which Captain Beacham encouraged Plaintiff to cooperate with other security staff members.
The Court finds Plaintiff fails to present any evidence that Captain Beacham was deliberately indifferent to a serious threat of injury to Plaintiff. Accordingly, Captain Beacham is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim.
Because Plaintiff has not established any violation of a constitutional right, the Court need not adjudicate Captain Beacham's defense of qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533, U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant Captain Beacham's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Additional Evidence) — Qualified Immunity (#67). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this action with prejudice.IT IS SO ORDERED.