Opinion
No. 11–P–2095.
2012-08-10
Patricia A. SULLIVAN v. COMMERCE INSURANCE COMPANY.
By the Court (GRAINGER, BROWN & SULLIVAN, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
In this case, we review a decision and order of the Appellate Division of the District Court interpreting a release. The plaintiff, Patricia A. Sullivan, contends that despite having executed the release, she may maintain an action against Commerce Insurance Company (Commerce) for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, attorney's fees, and violations of G.L. c. 93A and G.L. c. 176D. We disagree and affirm the decision and order of the Appellate Division.
“[A] release may be prompted by the settlement of a specific dispute or resolution of a specific issue, but broad wording in the release operates to settle all other, unrelated matters, even if they were not specifically in the parties' minds at the time the release was executed.” Eck v. Godbout, 444 Mass. 724, 728 (2005), citing Schuster v. Baskin, 354 Mass. 137, 140 (1968). In the present case, the release between Sullivan and Commerce was both broad and explicit. By any definition the claims Sullivan now pursues were covered by the release's unambiguous language covering all “demands, actions, causes of action ... and any and all claims....” “If the parties intended that there be limitations or exceptions to the scope of the releases, then they should have so stated.” Atlas Tack Corp. v. Crosby, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 429, 433 (1996). Sullivan's argument that the PIP benefits are contractual and therefore not covered by the release, in reliance on the Appellate Division's decision in Galena v. Commerce Ins. Co., 2001 Mass.App. Div. 222 (2001), would be unavailing even if we were bound by the holding in that case. In Galena, the PIP insurer was not a party to the release, whereas here the PIP insurer was precisely that.
The Appellate Division did not err.
“A general release of a tortfeasor, in the absence of a specific provision which unequivocally includes PIP claims within the terms of the release, does not operate to release an automobile insurer from its obligation to pay PIP benefits to the injured victim” (emphasis added). Galena v. Commerce Ins. Co., 2001 Mass.App. Div. 222, 224 (2001), quoting from Cingoranelli v. St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 658 P.2d 863, 869 (Colo.1983).
Because we affirm the Appellate Division's ruling on PIP benefits, we need not reach the parties' other arguments.
Decision and order of Appellate Division affirmed.