Opinion
Civil Action 7:24-CV-0125
11-22-2024
WILLIAM JOSEPH SULLIVAN, Petitioner, v. TRACY BELTZ, WARDEN, et al., Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
J. SCOTT HACKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Recently, the Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation for the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 4). Plaintiff is currently serving a prison sentence in Minnesota on two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Through his original complaint, Plaintiff raised errors associated with his trial proceedings, seeking either a new trial or that his conviction be vacated. Because Plaintiff sought habeas corpus-type relief, however, the Magistrate Judge concluded that his claims were improper in the context of a civil rights action. (Id. at 4).
Rather than submit timely objections to the report and recommendation, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint after several months of inaction. (See Dkt. No. 8). Through his amended complaint, Plaintiff claims in part that various officials from the State of Minnesota violated his constitutional rights throughout his prosecution and trial. (Id. at 1-5). Plaintiff raises causes of action under Section 1983 for wrongful conviction and wrongful incarceration. (See id. at 4). In terms of relief, Plaintiff now seeks money damages of over $10 million. (Id at 6).
The document filed by Plaintiff is styled as a Motion to Add Defendants to Civil Case. (Dkt. No. 8 at 1). Because the motion functions as an amended complaint and leave to amend is not required, the Magistrate Judge construes the filing as an amended complaint. See Arredondo v. Moser, 2004 WL 2511349, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2004). Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend their pleadings once, as a matter of course, the earlier of 21 days after service of their pleadings or 21 days after service of a responsive pleading. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). Plaintiff has not previously amended his pleadings, and service has not yet been ordered.
Considering that Plaintiff is appearing in forma pauperis, his pleadings are subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”), which contemplates dismissal of a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii).
This case was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). After review of the record and the relevant law, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's amended claims be DISMISSED as frivolous or malicious or for the failure to state a claim.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was charged in Minnesota of committing two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. See Sullivan v. Beltz, 2023 WL 6620721, at *1 (D. Minn. July 27, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 6058889 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2023). The reported victim was Plaintiff's former wife, a citizen of China who has since returned to her home country. See id. at *2-3. In October 2016, Plaintiff was convicted upon a jury trial and sentenced to 180 months of imprisonment. Id. at*l.
Plaintiff filed a direct appeal, but his conviction and sentence were affirmed in April 2019. See id. at *2.
In January 2023, Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 before the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. Id. at * 1. Through that petition, Plaintiff sought relief from his conviction based in part on the inability of the defense to examine or cross-examine witnesses. See id. Plaintiff also raised a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. See id. at *3. The district court denied the petition, dismissing all of Plaintiffs claims on procedural grounds. See Sullivan v. Beltz, 2023 WL 6058889, at *2-3 (D. Minn. Sept. 18,2023).
Plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeal for the Eight Circuit, but in December 2023, the Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal upon denying Plaintiff a certificate of appealability. Sullivan v. Beltz, 2023 WL 10450665 (8th Cir. Dec. 5, 2023).
In March 2024, Plaintiff filed his original complaint in this case. (Dkt. No. 2). Submitted at the same time was a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (the “Petition”), which was filed as a separate action before this court, Sullivan v. Beltz, et al., Civil Action No. 7:24-CV-0126. Through both actions, Plaintiff raised similar claims to those raised in his prior habeas petition before the District of Minnesota. He also sought the same relief, i.e., re-trial or the vacating of his conviction.
On May 28, 2024, the Magistrate Judge issued the report and recommendation for the dismissal of Plaintiffs claims in this case. (Dkt. No. 4). In screening the complaint under the PLRA, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim insofar as he did not raise a proper cause of action. (Id. at 4-5). As the Magistrate Judge noted, habeas corpus-type relief in the form of a new trial or release from prison is not a proper remedy for purposes of a Section 1983 civil rights action. (Id. at 4 (citing Roberson v. Rowlett Police Dep't, 2018 WL 7048072, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 22, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 202331 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2019))). Plaintiff was advised that he had fourteen days to submit objections. (Id. at 5). No objections were filed within the relevant timeframe.
Rather, on November 4, 2024, the Clerk of Court received Plaintiffs amended complaint dated October 30, 2024. (Dkt. No. 8).
II. ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS
Through the amended complaint, Plaintiff claims that several judicial and prosecutorial officials violated his constitutional rights during his underlying criminal investigation, prosecution, and trial, including the trial prosecutor and trial judge. (Dkt. No. 8 at 1-2). Plaintiff complains of the incompetence of his court appointed trial and appellate attorneys. (Id. at 2-3). He claims that several private persons lied when testifying before the court or reporting the offense to law enforcement. (Id. at 3-6). These include the victim herself, “matchmakers” who introduced Plaintiff to the victim in China, doctors who conducted a rape exam on the victim, and personnel from a woman's shelter at which the victim seemingly sought aid. (Id. at 3-5). Plaintiff also complains that the Attorney General of Minnesota, his prison warden, and the federal judges from the District of Minnesota have all failed to accept his civil rights violations and act to rectify them. (Id. at 4-5). Plaintiff raises causes of action against the defendants under Section 1983 for wrongful conviction and wrongful incarceration. (Id. at 4). In terms of relief, Plaintiff seeks money damages totaling over $10 million. (Id., at 6).
The fact that that Plaintiff was ostensibly wronged outside the State of Texas, and that most of the named defendants are from Minnesota or otherwise have no apparent connection to Texas, raises questions as to this court's personal jurisdiction over those defendants. The status of many of the defendants as private individuals-rather than state actors or officials-raises questions as to the validity of suit under Section 1983. Raising further concern, based on the case of Heckv. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), is the circumstance that Plaintiff remains incarcerated pursuant to a conviction that has not been overturned.
HI. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Screening Under the PLRA
Section 1915(e)(2)(B) of the PLRA imposes a screening responsibility on the district court whenever a plaintiff is granted in forma pauperis status. Omran v. Wyche, 745 Fed.Appx. 225,226 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam); Womack v. Teleplan, 2003 WL 21289652, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). Such screening applies to prisoners and non-prisoners alike. Womack, 2003 WL 21289652, at *1 n.l (citing Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 231-33 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)). Pursuant to such screening under the PLRA, courts must identify and dismiss any claims that: (i) are frivolous or malicious; (ii) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A “frivolous” claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,31 (1992). A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if it alleges the violation of a legal interest that clearly does not exist. McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)) (quotations omitted). A claim is factually frivolous if the facts alleged are clearly baseless, which encompasses allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional. Denton, 504 U.S. at 3233 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 327, 328) (quotations omitted).
A dismissal under the PLRA for the failure to state a claim is governed by the same standard under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See DeMarco v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2019). When considering whether the plaintiff has adequately stated a claim on which relief can be granted, the court examines whether the complaint contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403,407 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009)) (quotations omitted). The court construes the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff, takes all facts pleaded in the complaint as true, and considers whether, with every doubt resolved on the plaintiff's behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief. Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gregson v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 2003)) (quotations omitted).
B. Personal Jurisdiction
“Personal jurisdiction refers to a court's power to exercise authority over a particular defendant, and that power is subject to various limitations.” Alexander v. Anheuser-Busch, L.L. C., 2021 WL 3439131, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2021) (per curiam). A federal district court “may only exercise personal jurisdiction if it is authorized to do so by law and such exercise does not violate the Constitution.” Burstein v. State Bar of Cal., 693 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1982). Insofar as Section 1983 “lacks a provision for service of process, federal courts adopt state jurisdictional statutes to reach out-of-state defendants.” Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d 476, 482 '(5th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted). In Texas, the relevant statute is referred to as the long-arm statute, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §§ 17.041, et seq. As for the constitutional inquiry, in federal question cases like this one, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment fixes the limits of personal jurisdiction. Magee v. BSN Sports, LLC, 2022 WL 3701627, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 8,2022) (citing Ins. Corp, of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3702035 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2022); see also Burstein, 693 F.2d at 514. Because the Texas long-arm statute is understood to extend to the limits of federal due process, the two-step jurisdictional analysis conflates into a single due process inquiry. See Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999).
Due process allows for personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant where (i) the defendant has purposefully availed themselves of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing “minimum contacts” with the forum state, and (ii) the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id. (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) (quotations omitted). The defendant's “minimum contacts” with the forum statue must be such that they should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)) (quotations omitted).
“Minimum contacts” are understood to give rise to two kinds of personal jurisdiction, that is, “specific” personal jurisdiction and “general” personal jurisdiction. Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 182 F.3d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1999). Specific personal jurisdiction is found “when the nonresident's contacts with the forum state arise from or are directly related to the cause of action.” Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)). General personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, exists “when the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state, even if unrelated to the cause of action, are continuous, systematic, and substantial.” Id. (citing Hall, 466 U.S. at 415).
Generally, the party seeking to invoke the court's power has the burden of pleading a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction and, where challenged, bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists. See LuvN‘ care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 2006).
C. Section 1983
“Section 1983 creates a private right of action for redressing violations of federal law by those acting under color of state law.” Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1999). The violation of law must involve the deprivation of rights or privileges secured by federal statute or constitutional norms. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). To act under the color of law means to act under the “pretense” of law. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,111 (1945).
D. The/TecA Bar
Although Section 1983 cannot be used to vacate a conviction, it can provide a vehicle to recover monetary damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment. See Weible v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 2024 WL 385405, at *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 1, 2024) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486) (quotations omitted). As the Supreme Court held through the Heck case
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). Indeed, a claim that a person received an unfair trial because of alleged fabricated evidence does not accrue until the primary injury-the wrongful conviction and resulting incarceration-has occurred. See Marcelli v. Edwards, 2015 WL 13738834, at *6 (D. Nev. Mar. 6, 2015) (citing Venegas v. Wagner, 704 F.2d 1144,1146 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 2990633 (D. Nev. May 24, 2016). Thus, when a state prisoner brings a § 1983 suit for damages, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of their conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
When screening under the PLRA, courts may raise the issue of personal jurisdiction sua sponte. See Harris v. United States, 2002 WL 824277, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2002); see also Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006); Kolocotronis v. Dupont Meds, 2002 WL 31643025, at *3 (D. Del. Nov. 20, 2002) (citing Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 1999)). A claim may be dismissed as frivolous or malicious where it is clear from the face of the complaint that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See Harris, 2002 WL 824277, at *3; see also Trujillo, 465 F.3d at 1217; Jackson v. Rosenburg, 2019 WL 6702702, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 25, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 6698427 (D. Minn. Dec. 6,2019). To avoid a sua sponte dismissal, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. Hazim v. Schiel & Denver Book Publishers, 647 Fed.Appx. 455,457 (5th Cir. 2016). In conducting this review, the court need not credit any conclusory allegations, unproven assumptions, generalizations, or far-fetched inferences. See Fountain v. Illinois State Police, 2024 WL 4204399, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4204012 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2024).
Some courts recognize the alternative of transferring a case to another district where personal jurisdiction might exist. See Hutton v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 2024 WL 4135473, at *4 n.4 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4350329 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2024); see also Jackson v. Rosenburg, 2019 WL 6702702, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 25, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 6698427 (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2019). A transfer is not warranted here, however, given the other flaws with Plaintiff's claims. See Jackson, 2019 WL 6702702, at *3-4.
Here, an extended personal jurisdiction analysis is not necessary insofar as the amended complaint lacks any allegations to suggest that the defendants have any contacts whatsoever with Texas. See Jackson, 2019 WL 6702702, at *3. Most of the defendants would appear to reside or do business in Minnesota, where the factual events underlying Plaintiff's claims-such as that of his trial-occurred. Plaintiff appears to invoke a jurisdictional hook in stating that he, at one time or another, owned and operated an auto repair shop based out of Alamo, Texas. (See, e.g, Dkt. No. 8 at 2). This allegation, however, does not invoke any forum contacts of the defendants.
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge concludes that Plaintiff has failed to make a prima fade showing of personal jurisdiction over the defendants and, therefore, that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious.
B. Private Individuals Not Acting Under Color of State Law
A Section 1983 claim against a private individual is frivolous, or fails to state claim, insofar as the private individual was not acting under color of state law. See Sefiane v. Saeegh, 2019 WL 847737, at *1-2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 764464 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2019). Moreover, “[i]t is well established that neither appointed nor retained counsel acts under color of state law in representing a defendant at trial or on direct appeal.” Narcisse v. Gill, 2013 WL 4813530, at *2 (W.D. La. Sept. 9, 2013) (collecting cases); see also Sanders v. Settle, 2020 WL 1808505, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2020) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1809730 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2020). Nor do public defenders whether representing indigent defendants in state or federal court. Hernandez v. Castillo, 2022 WL 903748, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2022) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 902632 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2022).
Here, Plaintiff raises Section 1983 claims against several private individuals, generally alleging that they gave false testimony at trial or lied to investigators. As noted, these include the victim herself, “matchmakers” who introduced Plaintiff to her, doctors who conducted a rape exam, and personnel from a woman's shelter, among others. Plaintiff also complains of the incompetence of his court appointed trial and appellate attorneys. However, because these private individuals cannot be said to have acted under the color of state law, Plaintiff s claims against them do not fall within the ambit of Section 1983. Although there is a general exception to this rule where a private individual conspires with state actors, Plaintiff does not explicitly allege the existence ofa conspiracy, let alone the basis for one. See Villalobos v. Tijerina, 2016 WL 3581967, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 10, 2016) (citing Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 518 (5th Cir. 2005)), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 3523888 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2016).
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge concludes that Plaintiffs Section 1983 claims against any private individuals, including Plaintiffs attorneys, should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious or for the failure to state a claim.
C. Failure to Show Invalidated Conviction
A Section 1983 claim for wrongful conviction and imprisonment is subject to dismissal for the failure to state a claim where the plaintiff fails to show, for purposes of Heck, that the underlying conviction or sentence have been overturned or otherwise invalidated. See Robinson v. Salmeron, 2020 WL 1673184, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2020). Here, Plaintiffs attempts to overturn the conviction and sentence at issue, through both state and federal avenues, have proved unsuccessful. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge concludes that Plaintiffs Section 1983 claims are subject to dismissal for the failure to state a claim based on the Heck bar.
V. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs amended claims be DISMISSED as frivolous or malicious or for the failure to state a claim.
Objections
Within fourteen (14) days after being served a copy of this report, a party may serve and file specific, written objections to the proposed recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Failure to file written objections within fourteen (14) days after service shall bar an aggrieved party from de novo review by the District Court on an issue covered in this report and from appellate review of factual findings accepted or adopted by the District Court, except on grounds of plain error or manifest injustice.
Directive to Clerk of Court
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to forward a copy of this document to Plaintiff by any receipted means.