Opinion
No. 16-70354
09-20-2019
RAFIK SULEYMANYAN, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Agency No. A075-671-142 MEMORANDUM On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted September 9, 2019 Pasadena, California Before: RAWLINSON, BENNETT, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Rafik Suleymanyan (Suleymanyan), a native and citizen of Armenia, seeks review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denying his motion to reopen immigration proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Salim v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016).
The Board must "credit evidence supporting a motion to reopen unless that evidence is inherently unbelievable." Shouchen Yang v. Lynch, 822 F.3d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, the Board may not require submission of corroborative evidence while reviewing a motion to reopen. See Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 946-47 (9th Cir. 2004). As the Board made no determination that Suleymanyan's declaration was "inherently unbelievable," the Board was required to credit the declaration as true. Shouchen Yang, 822 F.3d at 508. By failing to credit Suleymanyan's declaration as true, and by requiring corroborative evidence, the Board abused its discretion. See id.; see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 946-47.
The prior adverse credibility determination was improperly used by the Board to discredit Suleymanyan's declaration, particularly as the adverse credibility determination related to matters other than those toward which the adverse credibility determination was directed. See Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 995 n.13 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[A]n alien may use a motion to reopen to present newly available material evidence that challenges the original factual conclusions drawn by the IJ. . . .") (citation omitted).
An error resulting from the Board's abuse of discretion is harmless if no prejudice results from the error. See Kumar v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 520, 523-24 (9th Cir. 2006). In other words, if Suleymanyan would not be entitled to relief even if his declaration were credited as true, the Board's error in failing to credit the declaration as true would be rendered harmless. See id. However, in this case, the Board failed to make an alternative finding that, even crediting the declaration as true, Suleymanyan was unable to establish a prima facie case for relief. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). We therefore vacate and remand to the Board for further proceedings to determine whether, when crediting Suleymanyan's declaration as true, he has established a prima facie case. See I.N.S. v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (requiring remand if additional inquiry is needed).
We express no opinion as to the outcome of the Board's subsequent review.
VACATED and REMANDED.