Suleman v. McBeath

3 Citing cases

  1. OGCI Training, Inc. v. Hegar

    NO. 03-16-00704-CV (Tex. App. Oct. 27, 2017)   Cited 8 times

    These issues—how much OGCI collects from the training sessions in Texas and how any apportionment of that revenue should be calculated—reasonably relate to and are wholly consistent with the legal basis presented by OGCI in its protest letter concerning the calculation of its apportionment factor. See Suleman v. McBeath, 614 S.W.2d 637, 639-40 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concluding that protest letter claiming that "tax computation was erroneous" was sufficient to give trial court jurisdiction over computational issues and that court could decide in pre-trial and trial proceedings whether certain evidence should be admitted in support of claim); see also Consolidated Steel Corp., 195 S.W.2d at 962 (concluding that protest letter that informed Commission that "[protestant] predicated its protest on specific provisions of the law [and] providing the method of computation" was sufficiently detailed and that "it was not necessary for the protestant to state all of the evidence on which it relied"). Accordingly, although OGCI did not affirmatively demonstrate facts that establish jurisdiction under Chapter 112 in paragraph 54, its pleadings do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction.

  2. H.K. Global Trading, Ltd. v. Combs

    429 S.W.3d 132 (Tex. App. 2014)   Cited 6 times
    Concluding that protest letter was sufficient to invoke trial court's jurisdiction

    Based on our review of the protest letter, we conclude that H.K. Global sufficiently alerted the Comptroller to its constitutional challenge to section 151.307 and, therefore, that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider both subsections (d) and (e) of that section. See Lawrence Indus., Inc. v. Sharp, 890 S.W.2d 886, 892–93 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994, writ denied) (concluding use of phrase “was sufficient to alert the Comptroller to the subject matter of the protest as required by the Tax Code, thereby giving the trial court jurisdiction over [challenged claim]”); see also Suleman v. McBeath, 614 S.W.2d 637, 639–40 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (addressing predecessor to current version of statute and holding that trial court had jurisdiction to hear controversy although “wording of appellant's protest letter leaves much to be desired”). We turn then to our analysis of H.K. Global's issues.

  3. Brooks Operating v. Bullock

    668 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. App. 1984)   Cited 2 times
    Holding that trial court properly sustained Comptroller's plea to the jurisdiction because taxpayer had failed to provide proper written protest as required by former version of section 112.051

    The written protest must set out all grounds and reasons why the taxes are claimed to be unauthorized, and must accompany payment of the tax. Suleman v. McBeath, 614 S.W.2d 637 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bullock v. Adickes, 593 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Contran Corporation v. Bullock, 567 S.W.2d 616 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1978, no writ). The failure to meet either of these requirements renders the trial court without jurisdiction and requires the dismissal of the suit. Bullock v. Adickes, supra.