Opinion
No. 2-215 / 01-1314
Filed April 4, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Gary D. McKenrick, Judge.
Rick and Darlene Suiter appeal from the district court's ruling quieting title to a disputed tract of real estate in the defendant, City of Princeton. AFFIRMED.
Marc Engelmann of Wells, Bowman Smith, Davenport, and John Flynn, Davenport, for appellant.
T. Randy Current, Clinton, for appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Miller, JJ.
Rick and Darlene Suiter appeal from the district court's ruling quieting title to a disputed tract of real estate in the defendant, City of Princeton. The Suiters contend the trial court erred in (1) failing to find that the City has acquiesced in their claim to the property and is estopped from dispossessing them from the property and failing to quiet title in them, (2) failing to grant them an injunction prohibiting the City from dispossessing them from the disputed property, and (3) quieting title to the disputed tract in the City. The City of Princeton cross-appeals, arguing the trial court erred in (1) failing to allow testimony regarding conversations between Daniel Dawson and James Suiter, Sr. regarding ownership of the disputed tract under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.804( b)(3), (2) ruling that the defendant's title to the disputed tract comes from a deed from Irvin Faur, and (3) holding that the disputed tract was not public trust property. We affirm on appeal, and we conclude the cross-appeal is moot.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS.
The Suiters own riverfront property in Princeton. The disputed tract of property is also riverfront property. It lies contiguous to and directly north of the Suiters' property. Immediately to the north of and contiguous to the disputed tract is a riverfront lot owned by Daniel Dawson. All of these tracts are bounded on the east by the Mississippi River and on the west by what is now apparently South River Drive, a north-south street. Vine Street is an east-west street located to the west of River Drive. The disputed tract is located in what would be Vine Street if Vine Street were extended eastward to the Mississippi River.
The predecessor title holder to the Suiters' and Dawson's properties was James Suiter, Sr. A plat of the original town of Princeton identifies the disputed tract, Suiters' tract, and the property immediately south of the Suiters as a "public landing."
The Suiters purchased their tract of property in 1994. Rick Suiter testified that he knew since 1994 that he did not have a deed conveying to him title to the real estate running all the way up to the southern boundary of Dawson's property. The Suiters, Dawson, and other neighbors used the disputed tract. In 1992 the City considered the disputed tract for potential use as a small park. In early to mid-2000 the City again discussed turning the disputed tract into a public park. The City then put up an orange barricade on the disputed tract.
The Suiters filed a petition for quiet title of real estate and requested a temporary injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of the City and quieted title to the disputed tract in the City. The trial court ruled that (1) the disputed tract is not subject to the public trust doctrine, (2) the doctrine of acquiescence is not applicable, (3) the Suiters have shown no affirmative actions by the City indicating an intent to abandon the disputed property, and (4) the Suiters failed to present clear and convincing evidence to establish their claim to the disputed property by equitable estoppel. The Suiters appeal.
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW.
An action to quiet title in land is in equity and, thus, this court's review is de novo. See Rouse v. Union Township, 530 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Iowa 1995). We examine the facts and the law and decide anew the issues properly presented. See In re Marriage of Full, 255 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Iowa 1977). "[T]he court gives weight to the fact findings of the district court, but is not bound by them." Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(6)( g). Nor are we bound by the trial court's conclusions of law. See Rouse, 530 N.W.2d at 716.
III. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.
The Suiters claim they should prevail under a theory of equitable estoppel. They argue that the City abandoned the property, as evidenced by its failure to maintain the property as a street, vicarious use of the property, and collection of a tax on the disputed tract, among other things. They maintain they were damaged because they installed water and electrical service to Vine Street which they extended to service the boat docks they built and installed on the disputed tract. They further contend they filled in dirt, graded the property, and removed rocks from the area of the river bank, and they will lose dock rent, among other things.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based on fair dealing and good faith. See Sioux City v. Johnson, 165 N.W.2d 762, 767 (Iowa 1969). The elements of equitable estoppel are largely ignored in dealing with estoppel in the context of title disputes. Fencl v. City of Harpers Ferry, 620 N.W.2d 808, 815 (Iowa 2000). In the context of property disputes, the plaintiff must generally prove the following: conduct on the part of the City indicating an abandonment of its interest, a claim of ownership through adverse possession, and assertion of the City's ownership interest would unfairly damage the person claiming the property adversely to the City, which generally requires the claimant to show that he has made some permanent improvement on the tract. Id. at 816. The claimant must prove estoppel by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
We conclude that the Suiters have failed to prove the City abandoned its interest in the property. To show abandonment, the claimant must prove that the City has not used the property for more than ten years. Id. "Mere nonuse is not enough, however; nonuse must be `coupled with affirmative evidence of a clear determination to abandon.'" Id. (quoting Allamakee County v. Collins Trust, 599 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Iowa 1999)). The City's mere nonuse of the disputed tract, then, would not be enough to show abandonment. In fact, the City's fire department has used the tract within the past ten years for a cold water rescue. The fire department did not ask Rick Suiter for permission to do this. The mayor of the City testified that there were other parcels of property that the City knew it owned but did not maintain. The City does not stop the residents of the area from maintaining those properties or from using the properties for their occasional personal use. Furthermore, the mayor testified that if the property was maintained, it was the City's position that it could be used for personal use. He testified that there was never any intent on the part of the City to abandon those properties. Dawson testified that Rick Suiter knew the City did not intend to sell any more property after Dawson approached Rick Suiter to see whether they should try to buy the tract from the City.
The Suiters were unable to prove that they have been paying taxes on the disputed tract. Rick Suiter testified that he had no objection to the amount he had been and was being taxed on his parcel of real estate. While the Suiters' property was taxed at a higher rate than Dawson's, it would be mere speculation to conclude that this higher rate was a result of the Suiters paying taxes on the disputed tract.
Because we conclude that the Suiters have failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence conduct on the part of the City constituting abandonment of the disputed tract, we need not address the remaining elements of equitable estoppel. We determine that the Suiters' claim of equitable estoppel fails.
IV. INJUNCTION.
The Suiters contend the trial court erred by not ruling they were entitled to an injunction against the City to prohibit the City from dispossessing their "use and possession" of the disputed tract and taking possession of the disputed tract for public use as a park and boat dock. The record does not appear to show that any such issue was presented to and passed on by the district court. Although we seriously doubt that this issue has been preserved for our review we nevertheless choose to address it.
The Suiters claim they are entitled to an injunction based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. They assert that their good faith use and possession of the disputed tract should entitle them to a permanent injunction prohibiting the City from dispossessing them from the disputed tract and changing the use of the property to a public park.
"An injunction may be issued in any action and need not be originally pleaded." McCarthy v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 386 N.W.2d 122, 126 (Iowa Ct.App. 1986). Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy, which is granted with caution and only when required to avoid irreparable damage. Skow v. Goforth, 618 N.W.2d 275, 277-78 (Iowa 2000). A party seeking an injunction must establish the following: (1) an invasion or the threatened invasion of a right, (2) substantial injury or damages will result unless an injunction is granted, and (3) there is no adequate legal remedy available. Id. at 278.
A claimant seeking to enjoin the City from using contested property so as to allow claimant's continued possession and use of property need not prove abandonment or adverse possession to estop the City. Johnson, 165 N.W.2d at 770. However, this claim must be "in good faith premised upon conduct of the municipality that would reasonably tend to lead another to believe that its once intended use as a street is no longer contemplated." Id. at 769.
We conclude the Suiters have not proved that conduct by the City would reasonably have led them to believe that the disputed tract's use as a public landing or for another public purpose was no longer contemplated. As early as 1992 and as recently as 2000 the City had considered creating a small park on the tract. The City's fire department used the disputed tract for a cold water rescue. The City allowed individuals to use the property in question and other city-owned real estate, but conditioned such use upon the users maintaining the properties. There is only speculation that the Suiters paid taxes on the disputed property. We conclude the Suiters failed to prove they should be awarded an injunction.
V. QUIET TITLE.
The Suiters claim the trial court erred in quieting title in the City. They argue the City did not have title to be quieted, and the City sought no such relief. The City responds that it did not need to request that title be quieted in it because although the Suiters sought to obtain title through acquiescence or equitable estoppel the Suiters conceded legal title rested with the City.
We have concluded, as the trial court did, that the Suiters have not proved title should be quieted in them. The trial court found in part, "The parties agree that the muniments of title under which the plaintiffs claim undisputed ownership of their property also indicate that the disputed tract is owned by the defendant." This finding is fully supported by evidence of the plaintiffs' acknowledgement that they had no legal title to the disputed tract and that the disputed tract was "public property." Although the City concedes the trial court erred in discussing what the source of the City's title was, the record fully supports the court's finding that the parties agreed legal title with the tract rested with the City. The Suiters' claim that the trial court erred because the City did not have title to be quieted is without merit.
It readily appears from the pleadings that, as asserted by the Suiters, the City did not request that title be quieted in it. However, we have agreed with the trial court that the Suiters have not shown title should be quieted in them, and the Suiters and the City are the only parties to this lawsuit. The effect of the trial court's ruling is therefore only that the City's acknowledged legal title to the disputed tract is superior to any right, title, or interest of the Suiters. Neither the trial court's ruling nor our affirmance of its judgment adjudicates or purports to adjudicate any rights of either party relative to the rights of any non-party who may claim some interest in the disputed tract. Under such circumstances no reversible error is shown because quieting title in the City, even if in error for going beyond the requested relief, has caused no harm or prejudice to the Suiters. See Shane v. Russell, 250 Iowa 44, 46, 92 N.W.2d 567, 568 (Iowa 1958) (stating a trial court will not be reversed unless it is shown a complaining party's rights were prejudiced by the court's action).
VI. CONCLUSION.
We conclude that the Suiters failed to prove they should have title of the property through equitable estoppel and failed to prove they should be awarded an injunction. We further conclude the trial court did not commit reversible error in quieting title in the City. Our resolution of these issues makes it unnecessary to consider the City's cross-appeal.