Opinion
97 Civ. 4026 (RPP).
January 3, 2001.
OPINION AND ORDER
By notice of motion dated December 1, 2000, Plaintiff Harold V. Suggs ("Suggs"), appearing pro se, moves for an order pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed.R.Civ.P.") granting relief from the judgment entered on December 1, 1999, after a jury verdict in favor of Defendant, The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) permits such a motion to be made on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect within one year after judgment was entered.
Plaintiff states that he is entitled to the relief he is seeking because he filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a) on December 16, 1999, one day beyond the 10-day limit in Rule 59. (Suggs Affidavit in Support of Motion, dated Dec. 1, 2000 ("Suggs Aff.").)
Plaintiff acknowledges that he received notice of entry of the December 1, 1999 Judgment from the Court's Clerk's Office, but he does not state any grounds to show that he committed any mistake or inadvertent act or that he was surprised or should be excused for his neglect. (Id.) Plaintiff could have filed a notice of appeal requesting a new trial but did not do so. Since the Plaintiff has failed to state any reason meeting the requirements stated in Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), his motion is denied.
Although Plaintiff does state, "This motion is being made to the Court due to excusable neglect on the part of the pro-se plaintiff," he does not explain what grounds exist for excusable neglect. (Suggs Aff.)
Furthermore, the essence of Plaintiff's Rule 59 motion is that "[T]he jury failed to weigh the entirety of the circumstantial evidence presented at trial that provided more than an inference of the discriminatory intent of the defendant manager." (Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgement at 1.) The essence of Plaintiff's claim is that the jury made a mistake in weighing the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. It is solely within the province of the jury to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses, unless the court concludes that the jury's findings were against the weight of the evidence. A motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 may not be granted by a court on the basis of the weight of the evidence unless the jury's verdict is "seriously erroneous." Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 57 F.3d 193, 202 (2d Cir. 1995). "Where the resolution of the issues depended on assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, it is proper for the court to refrain from setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial." Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 363 (2d Cir. 1992). "Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable." Tennant v. Peoria P.U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944). Accordingly, even if Plaintiff had stated the grounds showing mistake or inadvertence in the late filing of his motion, the Court could not grant Plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
IT IS SO ORDERED.