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Sugarman v. Pazin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Jul 16, 2012
1:12-CV-01073 GSA HC (E.D. Cal. Jul. 16, 2012)

Opinion

1:12-CV-01073 GSA HC

07-16-2012

NEIL P. SUGARMAN, Petitioner, v. MARK PAZIN, et al., Respondents.


ORDER DISMISSING SUCCESSIVE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)


ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO ENTER JUDGMENT


ORDER DECLINING ISSUANCE OF

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He has consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

Petitioner filed the instant petition on July 2, 2012. It appears Petitioner is presently awaiting trial in Merced County Superior Court. A review of the Court's dockets and files shows Petitioner has already sought habeas relief with respect to the Merced County case in Sugarman v. Pazin, case no. 1:12-cv-00508 LJO JLT HC. In that case, the petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust and pursuant to principles of abstention.

DISCUSSION

I. Second or Successive Petition

A federal court must dismiss a second or successive petition that raises the same grounds as a prior petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). The court must also dismiss a second or successive petition raising a new ground unless the petitioner can show that 1) the claim rests on a new, retroactive, constitutional right or 2) the factual basis of the claim was not previously discoverable through due diligence, and these new facts establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B). However, it is not the district court that decides whether a second or successive petition meets these requirements, which allow a petitioner to file a second or successive petition.

Section 2244 (b)(3)(A) provides: "Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." In other words, Petitioner must obtain leave from the Ninth Circuit before he can file a second or successive petition in district court. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656-657 (1996). This Court must dismiss any second or successive petition unless the Court of Appeals has given Petitioner leave to file the petition because a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a second or successive petition. Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1997); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1277 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 794 (1997); Nunez v. United States, 96 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1996).

Petitioner makes no showing that he has obtained prior leave from the Ninth Circuit to file his successive petition attacking his trial proceedings. That being so, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's renewed application for relief from that conviction under Section 2254 and must dismiss the petition. See Greenawalt, 105 F.3d at 1277; Nunez, 96 F.3d at 991.

II. Younger Abstention

Under principles of comity and federalism, a federal court should not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings by granting injunctive or declaratory relief except under special circumstances. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971). Younger abstention is required when: (1) state proceedings, judicial in nature, are pending; (2) the state proceedings involve important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional issue. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. V. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Dubinka v. Judges of the Superior Court, 23 F.3d 218, 223 (9th Cir. 1994). The rationale of Younger applies throughout the appellate proceedings, requiring that state appellate review of a state court judgment be exhausted before federal court intervention is permitted. Dubinka, 23 F.3d at 223 (even if criminal trials were completed at time of abstention decision, state court proceedings still considered pending).

In the instant case, the first requirement is satisfied because the state proceedings have not been concluded. The second requirement is also satisfied because an important state interest, to wit, that of not having the federal courts interfere in state proceedings to preclude a prosecution, is at issue here. Dubinka, 23 F.3d at 223. The third requirement is also met because Petitioner can present his federal constitutional claims to the state courts, if necessary.

Accordingly, abstention is mandated and the petition must be dismissed.

III. Certificate of Appealability

A state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.
(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention pending removal proceedings.
(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from-
(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or
(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.
(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

If a court denies a petitioner's petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability "if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). While the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate "something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . . part." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court's determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court hereby DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED as successive and pursuant to Younger abstention;

2) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability; and

3) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Gary S. Austin

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE


Summaries of

Sugarman v. Pazin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Jul 16, 2012
1:12-CV-01073 GSA HC (E.D. Cal. Jul. 16, 2012)
Case details for

Sugarman v. Pazin

Case Details

Full title:NEIL P. SUGARMAN, Petitioner, v. MARK PAZIN, et al., Respondents.

Court:UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Date published: Jul 16, 2012

Citations

1:12-CV-01073 GSA HC (E.D. Cal. Jul. 16, 2012)