Opinion
No. 30703-CA.
June 26, 1998.
APPEAL FROM FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CADDO, NO. 396,641, STATE OF LOUISIANA, HONORABLE CHARLES R. SCOTT, J.
Barry Feazell, for Appellant Exie B. Tyson and Arbie E. Fields.
T. Lynn Geneux, Shreveport, for Appellee Irene Tyson Hucherson.
Before MARVIN, C.J., and NORRIS and WILLIAMS, JJ.
Exie B. Tyson, testator's wife, her nephew, Arbie E. Fields, and Irene Tyson Hutcherson, testator's sister and executrix of his will, filed a joint petition for declaratory judgment seeking a judicial interpretation of the meaning of the dispositive language of the testator's last will and testament and handwritten codicil. The trial court rendered a declaratory judgment interpreting the testator's intent with respect to the testator's Louisiana property. The trial court's judgment declared that Exie B. Tyson and Arbie E. Fields were entitled to inherit the testator's Louisiana property known as the Henderson estate and that the residuary legatees were entitled to inherit the testator's other immovable property in Louisiana, known as the Tyson estate. Exie Tyson and Arbie Fields appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part and render.
Testimony in the record reveals that Arbie E. Fields had resided with Marshall and Exie Tyson since he was approximately six weeks old.
FACTS
The testator, Marshall Lee Tyson ("Tyson") died on November 1, 1991. Although Tyson was originally from Louisiana, he was domiciled in Los Angeles, California at the time of his death. He executed a valid typewritten will in California on February 22, 1984, and subsequently, a handwritten codicil dated November 12, 1986.
Tyson's will provided in pertinent part:
I declare that it is my intention to dispose of all my property, both real and personal, of whatever nature and wherever situated, which I am entitled to dispose of by will.
I declare that all property held and known by me, of whatever nature and wherever situated, regardless of how title is held is separate property.
I declare that the property to be dispose [sic] of by this will as follows:
Real property located in the City of Longwood, Caddo Parish, Louisiana, and described as:
16,467 Acres-Lot 7. Henderson Estate. 3.47 Acres-Lot 7A. Henderson Estate.
Other real property in Louisiana (location and description are unknown)
APPOINTMENTS
I appoint as Executrix of this will IRENE HUTCHISON [sic], to serve without Bond.
DISPOSITION OF ESTATE
I make the following specific bequests:
To EXIE B. TYSON, my spouse and ARBY E. FIELDS, my nephew of my wife, as joint tenants, the real property in Louisiana and interest in other real property and personal property wherever located to be divided according to the laws where such property is located.
To IRENE HUTCHINSON [sic], my sister I give 50% of the residue of my estate, of whatever nature and wherever situated, provided she survives me by at least 90 days.
To my nieces and nephews, MARSHALL GILLIAM, HALDENE GILLIAM, MILDRED WILLIAMS AND CHANCEY GILLIAM, I give 50% of the residue of my estate, of whatever nature and wherever situated, to share and share alike provided they survives [sic] me by at least 90 days.
If any beneficiary of mine predeceases me or fails to survive me by at least 90 days and leaves no issue, then any share of my estate that they may have taken shall augment proportionately to the shares of my surviving beneficiaries, unless a contrary intent is herein expressed.
The codicil, dated November 12, 1986, stated:
I am in sound mind. I am adding a little more to my will Give my sister Ira D. Gilliam [sic] four children my part of the Shufer estate on which Shrulock Oil Co. have [sic] the lease on it [sic]. I hope you all understand this will the other will is still good only it pertain [sic] to the Henderson estate
/s/
Marshall L. Tyson
The residuary legatees, Irene Tyson Hutcherson, individually and as executrix of the estate, and the testator's nieces and nephews, Mildred Williams, Marshall Gilliam, Harold Dean Gilliam and Chauncey Gilliam, suggest that the will was not clear with respect to what constituted the "residue." They contend that the clear intent of the codicil, read in conjunction with the will, was for the "other real property in Louisiana," items 3 through 11 and item 13 of the sworn descriptive list, to be considered the residual portion of the estate and inherited 50% by Hutcherson and 50% by Tyson's nieces and nephews. [The Last Will and Testament, 1986 Codicil and Sworn Descriptive List of Assets and Liabilities have been reproduced and attached to this opinion as Appendix "A".] They also assert that the only property in Louisiana that Tyson intended to bequest to Exie Tyson and Arbie Fields was the Henderson estate.
Exie Tyson and Arbie Fields contend that the estate has no residue and the only effect of the codicil was to bequest the Schuford property to the testator's nieces and nephews. They argue that Tyson intended for them to inherit the Henderson estate as well as the "other real property in Louisiana."
Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that the Henderson estate should be inherited by Tyson's widow and her nephew. They also stipulated that the Schuford property should be inherited by Tyson's nieces and nephews. Thus, this litigation focused on items 3 through 11 and item 13 of the sworn descriptive list, which describes other Caddo Parish properties owned by the testator.
After trial, the court concluded that the bequest to Exie Tyson and Arbie Fields in the typewritten will was limited by the codicil to include only the Henderson estate. The trial court rendered judgment declaring that Exie Tyson and Arbie Fields are entitled to inherit the Henderson estate and the "other real property located in Louisiana" is considered the residue of the estate and is to be inherited by the residual legatees.
Exie Tyson and Arbie Fields appeal the trial court's judgment.
DISCUSSION
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of the codicil. Appellants challenge the trial court's interpretation of the testator's statement "the other will is still good only it pertain [sic] to the Henderson estate."
When interpreting testaments, this Court must attempt to ascertain and carry out the intention of the testator. LSA-C.C. Art. 1712; Succession of Hagelberger, 96-2049 (La.App. 4th Cir. 8/27/97), 700 So.2d 226; Succession of Meeks, 609 So.2d 1035 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992). The intent of the testator is the paramount consideration in determining the provisions of a will, and when a will is free from ambiguity, the will must be carried out according to its written terms, without reference to information outside the will. Succession of Schiro, 96-1567 (La.App. 4th Cir. 4/9/97), 691 So.2d 1374. However, if a provision in a will is subject to more than one equally reasonable interpretation, the court may consider all circumstances existing at the time of the execution of the will which may aid in determining the intent of the testator, and not just the language of the will. Succession of Schiro, supra. Thus, where there is ambiguity in the description of the legatee, or the thing which the testator intended to bequeath, or the quantum or portion of the legacy, or where there is doubt as to the sense in which the words are used by the testator, the court may resort to extrinsic evidence. Succession of Hurst v. Gremillion, 552 So.2d 799 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1989). The court uses extrinsic evidence to determine what the words of the testator, as written, actually mean. It is important to note that such evidence is used solely to resolve ambiguity, not to rewrite the will or do violence to its terms. Succession of Hurst v. Gremillion, supra.
Courts must seek to give meaning to all testamentary language in a will and avoid any interpretation that would act to render the language meaningless or reduce it to surplusage. LSA-C.C. art. 1713; Succession of Meeks, supra. In the interpretation of wills, the first and natural impression conveyed to the mind on reading the clause involved is entitled to great weight. Adams v. Taylor, 552 So.2d 744 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1989).
According to appellees, if Exie Tyson and Arbie Fields inherit according to the terms of the will, the residuary clauses will have no effect. Appellees argue that LSA-C.C. art. 1713 requires that a disposition should be read in a manner so that it can have effect, rather than one where it has no effect. The appellees claim that the testator intended for them to inherit all of his real property in Louisiana, except the Henderson estate. They base their assertion on the wording of the codicil, in particular, the testator's use of the word "only" when referring to the Henderson estate. Appellees concluded that, the word "only" was used to specifically limit the bequest to Exie Tyson and Arbie Fields to the Henderson estate.
Appellants claim that the will is unambiguous in its declaration that the testator intended to dispose of all of his real and personal property in Louisiana as well as in any other state. According to appellants, to reach a conclusion that the term "real property in Louisiana" refers only to the Henderson estate would eliminate the disposition of most of the real property in the estate, and therefore, violate the provisions of LSA-C.C. art. 1713.
As previously stated, a court may resort to extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguity in a will. In this instance, the trial court relied on the testimony of Irene Hutcherson to attempt to resolve the ambiguity. Hutcherson testified that she had discussions with the testator regarding his will. She stated that Tyson had informed her that he wanted Exie Tyson and Arbie Fields to have the Henderson estate. However, Hutcherson did not testify that the testator intended for Exie Tyson and Arbie Fields to inherit only the Henderson estate. During further questioning, Hutcherson was asked about "her interpretation of the will" and what "in her mind" was the testator's intention. She responded that the testator intended to give the residuary legatees the remaining property in Louisiana. We conclude that Hutcherson's testimony was not sufficient to determine what the words of the testator, as written, actually meant. Most of Hutcherson's testimony was based on her interpretation of the testator's will rather than concrete evidence. Thus, her testimony does not resolve the ambiguity in the will.
We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the codicil makes a specific bequest of the Schuford property, but we cannot agree with the trial court's conclusion that the codicil also limits the language of the will with respect to the bequest of the real property to include only the Henderson estate.
The record discloses that the testator's property in Louisiana consists of the Henderson estate, the Schuford property and other property in Louisiana referred to at the trial as the Tyson property. Despite the poor wording of the will and the ambiguities present, the provisions of the will clearly declare the testator's intent to leave Exie Tyson and Arbie Fields, as joint tenants, all of his real property in Louisiana. The provisions of the will were affected by the subsequent codicil which made a specific bequest of the Schuford property to the testator's nieces and nephews, thus leaving the remaining real property in Louisiana to Exie and Arbie.
The will included, among other errors, a misspelling of the names of family members and a mistake in the amount of acreage in the description of the Henderson estate.
In the codicil, the testator did not state that the will only pertained to the Henderson estate. Instead, he remarked that the will was "still good only it pertain [sic] to the Henderson estate." We conclude that the word "only" was intended to be descriptive (and) as opposed to restrictive, thereby limiting the bequest that the testator made to Exie and Arbie. In other words, the testator was not using the word "only" as an adverb, but as a conjunction with essentially the same meaning as the word "except." As previously stated, the original will was clear in describing Tyson's intent regarding the disposition of his property in Louisiana. In the codicil, the testator stated that he wanted to "add a little more" to his will. This statement did not revoke any provisions of the original will other than with respect to the Schuford property. To read the codicil otherwise, not only would transpose the words "only" and "it" in the codicil, but would depart significantly from the original will that plainly described the real property to be disposed of as including both the Henderson estate and other real property in Louisiana and plainly made a bequest to the decedent's spouse and her nephew, as joint tenants, of the real property in Louisiana. Under the provisions of LSA-C.C. art. 1693, posterior testaments that do not expressly revoke prior ones, annul in the latter only such dispositions therein contained as are incompatible with the new ones, or contrary to them, or entirely different.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment declaring that Exie B. Tyson and Arbie E. Fields are entitled to inherit items 1 and 2 of the sworn descriptive list, also known as the Henderson estate. We reverse the trial court's judgment finding that the residuary legatees, Irene Tyson Hutcherson, Mildred Williams, Marshall Gilliam, Harold Dean Gilliam and Chauncey Gilliam are entitled to inherit items 3 through 11 and item 13 of the sworn descriptive list, known as the Tyson property. We amend the judgment to interpret Marshall Lee Tyson's will as a bequest of items 3 through 11 and item 13 of the sworn descriptive list of assets and liabilities, known as the Tyson property, 50% to Exie B. Tyson and 50% to Arbie E. Fields. Costs of this appeal are assessed to appellees, Irene Tyson Hutcherson, Mildred Williams, Marshall Gilliam, Harold Dean Gilliam and Chauncey Gilliam.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AMENDED AND RENDERED.
Appendix A