Louisiana courts have consistently held that the plaintiff's knowledge of certain facts, rather than the legal consequences of those facts, commences the running of the prescriptive period. Succession of Albritton, 497 So.2d 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1986), writ denied, 498 So.2d 742 (La. 1986); Bellamy v. Janssen, 477 So.2d 928 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1985), writ denied, 484 So.2d 667 (La. 1986).
The one-year prescriptive period begins to run from the knowledge of facts, not their legal consequences. Succession of Albritton , 497 So.2d 10, 12 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1986). It is not necessary that a party have actual knowledge of the conditions as long as there is "constructive notice." Cartwright v. Chrysler Corp., 255 La. 597, 603, 232 So.2d 285, 287 (1970).
It is the knowledge of the facts, not knowledge of the legal consequences of the facts, that "commences the running" of the time period. Succession of Albritton, 497 So.2d 10, 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1986). Constructive notice sufficient to "excite" the litigant's attention and "put [her] on inquiry" is "tantamount to knowledge or notice of everything to which inquiry may lead" and "[i]n the absence of fraud or concealment, a plaintiff's mere ignorance of [her] rights will not toll the statute of limitations."
It is the knowledge of the facts, not knowledge of the legal consequences of the facts, that "commences the running" of the time period. Succession of Albritton, 497 So. 2d 10, 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1986). Constructive notice sufficient to "excite" the litigant's attention and "put [her] on inquiry" is "tantamount to knowledge or notice of everything to which inquiry may lead" and"[i]n the absence of fraud or concealment, a plaintiff's mere ignorance of [her] rights will not toll the statute of limitations."
However, this Court has held that under La. C.C.P. art. 2004 the prescription period commences when one has the knowledge of the facts that form the basis of the action for nullity, not when one becomes aware of the legal consequences.Haney, 06-1058, p. 6, 952 So.2d at 808 (citing Succession of Albritton, 497 So.2d 10, 12 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986). -------- In this case, what is undisputed is that the Appellant's signature is on the acceptance of service for the original petition.
The one year prescriptive period begins to run from the knowledge of the facts, not their legal consequences. Succession of Albritton, 497 So.2d 10, 12 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986). The party pleading the exception of prescription bears the burden of proof unless the action is prescribed on the face of the petition.
What happened in the succession case is not an ill practice and, in fact, is a far cry from the recent cases which have annulled succession judgments. Succession of Albritton, 497 So.2d 10 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ denied, 498 So.2d 742 (1986); Succession of Skye, 364 So.2d 1357 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1978). The majority's generous reading of Art. 2004 sets the bar disturbingly low for someone to annul a judgment.
The jurisprudence has held that "[i]t is the knowledge of these facts, and not their legal consequences which commences the running of prescription under C.C.P. art. 2004." Succession of Albritton, 497 So.2d 10, 12 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986); A.S. v. M.C. and P.C., 96 0948, p. 10 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/20/96), 685 So.2d 644, 649 (citing Albritton, supra). Prescription commenced when Plaintiffs had knowledge of the facts that form the basis of their nullity action, which was no later than July 30, 1998.
It is the knowledge of these facts, and not necessarily their legal consequences, which commenced the running of the one year limitation provided in LSA-C.C.P. art. 2004. Succession of Albritton, 497 So.2d 10, 12 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 498 So.2d 742 (La. 1986). Thus, A.S.' claim to annul the judgment for fraud or ill practices was extinguished on July 6, 1988, one year after the execution of the Concurrence, the date on which A.S. undisputedly became aware of the facts which gave rise to the claim for nullity based on alleged fraud or ill practices.