Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. EC038648, John P. Doyle and David M. Schacter, Judges.
Albert Abkarian & Associates and Robert E. Racine for Defendants and Appellants.
Law Offices of Richard A. Marcus and Richard A. Marcus for Plaintiff and Respondent.
WOODS, J.
INTRODUCTION
The dispute in this appeal involves the construction of a family home by respondent Subcrete Construction, Inc., a California Corporation, (hereafter referred to as “SCI”) for appellants Onnik Mehrabian and Armenouhi Mehrabian (hereafter referred to as “owners”) on a hillside lot in Glendale, California.
SCI, as the general contractor, was to be paid by owners on what is commonly referred to as a cost-plus basis, with fees to be computed at eight percent of the costs of materials and labor.
SCI eventually had a disagreement with owners in which it maintained it was not fully paid pursuant to the contract terms for supervisory fees and costs, making it necessary to file a mechanic’s lien and then a lawsuit against owners. Owners responded by filing a cross-complaint against SCI and other named defendants claiming that the house was poorly built, costs of construction and labor were inflated and the contract was breached in other particulars.
Following a nine day bench trial the court entered judgment for SCI . In a post judgment hearing the trial court heard owners’ objections to the Memorandum of Costs filed by SCI and SCI’s Motion to Recover its Attorneys Fees incurred in proving the truth of matters denied by owners in SCI’s Request for Admissions. The trial court ruled in favor of SCI except for one item of costs, namely jury fee expenses in view of the fact that the trial was conducted by the court.
Owners appealed the judgment and post judgment awards in separate appeals. Both appeals have been joined for briefing and argument before this court.
For the reasons hereafter given, the judgment and post-judgment awards are affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SYNOPSIS [ ]
This court appreciates the palliative extended by owners in the appellant’s opening brief where they state: “‘This is a simple breach of contract action. Plaintiff claims he is owed monies for material, labor and his fee of 8% thereon. Defendant(s) contend they were over-billed for the project.’ [¶] What happened, then at the trial, to turn this case into a paper monster?” (Emphasis added.) This court agrees that we have indeed been presented with a paper monster and in the cause of brevity we merely summarize the relevant trial proceedings and motions hereafter and resort to a more expansive presentation as necessity dictates.
The agreement.
On May 3, 2002, SCI and owners signed a written agreement entitled “California Contractor Agreement.” The agreement provided for the construction of a two story, 4,400 square foot custom home with a date of completion on February 1, 2003. SCI was to be compensated for supervising the construction of the home at the rate of 8 percent of the costs and labor required to complete the job.
Generally speaking, in a costs plus contract the general contractor has the obligation to provide the actual costs of labor and materials in a timely fashion to the owner to insure prompt payment of vendors and subcontractors. Accordingly, in this instance, all payments expended by SCI were supposed to be based upon the actual costs of construction with a commensurate obligation on the part of SCI to keep fair and accurate records of accounts for costs, charges and expenditures for the construction and to promptly and accurately report to owners.
Article 5, subparagraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the contract provide that all subcontractors working on the construction shall be fully licensed, authorized to do the work, and would be fully paid by SCI in any event. Pursuant to the agreement, releases or waivers of liens were to be provided to owners for all work done prior to any periodic payments being due or payable.
After the contract was executed, owners began making payments of $50,000 via check and cash to SCI.
Labor and construction costs.
At trial SCI claimed to have spent the sum of $875,117.28 to build the home. By stipulation, it was agreed SCI received the sum of $700,000 from owners resulting in a claim by SCI that it was entitled to recover the difference of $175,117.28. These figures are to be contrasted with SCI’s pleadings in which it alleged that the total cost of completion was $1,355,383.24, that the owners had paid only $1,072,902.71 for an outstanding balance due SCI in the amount of $282,480.53.
Agreeing with SCI’s position generally, the court made an off-set of $7,750 for warranty repair items, which SCI opposed, resulting in an award to SCI of $167,367.28 for costs incurred.
The court then determined that the 8 percent contractor fee should be based upon the sum of $700,000 advanced by owners to SCI plus the itemized invoices and checks paid by owners totaling $303,577.37 or the grand total of $1,003,577.37 for purposes of calculating the 8 percent fee due SCI pursuant the contract, which came to $80,286.18.
Trial proceedings and motions.
In keeping with the admonition contained in footnote 1, supra, we note that from February 9, 2004, through August 24, 2006, the following relevant proceedings occurred in the trial court which are summarized in chronological order for purposes of brevity at this time: defendant and cross-complainant owners filed a first amended cross-complaint alleging claims for breach of contract, fraud and negligent misrepresentations; plaintiff and cross-defendant SCI filed a third amended complaint (its operative complaint at trial); owners filed an answer to the third amended complaint, alleging 21 affirmative defenses, which included the defense of unclean hands; defendant owners filed a notice (of lodging transcripts of videotape depositions of Masis Moradi and Vahik Makarian); defendant owners filed a notice (of lodging transcripts of videotape depositions of Shara Nazarian); plaintiff SCI filed its post trial brief; defendant owners filed their post trial brief and reply; plaintiff SCI filed its reply brief; the trial court issued its tentative decision; plaintiff SCI filed comments on the tentative decision; defendant owners filed objections to the statement of decision; Judge John P. Doyle filed a statement of decision, judgment and order on foreclosure of mechanic’s lien; and the defendant owners filed a timely notice of appeal.
Post trial motions.
In further keeping with this court’s admonition contained in footnote 1, the following post trial proceedings in the trial court occurred between July 17, 2006, and October 5, 2006, and are summarized as follows: plaintiff SCI filed a motion requiring defendant owners to pay expenses incurred by SCI in proving the genuineness of facts denied by owners; defendant owners filed a motion to tax costs; defendant owners filed opposition to the motion of SCI for payment of expenses incurred in proving the genuineness of facts denied by owners; plaintiff SCI filed its opposition to the defendant owners’ motion to tax costs; plaintiff SCI filed a reply to the opposition of defendant owners for payment of expenses incurred in proving the genuineness of facts denied by owners; defendant owners filed a reply to the opposition of plaintiff SCI to owners’ motion to tax costs; Judge Schacter denied the motion of defendant owners to tax costs, save and except for jury fees, and issued an order awarding reasonable attorney fees and costs to SCI in the amount of $122,519; and defendant owners filed a timely notice of appeal of the two post-trial orders.
APPELLATE CONTENTIONS
Owners maintain that the judgment and order should be reversed and a judgment entered for owners for the following reasons:
“SCI breached the terms of the unambiguous, written contract;
“Makarian, Moradi and SCI were ‘unlicensed contractors’ intermittingly [sic] throughout the construction of the Mehrabian home;
“Moradi was not a responsible managing officer/employee of SCI;
“SCI’s proof regarding labor costs and materials was based on inadmissible evidence;
“The doctrine of unclean hands provides a complete defense to all claims;
“Monetary off-sets rejected by the trial court were not deducted from the fees and costs claimed by SCI; and
“The post-trial award of attorney fees and costs was improper and unreasonable.”
We now address owners’ contentions hereafter as stated by them, but not seriatim.
DISCUSSION
Makarian, Moradi and SCI were “unlicensed contractors” [intermittently] throughout the construction of the Mehrabian home
Owners maintain in their second contention that Makarian, Moradi and SCI were unlicensed contractors intermittently throughout the construction of the home. Owners describe the issue as “critical” because in the absence of a valid license SCI cannot sue owners, citing Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (a). The section provides as follows: “(a) Except as provided in subdivision (e), no person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor, may bring or maintain any action, or recover in law or equity in any action, in any court of this state for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act or contract where a license is required by this chapter without alleging that he or she was a duly licensed contractor at all times during the performance of that act or contract, regardless of the merits of the cause of action brought by the person, except that this prohibition shall not apply to contractors who are each individually licensed under this chapter but who fail to comply with Section 7029.”
SCI on the other hand relies on subdivision (e) mentioned in Business and Professions Code section 7031 for the proposition that SCI has substantially complied with Business and Professions Code section 7031. Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (e) provides: “(e) The judicial doctrine of substantial compliance shall not apply under this section where the person who engaged in the business or acted in the capacity of a contractor has never been a duly licensed contractor in this state. However, notwithstanding subdivision (b) of Section 143, the court may determine that there has been substantial compliance with licensure requirements under this section if it is shown at an evidentiary hearing that the person who engaged in the business or acted in the capacity of a contractor (1) had been duly licensed as a contractor in this state prior to the performance of the act or contract, (2) acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure, (3) did not know or reasonably should not have known that he or she was not duly licensed when performance of the act or contract commenced, and (4) acted promptly and in good faith to reinstate his or her license upon learning it was invalid.”
SCI urges this court to affirm the finding of the trial court that substantial compliance permits it to recover the contract amount because its license only lapsed for six days. SCI cites two Court of Appeal decisions, in urging this court to affirm the finding of substantial compliance by the trial court. The first is Slatkin v. White (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 963 in which homeowners sought an injunction to vacate a mechanics’ lien on the ground that the lien claimant was an unlicensed contractor. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction, because a contractor may avoid the harshness of Business and Professions Code section 7031 by showing that it had been duly licensed, acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure, and did not know or reasonably should have known of the lack of due licensure. The second cite on this issue by SCI is to ICF Kaiser Engineers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 226, wherein the trial court was found to have erroneously failed to find that a contractor had met the substantial compliance requirements of Business and Professions Code section 7031.
We find no abuse of discretion in finding substantial compliance. That finding is supported by evidence in the record. SCI’s license was in place prior to performance of the contract, it acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure and acted promptly and in good faith to reinstate its license. SCI points out that the project had progressed for about one year before the license lapsed. The trial testimony of Mr. Makarian and Mr. Hazarian demonstrated that diligent efforts were made to ensure that the license would remain in effect and that any lapse would be corrected forthwith.
Moradi was not a responsible managing officer/employee of SCI.
It is undisputed that but for lack of licensure for approximately six days, SCI was possessed of its own contractor’s license. Owners complain that Mr. Moradi did not hold a license and Mr. Moradi was not a responsible managing officer (“RMO”) or employee (“RME”). But we find no requirement in section 7068 of the Business and Professions Code or elsewhere to back up owners’ theory that the RME must at all times hold a valid license and that if the license is lost, the corporation will lose its own separate license. Applicants for a contractor’s license must take a written examination pursuant to section 7065 of the Business and Professions Code to demonstrate the degree of knowledge and experience that the Contractor’s State License Board considers necessary for the safety and protection of the public. Licenses may be issued to individuals, partnerships, or corporations, and each entity may qualify through a qualifying individual appearing for the examination as the responsible managing employee RME or responsible managing officer RMO, on behalf of the licensee. The RME or RMO must be qualified for the same license classification as the applicant is seeking. The statute requires only that the RME be qualified for the same license classification, not that the RME hold a valid license at all times.
Business and Professions Code section 7068, subdivision (a) states as follows pertaining to qualifications: “(a) The board shall require an applicant to show such degree of knowledge and experience in the classification applied for, and such general knowledge of the building, safety, health, and lien laws of the state and of the administrative principles of the contracting business as the board deems necessary for the safety and protection of the public.”
Thus, an individual can show proper qualifications by initially obtaining a license. He does not lose those qualifications simply because his individual license may lapse after he becomes an RME or RMO.
Every applicant or licensee qualifying through as individual must submt to the Board detailed information on that person’s supervisory duties and responsibilities in its operations.
The person who serves as qualifier for a licensed contractor must exercise the direct supervision and control of construction operations necessary to secure full compliance with the contractor’s license law and the rules and regulations of the Contractor’s State License Board. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7068.1.)
Mr. Makarian testified that Mr. Moradi was the qualifying individual who had the qualifications and experience the state recognizes for the corporation to have its own license. He also testified that an individual who qualifies with sufficient experience on behalf of a corporation does not need a license, and even if he and Moradi did not have licenses, if one of them was tied to SCI like Mr. Moradi who had an “A” certification, the corporation could have its own license. No testimony was offered by owners to rebut this testimony.
If the individual is continuously associated with the entity by exercising direct supervision and control, the entity is deemed to have a valid license. Personal presence is not necessary. (G. E. Hetrick & Associates, Inc. v. Summit Const. & Maint. Co. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 318, 329, distinguished and questioned on a related issue in Opp v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 71, 77-79.)
California Code of Regulations, title 16, section 823 provides as follows:
Owners rely on Buzgheia v. Leasco Sierra Grove (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 374, a case in which defendant had introduced evidence that the contractor’s responsible managing employee was not a bonafide employee actively engaged in the contractor’s work and exercising direct supervision and control of the contractor’s work as required by Business and Professions Code sections 7068-7068.1. The trial court held in Buzgheia that after the introduction of such evidence, the burden shifted back to the contractor to prove proper licensure and that the trial court’s instruction to the jury that the defendant had the burden of proving non-licensure was prejudicial error. However, while Mr. Makarian was the primary property supervisor on this project, there was no evidence introduced by owners to demonstrate that Mr. Moradi was not continuously associated with SCI as was the case in Buzgheia which is therefore distinguishable. To the contrary, the testimony was that Moradi visited the site frequently and supervised the project during Makarian’s absence. Evidence is also in the record that Mr. Moradi executed the necessary documentation to establish his ongoing association with SCI, such as in exhibit 235 (state application form) and certification of record and in exhibit 254 Statement by Domestic Stock Corporation, Statement of Information (Domestic Stock Corporation). The record further reveals that Mr. Moradi’s obligation was to exercise supervision and control over SCI, not the Mehrabian project only. The testimony was that SCI’s business at the time consisted of more than just the Highland project. SCI does not take issue with owners’ assertion that SCI was working on four projects.
Mr. Moradi testified that he is the Chief Financial Officer “CFO” of the company and was actually at the site 2-3 times per week. When Mr. Makarian went on vacation, he was the supervisor. Thus, based upon all of the foregoing, and in spite of the issue being raised for the first time after the tentative decision was issued, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings.
SCI breached the terms of the unambiguous, written contract.
It appears to this court that the gravamen of owners’ claim is that SCI had an unambiguous, written contract which required strict performance. On the other hand SCI maintains that change orders are a necessity in the construction industry frequently involving verbal authorization to proceed with work in given circumstances, particularly where there is a longstanding personal relationship or friendship between the owners and contractor. In the latter situation, SCI maintains that equitable principles come into play which frequently require owners to pay for work performed without written change orders based on the equitable doctrines of waiver, estoppel and unjust enrichment.
Mr. Makarian testified that changes were accomplished after verbal contact with Mr. Mehrabian. Mr. Mehrabian said he wanted to go and run his business and paid Mr. Makarian to build the house. They spoke verbally and Mr. Mehrabian said to go ahead and do anything you need to. Their relationship allowed them to do things verbally. Mr. Makarian further testified that Mr. Mehrabian never requested that changes were to be in writing.
One Chris Behr, a licensed general contractor for over 20 years, and owner of Behr construction, a company that builds extravagant custom homes on a daily basis in California, testified as an expert on behalf of SCI. During his testimony, Mr. Behr indicated that he conducted an inspection and took photographs of the property and prepared a bid of $1,487,000 as an indication of what his company would have charged to complete the project. During this process he confirmed the integrity of the Highland construction, and that there were no defects. He further testified that there were no change orders in writing, but change orders were needed daily and that upgrades were changed but the plans did not substantially change. If a homeowner has an arrangement with a general contractor where they are friends or have a prior relationship or make a verbal arrangement or otherwise by their act of acceptance or continued payment, they waive the right to require change orders to be done in writing.
This court is in agreement with the statement of SCI found in its brief on appeal that “On this evidence coupled with the fact that Mr. Mehrabian paid for some of the changes made, [sic] Appellants should not be able to escape paying for the changes that they ordered and approved.”
SCI’s proof regarding labor costs and materials was based on inadmissible evidence.
Owners make a concession in their opening brief on appeal as follows: “Appellant is mindful that the appellate court must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the judgment, taking into account all inferences which might reasonably have been thought by the trial court to lead to the same conclusion. (Roberts v. Salot (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 294,296.)” The concession is an accurate statement of the law in this seasoned decision. SCI buttresses this well settled statement of the law with citations to more recent decisions in the following manner: “It is not a question of whether there is ‘substantial conflict’ in the evidence but, rather, whether the record as a whole demonstrates substantial evidence in support of the appealed judgment or order. Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 872-873, 197 Cal.Rptr. 925, 926-927.”
SCI elaborates further by stating: “So long as there is ‘substantial evidence,’ the appellate court must affirm . . [.] even if the reviewing justices personally would have ruled differently had they presided over the proceedings below, and even if other substantial evidence would have supported a different result. Bowers v. Bernard, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at 874, 197 Cal.Rptr. at 927; Rupf v. Yan (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 411, 429-430, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 157, 170, fn. 5.”
While owners contend that the judgment should be reversed because of the lack of proof of cost incurred and payments made by SCI, the trial court found SCI’s accounting records to be detailed, thorough and maintained as one would expect for the project. Substantial evidence supports this finding.
Testimony of SCI’s office manager.
Mr. Shara Nazarian testified that he was the office manager of SCI; that his responsibility on the project was to sort out and divide expenses incurred in invoices by mail or at the jobsite and keep track of payments. Exhibit 23 contained all of the invoices and exhibit 24 contained the checks produced by owners. Mr. Nazarian testified that he personally created a progress expense report which is a summary of the invoices incurred for the month. He gave a copy to Mr. Mehrabian. The binder represents all of the amounts SCI paid. He wrote checks for most of them.
Mr. Mehrabian was not charged for any amounts that had not been paid or were not incurred for his project. Exhibit 15 comprises a collection of progress expense statements he prepared for a listing of vendors. Each number represents either a subcontractor, supplier or vendor. The second document of exhibit 30 is similar, but is a little more detailed and shows each of the checks the vendors were paid with the amount of the check and date the check was posted for each of the statements contained in the progress reports.
Mr. Nazarian testified that the total amount SCI spent and incurred for the project was $875,117.28. The trial court found the testimony and exhibits produced by Mr. Nazarian to be credible.
Further testimony of SCI’s expert.
In addition to the testimony of SCI’s expert, Chris Behr, quoted supra, during which Mr. Behr stated his expertise and qualifications, he further testified that he had examined the records of SCI and that the records kept were excellent. The labor appeared to be far less than most general contractors would have needed to do the work. It would have cost him three to four thousand dollars more for the same work.
Other admitted trial exhibits.
Exhibits 60, 61, 23, 24, 25, 27 and 30 are supportive of the amounts charged by SCI. We are constrained to note that owners’ expert, Mr. Brad Avrit, never stated that the amounts incurred by SCI on exhibit 30 had not actually been paid, nor did owners produce an expert witness or provide an accounting on this issue.
This court finds ample evidence in the record to support the finding of the trial court on this issue.
Monetary off-sets rejected by the trial court were not deducted from the fees and costs claimed by SCI.
We decline owners’ invitation to examine each and every offset found by the trial court to be proper in this instance. SCI is correct in asserting that reversals are extremely rare when factual determinations are made by the trial court which require a determination based upon the credibility of the evidence, citing Evje v. City Title Ins. Co.(1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 488, 492 as authority. SCI is also correct in asserting that evidence will be disregarded on appeal for credibility reasons only if “inherently improbable” or “implausible” in the strictest sense, i.e., it must appear that the truth of the testimony was physically impossible or the falsity of the testimony must otherwise be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions, relying again on the Evje decision cited, supra. SCI claims, and this court agrees, that owners have failed to meet this test and owners are merely asking this court to reweigh the evidence in considering the offsets found applicable by the trial court. As an example, SCI accentuates one incident which occurred during the taking of the deposition of SCI’s office manager, Shara Nazarian. A stipulation was reached that Mehrabian was not charged for the work of Nazarian or Mr. Makarian, but was billed separately. The charges were not included in calculating the 8 percent fee of SCI. SCI correctly asserts that the matter was later resolved by a joint stipulation, leading to the conclusion that these offsets were properly denied by the trial court. We will not reweigh the evidence.
We remind counsel courts cannot set aside a judgment or grant a new trial based upon instructional, evidentiary, pleading or procedural error unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error or errors complained of have resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) We discern no miscarriage of justice in this instance and decline to disturb the judgment rendered in the trial court.
The doctrine of unclean hands provides a complete defense to all claims.
Having determined that all of the issues raised by owners in support of their claims of entitlement to a reversal of the judgment are lacking in merit, by implication, the owners’ equitable affirmative defense of unclean hands is also without merit and we so find.
The judgment is affirmed and we now turn our attention to the post-judgment orders of the trial court.
The post-trial award of attorney fees and costs was improper and unreasonable.
Award of attorneys fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420.
Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 provides: “(a) If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney’s fees.
“(b) The court shall make this order unless it finds any of the following:
“(1) An objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under Section 2033.290.
“(2) The admission sought was of no substantial importance.
“(3) The party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter.
“(4) There was other good reason for the failure to admit.”
It is conceded by owners that SCI propounded a set of requests for admission and that owners denied the request to admit. The requests and the denials are found in SCI’s exhibits 40 and 41. Owners’ denials were read into the record at time of trial. In response to SCI’s motion for attorney fees and costs, over the objection of owners, the trial court made an order awarding SCI the sum of $122,519. Owners do not challenge the authority of the trial court to enter such an order under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420, but simply complain about the amount of the award.
Owners correctly state that “The determination of whether a party is entitled to expenses under C.C.P. § 2033 is within the sound discretion of the trial court,” citing Wimberly v. Derby Cycle Corp. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 618, 637. Owners further correctly state that “An abuse of discretion occurs only where it is shown that the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason,” citing Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 953, 972.
In attacking the amount of the award, owners concentrate on the lack of invoices, bills or canceled checks to support SCI’s claimed expenses, including attorney fees. We find that owners’ objections are wide of the mark for the reason that the trial judge is considered to be an expert in his or her own right in judging the reasonableness of fees and costs required to prosecute a lawsuit and such an award can be made in a given situation without a detailed analysis of the items of costs claimed, particularly attorney fees. This court finds the decision of our Supreme Court in PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096 to be instructive on the issue where the high court states: “‘It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court . . . . [Citations.] The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. [Citation.] The trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony. [Citations.] The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.’ (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624.) Although the terms of the contract may be considered, they ‘do not compel any particular award.’ (Vella v. Hudgins, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 520; All-West Design, Inc. v. Boozer (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1227 [trial court was not bound by contingency agreement in awarding fees under Civil Code section 1717]; Beverly Hills Properties v. Marcolino, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. Supp. 12 [affirming an award of reasonable attorney fees for pro bono legal services].)” We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in making this award, considering the fact that nine days of trial were required to reach a judgment in the case.
Denial of motion to tax cost.
Again, owners correctly state that the standard of review for determining allowable costs is one of discretion. Owners state “The general standard of review for a cost award is generally whether the trial court abused its discretion in making the award,” citing Heppler v. J.M. Peters Co. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1298 as authority.
It is noted that one item of cost was not allowed by the trial court, namely, the claim pertaining to jury fees because no jury was required to reach a disposition of the case. As to the remaining items of costs awarded by the trial court, we find to be well within the discretion of the trial court and no reversible error occurred.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and post judgment orders are affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs of appeal.
We concur: PERLUSS, P.J., ZELON, J.
“(a) For purposes of Section 7068 of the Code, ‘bona fide employee’ of the applicant means an employee who is permanently employed by the applicant and is actively engaged in the operation of the applicant’s contracting business for at least 32 hours or 80% of the total hours per week such business is in operation, whichever is less.
“(b) For purposes of Section 7068.1 of the Code, ‘direct supervision and control’ includes any one or any combination of the following activities: supervising construction, managing construction activities by making technical and administrative decisions, checking jobs for proper workmanship, or direct supervision on construction job sites.”