Opinion
23-CV-9900 (LTS)
11-09-2023
SHIVANA STYLES, Plaintiff, v. ATTORNEY ALYSSA ELSNER, Defendant.
TRANSFER ORDER
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff, who resides in Nassau County, New York, brings this pro se action against her former attorney, from a law firm in Queens County, New York. Plaintiff alleges that her claims arose in Family Court in Nassau County. For the following reasons, this action is transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
DISCUSSION
Under the general venue provision, a civil action may be brought in
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . .; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued” resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated her rights in the Family Court in Nassau County. (ECF 1 at 5.) She attaches to the complaint documents from the New York State Supreme Court, Queens County, regarding the arbitration of a fee dispute. (Id. at 9-13.) Plaintiff names attorney Eisner, with the law firm Sager Gellerman Eisner, LLP, in Forest Hills, New York, as the sole defendant in this matter. There are no facts in the complaint about where Defendant resides.
Because it is unknown where Defendants reside, it is unclear whether venue is proper in this district under Section 1391(b)(1). Plaintiff alleges that her claims arose outside this district, and venue therefore is not proper in this district under Section 1391(b)(2). Because Plaintiff alleges that her claims arose in Queens and Nassau Counties, which are both within the Eastern District of New York, 28 U.S.C. § 112(c), venue under Section 1391(b)(2) is proper in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), even if a case is filed in a jurisdiction where venue is proper, a court may transfer the case to any other district where it might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following ten factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum's familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff's choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. Keitt v. N.Y. City, 882 F.Supp.2d 412, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). A plaintiff's choice of forum is accorded less deference where the plaintiff does not reside in the chosen forum and the operative events did not occur there. See Iragorri v. United Tech. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001).
Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate in this case. Plaintiff does not reside in this district, and she alleges that the underlying events occurred outside this district. Plaintiff alleges that her claims arose in the Eastern District, and it is reasonable to expect that all relevant documents and witnesses also would be in that district. The Eastern District of New York appears to be a more convenient forum for this action. Accordingly, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) (“District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.”).
CONCLUSION
The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this Court. This order closes the case in the Southern District of New York.
The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.