Styler v. State

63 Citing cases

  1. Lovett v. State

    516 A.2d 455 (Del. 1986)   Cited 69 times
    Holding that "third hand allegations" that the jury considered facts outside evidence do not require a new trial

    Juror bias will not be tolerated in our judicial system. If only one juror is improperly influenced, a defendant in a criminal case is denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Styler v. State, Del.Supr., 417 A.2d 948, 951-952 (1980). However, post-verdict questioning of jurors is sparingly employed because of the potential for harassment and intimidation. Burke v. State, Del.Supr., 484 A.2d 490, 500 (1984); See also Styler, 417 A.2d at 952.

  2. Purnell v. State

    979 A.2d 1102 (Del. 2009)   Cited 22 times

    The trial judge's prompt instruction concerning a single juror's vacation plans provided a "meaningful and practical alternative to a mistrial." See Moore v. State, 1992 WL 354222, at *2 (Del.); Styler v. State, 417 A.2d 948, 951 (Del. 1980).Styler, 417 A.2d at 951.

  3. Hughes v. State

    437 A.2d 559 (Del. 1981)   Cited 225 times
    Holding that the prosecutor vouched for the State's case by emphasizing the careful and lengthy investigation before charging the defendant with first degree murder

    It follows that the remarks prejudicially affected Hughes' substantial rights. The State relies on our recent opinion in Styler v. State, Del.Supr., 417 A.2d 948 (1980), in arguing that its characterization of defendant's statements as "lies" did not go beyond fair comment. In Styler, under the circumstances of that case, we concluded that the statements by the prosecutor "viewed as a whole and in context" did not amount to reversible error in that case.

  4. Burroughs v. State

    988 A.2d 445 (Del. 2010)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that the prosecutor did not improperly vouch for two police witnesses or improperly comment on Defendant's right not to testify

    Plain error exists when the defendant demonstrates deprivation of a substantial right or manifest injustice.Taylor v. State, 685 A.2d 349, 350 (Del. 1996) (citing Styler v. State, 417 A.2d 948, 953 (Del. 1980); Boyd v. State, 389 A.2d 1282, 1289 (Del. 1978)).See Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 1220 (Del. 2002).

  5. Hardin v. State

    840 A.2d 1217 (Del. 2003)   Cited 13 times

    There is no requirement that testimonial evidence be corroborated either by physical evidence or corroborating testimony.Styler v. State, 417 A.2d 948, 950 (Del. 1980); see also Mghirbi v. State, 2000 WL 1011063, *2 (Del.) (ORDER).

  6. Capano v. State

    781 A.2d 556 (Del. 2001)   Cited 138 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that hearsay testimony regarding the victim's then existing state of mind was relevant to prove that the victim sought to end her romantic involvement with the defendant and that the defendant, as the spurned lover, therefore had a motive to kill her

    See Styler v. State, Del. Supr., 417 A.2d 948, 953 (1980) (finding that trial judge could properly conclude that statements by two jurors before the end of the trial indicating that they thought that the defendant was guilty was "loose talk" and did not reflect a bias against defendant).

  7. Sheeran v. State

    526 A.2d 886 (Del. 1987)   Cited 63 times
    Holding that the Court did not abuse its discretion when it did not investigate a juror's complaint that the foreperson prevented the juror from sending a note to the judge because the foreperson's conduct was not intrinsic influence about which the juror could not testify

    If only one juror is improperly influenced, a defendant in a criminal case is denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Styler v. State, Del.Supr., 417 A.2d 948, 951-52 (1980). (emphasis added).

  8. Williams v. State

    491 A.2d 1129 (Del. 1985)   Cited 6 times
    Finding prosecutor's single comment in summation that defense counsel did not act in good faith in stating his opinion of the facts and circumstances of the case inappropriate

    Courts are extremely hesitant to delve into the sanctity of a jury's verdict. Barnes v. Toppin, Del.Supr. 482 A.2d 749 (1984); Styler v. State, Del.Supr., 417 A.2d 948 (1980). However, after hearing the testimony of the defense witness, the trial judge agreed to examine certain jurors.

  9. Barnes v. Toppin

    482 A.2d 749 (Del. 1984)   Cited 13 times

    Therefore, the statements which are before the Court here were not a part of jury deliberations, and their disclosure does not violate Evidence Rule 606(b). As this Court stated in Styler v. State, Del.Supr., 417 A.2d 948, 951 (1980): "Juror bias, of course, will not be tolerated in our judicial system." We conclude that there was evidence before the trial judge from which he could, and did, find that extraneous matter, in the form of racial bias, probably played a role in the deliberations of the jury.

  10. State v. Ruiz

    I.D. #0102021276 (Del. Super. Ct. Jun. 4, 2002)   Cited 7 times

    While the State would agree that juror bias cannot be tolerated in our judicial system, there are at the same time sound reasons for limiting after-the-fact inquiries into judicial verdicts. Styler v. State, Del. Supr., 417 A.2d 948 (1980). The Courts do not want jurors to be harassed by the defeated party.