Juror bias will not be tolerated in our judicial system. If only one juror is improperly influenced, a defendant in a criminal case is denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Styler v. State, Del.Supr., 417 A.2d 948, 951-952 (1980). However, post-verdict questioning of jurors is sparingly employed because of the potential for harassment and intimidation. Burke v. State, Del.Supr., 484 A.2d 490, 500 (1984); See also Styler, 417 A.2d at 952.
The trial judge's prompt instruction concerning a single juror's vacation plans provided a "meaningful and practical alternative to a mistrial." See Moore v. State, 1992 WL 354222, at *2 (Del.); Styler v. State, 417 A.2d 948, 951 (Del. 1980).Styler, 417 A.2d at 951.
It follows that the remarks prejudicially affected Hughes' substantial rights. The State relies on our recent opinion in Styler v. State, Del.Supr., 417 A.2d 948 (1980), in arguing that its characterization of defendant's statements as "lies" did not go beyond fair comment. In Styler, under the circumstances of that case, we concluded that the statements by the prosecutor "viewed as a whole and in context" did not amount to reversible error in that case.
Plain error exists when the defendant demonstrates deprivation of a substantial right or manifest injustice.Taylor v. State, 685 A.2d 349, 350 (Del. 1996) (citing Styler v. State, 417 A.2d 948, 953 (Del. 1980); Boyd v. State, 389 A.2d 1282, 1289 (Del. 1978)).See Walker v. State, 790 A.2d 1214, 1220 (Del. 2002).
There is no requirement that testimonial evidence be corroborated either by physical evidence or corroborating testimony.Styler v. State, 417 A.2d 948, 950 (Del. 1980); see also Mghirbi v. State, 2000 WL 1011063, *2 (Del.) (ORDER).
See Styler v. State, Del. Supr., 417 A.2d 948, 953 (1980) (finding that trial judge could properly conclude that statements by two jurors before the end of the trial indicating that they thought that the defendant was guilty was "loose talk" and did not reflect a bias against defendant).
If only one juror is improperly influenced, a defendant in a criminal case is denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Styler v. State, Del.Supr., 417 A.2d 948, 951-52 (1980). (emphasis added).
Courts are extremely hesitant to delve into the sanctity of a jury's verdict. Barnes v. Toppin, Del.Supr. 482 A.2d 749 (1984); Styler v. State, Del.Supr., 417 A.2d 948 (1980). However, after hearing the testimony of the defense witness, the trial judge agreed to examine certain jurors.
Therefore, the statements which are before the Court here were not a part of jury deliberations, and their disclosure does not violate Evidence Rule 606(b). As this Court stated in Styler v. State, Del.Supr., 417 A.2d 948, 951 (1980): "Juror bias, of course, will not be tolerated in our judicial system." We conclude that there was evidence before the trial judge from which he could, and did, find that extraneous matter, in the form of racial bias, probably played a role in the deliberations of the jury.
While the State would agree that juror bias cannot be tolerated in our judicial system, there are at the same time sound reasons for limiting after-the-fact inquiries into judicial verdicts. Styler v. State, Del. Supr., 417 A.2d 948 (1980). The Courts do not want jurors to be harassed by the defeated party.