As Hurst points out, "any substance" in the context of the statute refers to any substance that may affect a driver's ability to safely operate a vehicle. See Sturgeon v. City of Vestavia Hills, 599 So. 2d 92, 93 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (concluding that (a)(5) of the statute encompasses substances other than alcohol or controlled substances that impair a person's mental or physical faculties). Taken in the light depicted by video footage, and otherwise in a light most favorable to Stallworth, the summary judgment record shows that Hurst possessed the following information at the time he placed Stallworth under arrest shortly after midnight on December 5, 2016: Hurst had observed Stallworth drive at inconsistent and erratic speeds late at night, and as she began to weave within her own lane and eventually into the adjacent lane, his focus on her narrowed.
We also presume that the legislature does not enact meaningless, vain, or futile statutes. Langham v. State, 662 So.2d 1201 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994); Sturgeon v. City of Vestavia Hills, 599 So.2d 92 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992); Powers v. State, 591 So.2d 587 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991). Because the provisions of the former § 12-16-9 are substantially similar to [the provisions of the pre-December 1, 1997, version of] Rule 19.3, the legislature must have intended to change the existing law and depart from [it].
Thus, this Court has previously held that § 32-5A-191(a)(5) "was enacted to cover those situations in which the defendant's mental and/or physical faculties are impaired by some substance other than alcohol or a controlled substance." Sturgeon v. City of Huntsville, 599 So.2d 92, 94 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) (emphasis added).
The majority correctly sets out the relevant legal principles. After quoting from this Court's analysis in Sturgeon v. City of Vestavia Hills, 599 So.2d 92 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), regarding the elements of § 32–5A–191(a)(5), Ala. Code 1975, that must be pleaded and proved to sustain a conviction, the majority states: "Thus, in order to sustain a conviction under § 32–5A–191(a)(5), Ala. Code 1975, the State must prove that the defendant was under the influence of a substance other than alcohol, a controlled substance, or a combination thereof."Then, failing to follow the legal principles it set out, the majority states, briefly and erroneously, that,
"Proof of a violation of one subsection will not support a conviction where the defendant is charged with violating a different subsection. See Sturgeon v. City of Vestavia Hills, 599 So.2d 92, 94 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992)." Stone v. City of Huntsville, 656 So.2d 404, 413 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994) (discussing five subsections of § 32-5A-191(a), Ala. Code 1975).
We also presume that the legislature does not enact meaningless, vain, or futile statutes. Langham v. State, 662 So.2d 1201 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994); Sturgeon v. City of Vestavia Hills, 599 So.2d 92 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992); Powers v. State, 591 So.2d 587 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991). Because the provisions of the former § 12-16-9 are substantially similar to Rule 19.3, the legislature must have intended to change the existing law and depart from the prior law.
We also presume that the legislature does not enact meaningless, vain, or futile statutes. Langham v. State, 662 So.2d 1201 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994); Sturgeon v. City of Vestavia Hills, 599 So.2d 92 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992); Powers v. State, 591 So.2d 587 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991). Because the provisions of the former § 12-16-9 are substantially similar to Rule 19.3, the legislature must have intended to change the existing law and depart from the prior law.
However, the appellant was not charged under this subsection and cannot be convicted under this subsection. Cf. Sturgeon v. City of Vestavia Hills, 599 So.2d (Ala.Cr.App. 1992) (a person charged with violating a subsection of the driving under the influence statute must be proven guilty and convicted under that subsection; ". . . a person charged under (a)(1) cannot be convicted under the proof required for (a)(2)," Id. at 94). The judgment of the trial court is reversed and a judgment rendered for the appellant.
Proof of a violation of one subsection will not support a conviction where the defendant is charged with violating a different subsection. See Sturgeon v. City of Vestavia Hills, 599 So.2d 92, 94 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992). Consequently, had the prosecution introduced evidence that the appellant was under the "combined influence of alcohol and a controlled substance," it would have proved a violation of § 32-5A-191(a)(4), rather than a violation of § 32-5A-191(a)(2), and the jury instruction complained of would clearly have been error.