Stumpf v. Stumpf

6 Citing cases

  1. Holler v. Holler

    257 Ga. 27 (Ga. 1987)   Cited 14 times

    We reverse. See Stumpf v. Stumpf, 249 Ga. 759, fn. 1 ( 294 S.E.2d 488) (1982). Assuming that vested and unvested military retirement benefits acquired during the marriage are now marital property subject to equitable division (see Stumpf, supra; Courtney v. Courtney, 256 Ga. 97 (2) ( 344 S.E.2d 421) (1986)), the issue before us is whether the divorce decree, which purported to settle all issues regarding alimony and property division, can be modified so as to grant an equitable division of these benefits, which were not subject to equitable division at the time of the divorce.

  2. Courtney v. Courtney

    256 Ga. 97 (Ga. 1986)   Cited 18 times

    Mullinax v. Mullinax, 234 Ga. 553 ( 216 S.E.2d 802) (1975). Compare Stumpf v. Stumpf, 249 Ga. 759, 761 ( 294 S.E.2d 488) (1982), where we held that evidence of military retirement benefits already being collected by the husband was relevant and admissible on the alimony issue. With evidence before it concerning the length of the marriage, the contributions made by the wife in furtherance of the husband's career and the conditions which must be satisfied before the retirement benefits become vested, the jury can decide whether or not an alimony award is in order and the amount to be paid. Whether lump sum or periodic, any such award may reflect the jury's consideration of the husband's potential retirement benefits.

  3. Baldree v. Baldree

    306 S.E.2d 654 (Ga. 1983)   Cited 4 times

    The instant case is more like Hand v. Hand, 244 Ga. 41 ( 257 S.E.2d 507) (1979), where we said that an inheritance received after the institution of divorce proceedings is subject to the award of alimony. We find further support for our conclusion in Stumpf v. Stumpf, 249 Ga. 759 ( 294 S.E.2d 488) (1982), which examines the question of whether military retirement pay of an already retired party is relevant to the determination of an alimony award in a divorce action. We held that such retirement pay is relevant to the jury's determination of an award of alimony, and we further stated that a jury can hear evidence of all of a party's assets as relevant to such an award.

  4. King v. King

    225 Ga. App. 298 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that, although generally state law rather than federal law controls domestic relations matters, federal law preempted state law where Congress enacted specific conditions under which former spouse awarded SBP benefits in state court divorce decree may be elected beneficiary of annuity under SBP

    McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. [210, 220 (101 SC 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589) (1981)]." Stumpf v. Stumpf, 249 Ga. 759, 760 ( 294 S.E.2d 488) (1982). In McCarty, supra, the Supreme Court held that, because the application of state community property principles to the allocation of military retirement pay threatened clear and substantial federal interests embodied in the applicable federal statutes governing such pay, the application of such state law was federally preempted.

  5. In re Appling

    186 B.R. 1013 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995)   Cited 1 times

    In awarding alimony, juries have virtually unlimited power in terms of the scope of property subject to such an award and the structure or manner of its payment. See O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5(a); see also Stumpf v. Stumpf, 249 Ga. 759, 760, 294 S.E.2d 488 (1982). Accordingly, a jury, in the exercise of its broad discretion, may decide that an award of an absolute estate is the best way to address adequately the support needs in a particular situation.

  6. In re Ackley

    186 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994)   Cited 1 times
    Noting that the structure of a provision — whether payment is lump sum or periodic, method of payment, terms of payment, amount of payment, whether payment is modifiable, and whether payment is subject to contingencies — is an important element in determining whether the provision is one for support or a property division

    A jury has virtually unlimited power in awarding alimony in terms of the scope of property subject to such an award and the structure or manner of its payment. See O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5(a); see also Stumpf v. Stumpf, 249 Ga. 759, 760, 294 S.E.2d 488 (1982). Additionally, the immunity of lump sum alimony awards from modification played a basic role in their development as a means of fully meeting all of an ex-spouse's needs.