Opinion
6:21-CV-06256 EAW, 6:21-CV-6370 EAW, 6:21-CV-06371 EAW
2022-06-06
Nicholas Bates STUMPF, Petitioner, v. NYS DEPARTMENT OF CHILD PROTECTION SERVICES, Respondent. Nicholas Bates Stumpf, Petitioner, v. NYS Child Protection, Respondent. Nicholas Bates Stumpf, Petitioner, v. NYS Child Protection, Respondent.
Nicholas Bates Stumpf, Hamlin, NY, Pro Se.
Nicholas Bates Stumpf, Hamlin, NY, Pro Se.
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge
INTRODUCTION
Pro se petitioner Nicholas Bates Stumpf ("Petitioner") filed these related actions against respondent NYS Child Protection ("Respondent"), seeking a writ of habeas corpus. (See Stumpf v. NYS Child Protection Services, Case No. 21-CV-06256, Dkt. 1 ("Action 1"); Stumpf v. NYS Child Protection , Case No. 21-CV-06370, Dkt. 1 ("Action 2") and Stumpf v. NYS Child Protection , Case No. 21-CV-06371, Dkt. 1 ("Action 3")). The docket reflects that Petitioner paid the $5.00 filing fee in Action 2 and Action 3.
Action 1, which is styled a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" (see Action 1, Dkt. 1), is docketed as a complaint seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The civil cover sheet submitted with the Petition states that Plaintiff is seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for civil rights violations (see id. , Dkt. 1-1); however, Docket 1 demonstrates that substantively Petitioner is seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner filed in Action 1 an application to proceed in forma pauperis , which is pending. (Id. , Dkt. 2). Plaintiff's affirmation of poverty has been reviewed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). He has met the statutory requirements for in forma pauperis status and permission to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. Given that the pleading filed in Action 1 is a Petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus, the Court will treat that action as such.
Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the district court must review the petition, and "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner." The Court has reviewed the Petitions in each case (Action 1, Dkt. 1; Action 2, Dkt. 1; Action 3, Dkt. 1), and as further explained below, finds that the Petitions must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Petitions. (Action 1, Dkt. 1; Action 2; Dkt. 1; Action 3, Dkt. 1). As is required at this stage of the proceedings, the Court treats Petitioner's allegations as true.
The petitions are based on the same set of facts. Petitioner alleges that his daughter and son (Action 1, Dkt. 1), and then separately his son (Action 2, Dkt. 1) and his daughter (Action 3, Dkt. 1), were taken from him on or about May 11, 2020, and restrained by Respondent. He believes that the "cause or pretext" of the restraint "is that Petitioner gave up h[is] parental rights to the Child, which is untrue." He alleges that he wishes to have their care, custody, and control restored to him, but that Respondent has refused, despite Petitioner's several demands. He alleges that the confinement and restraint of each child is unlawful, because Petitioner is the guardian of the children, and there exists no outstanding court order terminating Petitioner's parental rights over them, or granting legal custody of the children to Respondent, or to any other person. He asks that the Court issue a writ of habeas corpus commanding Respondent to have each child appear before the Court. (Action 1, Dkt. 1 at 1-4; Action 2, Dkt. 1 at 1-2; Action 3, Dkt. 1 at 1-2).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner alleges that his children have been in the custody of Respondent since May 11, 2020, despite that he has not given up his parental rights. "It is well established that a petition for habeas relief pursuant to section 2254 is not an appropriate vehicle for challenging a child custody determination." Woolsey on behalf of R.M.R. v. Mitzel , No. 1:17-CV-0074 (TJM/DEP), 2017 WL 2241527, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2017), adopted , 2017 WL 2242953 (N.D.N.Y. May 22, 2017) ; Davis v. Baldwin , 594 F. App'x 49, 50 (2d Cir. 2015) ("As the district court observed ... Davis cannot challenge a child-custody determination pursuant to a habeas corpus petition. Accordingly, we decline to grant a [certificate of appealability] and dismiss the appeal from the denial of Davis's habeas corpus petition for lack of jurisdiction." (citation omitted)); Middleton v. Attnys. Gen. of New York, Pennsylvania , 396 F.3d 207, 209-10 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that "federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review by means of a habeas application a state court's child-custody determination," and rejecting argument that a different conclusion was warranted because petitioner's parental rights had not been terminated); see also Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Children's Servs. Agency , 458 U.S. 502, 510-11, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982) (finding that children in foster care are not "in the custody" of the state within the meaning of section 2254, and explaining that children in foster homes "are not prisoners. Nor do they suffer any restrictions imposed by a state criminal justice system. These factors alone distinguish this case from all other cases in which this Court has sustained habeas challenges to state-court judgments."). Accordingly, the Court does not have jurisdiction to review the custody determinations pertaining to Petitioner's children, and it may dismiss the petitions on this basis alone.
The Court has the authority to grant Petitioner leave to amend his Petitions to complaints asserting causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Woolsey , 2017 WL 2241527, at *3 ("Although petitioner has selected the wrong procedural vehicle to challenge the custodial circumstances of R.M.R., the court retains the inherent authority to grant her leave to amend her petition to a complaint asserting causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983."); Snyder v. Kelly , 769 F. Supp. 108, 112 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Because granting a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus has been determined to be inappropriate, this Court must find ... that relief for any prejudice suffered by this petitioner is best obtained through a suit for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983."). The Court declines to do so in this instance because Plaintiff has already filed such an action based on the removal of his children, which alleges constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Stumpf v. Maywalt, et al. , Case No. 21-CV-06248, Dkt. 1 (making allegations against individuals allegedly involved in removing Petitioner's children)). The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint in that action, should he choose to do so.
In addition, the Petitions may also be dismissed pursuant to the abstention doctrine articulated in Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). "Under the abstention doctrine ... a district court must dismiss the federal action if it involves ongoing: (1) state criminal prosecutions; (2) civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions; or (3) civil proceedings that implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts." Davis , 594 F. App'x at 51 (quotations and citations omitted). "[A] state-initiated proceeding to gain custody of children allegedly abused by their parents falls within the second category." Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
Although it is not entirely clear from the Petitions, Petitioner's allegations indicate that the removal proceedings are ongoing and not final. For example, Petitioner alleges that there is no court order terminating his parental rights or granting legal custody of the children to any other person. See Davis , 594 F. App'x at 51 ("Because Davis does not dispute that the federal action here involved an ongoing, state-initiated custody proceeding, the proper basis for the district court's dismissal was the Younger abstention doctrine."); McIntosh v. White , No. 16-CV-6654 (PKC)(LB), 2017 WL 1533539, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2017) (plaintiff's lawsuit, in which he asked the court to review and intervene in ongoing New York Family Court custody proceedings relating to her daughter and granddaughter, was barred by the Younger abstention doctrine). Accordingly, because the allegations contained in the Petitions indicate that any custody dispute is ongoing and not final, they must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Because the Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims in the Petitions, they are dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk of Court is instructed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent and to close these cases.
Further, because Petitioner has not made "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. Likewise, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Decision and Order would not be taken in good faith and, therefore leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals as a poor person is denied. Coppedge v. United States , 369 U.S. 438, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 (1962). Any request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal should be directed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in accordance with Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SO ORDERED.