However, a petition for rehearing should only ask for a rehearing on points that were properly presented to the court in the original petitions and which were overlooked or improperly decided by the court. See New York Life Insurance Co. v. Henriksen, 421 N.E.2d 1117, 1118 (Ind.App. 1981); Stucker v. College Life Insurance Co. of America, 139 Ind. App. 422, 440-41, 211 N.E.2d 320, 321 (1965) (in banc), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 934, 87 S.Ct. 958, 17 L.Ed.2d 806 (1967); Daviess-Martin Co. Rural Telephone Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 132 Ind. App. 610, 625, 175 N.E.2d 439, 440 (1961) (in banc), Kennedy v. Kennedy, 241 Ind. 633, 638, 174 N.E.2d 410, 411 (1961) (per curiam). Petitioner did not properly present the Fourth Amendment issue in his original petition.
"The trial court must give effect to what the parties expressly agreed upon" instead of "plac[ing] a strained interpretation thereon contrary to the intent of the parties. . . ." Tucker v. College Life Insurance Company of America, 139 Ind. App. 422, 438, 208 N.E.2d 711, 739 (1965). Policies should be interpreted according to the parties' mutual understanding at the time they entered into the contract and "[s]uch mutual intention is to be deduced, if possible, from the language of the contract alone."
Courts in Indiana have invoked this rule of construction when interpreting insurance contracts as well. See Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Lamb, 361 N.E.2d 174, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); Stucker v. College Life Ins. Co., 139 Ind. App. 422, 438, 208 N.E.2d 731, 739 (1965). This rule of construction applies without doubt in the present case.
Any question which has not been briefed or argued in the briefs on appeal cannot be raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing. City of Indianapolis v. Wynn (1959), 239 Ind. 567, 159 N.E.2d 572. The petition is to be confined to those issues which were properly presented in the initial appeal and which were overlooked or improperly decided. Stucker v. College Life Ins. Co. of America (1965), 139 Ind. App. 422, 211 N.E.2d 320. As such, we will not consider Ms. Henriksen's contentions. In her capacity as administratrix, Ms. Henriksen also attempts to re-argue issues which have been previously passed on by this Court.
Simply stated, this Court is not obligated on rehearing to address an issue not theretofore presented for our consideration. Pintozzi v. Small (1959), 130 Ind. App. 570, 161 N.E.2d 380. Such tardily-raised questions are waived.Id.; Browne v.Blood (1964), 245 Ind. 447, 199 N.E.2d 712, 713; State v. Indianapolis Airport Authority (1977), Ind. App., 366 N.E.2d 240; Stucker v. College Life Ins. Co. (1965), 139 Ind. App. 422, 211 N.E.2d 320, 321; Daviess-Martin County Rural Tel. Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1961), 132 Ind. App. 610, 175 N.E.2d 439, 440; Groves v. Burton (1955), 125 Ind. App. 302, 123 N.E.2d 705, 707. Inasmuch as Hiles has waived his right to have this Court address his argument, we do not reach Homeowners' contention that Hiles' "Reply brief" should be stricken on the basis that it was not timely filed.
Simply stated, this Court is not obligated on rehearing to address an issue not theretofore presented for our consideration. Pintozzi v. Small (1959), 130 Ind. App. 570, 161 N.E.2d 380. Such tardily-raised questions are waived. Id.; Browne v. Blood (1964), 245 Ind. 447, 199 N.E.2d 712, 713; State v. Indianapolis Airport Authority (1977), 173 Ind. App. 55, 362 N.E.2d 200; Stucker v. College Life Ins. Co. (1965), 139 Ind. App. 422, 211 N.E.2d 320, 321; Daviess-Martin County Rural Tel. Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1961), 132 Ind. App. 610, 175 N.E.2d 439, 440; Groves v. Burton (1955), 125 Ind. App. 302, 123 N.E.2d 705, 707. This Court may, however, modify its mandate when it is informed upon Rehearing that the condition of the parties has been materially changed during the pendency of the appeal.
A party may raise in his petition for rehearing only those issues which were presented at the first hearing but [1] overlooked or improperly decided. Stucker v. College Life Ins. Co. (1965), 139 Ind. App. 422, 211 N.E.2d 320. In his petition for rehearing, Fields challenges certain events which occurred after we filed our opinion October 17, 1978.
We are constrained to give the words of an insurance policy their popular and ordinary meaning. Stucker v. College Life Ins. Co. (1965), 139 Ind. App. 422, 208 N.E.2d 731, 4-5. rehearing denied 211 N.E.2d 320, cert denied; 386 U.S. 934; Hartford Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Everett (1930), 93 Ind. App. 238, 169 N.E. 473; Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County (1894), 151 U.S. 452, 14 S.Ct. 379, 38 L.Ed. 231. In so doing, we are bound to hold that the term "waves" given its popular and ordinary meaning is a generic term which encompasses both those waves which are motivated by natural forces and those motivated by artificial forces.
This court has previously declared that its function is not to remake an insurance contract. Stucker v. College Life 3. Insurance Co. of America (1965), 139 Ind. App. 422, 208 N.E.2d 731. We do not intend to change this rule in the case at bar.