Stubbs v. Stubbs

2 Citing cases

  1. Yowell v. Granite Operating Co.

    630 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. App. 2021)   Cited 3 times

    However, the Rule is not concerned with whether an interest might never vest; the Rule provides only that if an interest is going to vest, it must do so within the period of the Rule. Peveto , 645 S.W.2d at 772 ; Stubbs v. Stubbs , 447 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. App.—Waco 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("the [R]ule requires only that the [interest] will necessarily become vested, if it vests at all , within a life or lives in being and 21 years plus the period of gestation."). We agree with the Yowells that their interest can be reformed to come within the limits of the Rule by imposing a limitation on the time period for the contingencies to either be satisfied or not.

  2. Kritser v. First Nat'l Bank of Amarillo

    463 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)   Cited 2 times

    "The conclusion that the remainder in the child or children is contingent rather than vested is also impelled by the words 'if any survive him'. Survival is made a condition precedent to the vesting of the remainder rather than a condition of defeasance." Following Guilliams are Coker v. Eckert, 369 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth, 1963, error ref., n.r.e.); and Stubbs v. Stubbs, 447 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco, 1969, error ref. n.r.e.). See also, Hunt v. Carroll, 157 S.W.2d 429, 437 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont, 1941), error dismissed 140 Tex. 424, 168 S.W.2d 238 (1943).