Opinion
CV176069309S
01-18-2019
Tonya STUBBS v. ICARE MANAGEMENT, LLC
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Sybil V. Richards, Judge
The defendants, iCare Management, LLC, and Meriden Care Center, LLC, move for summary judgment as to the entirety of the plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case to support any of her claims and there are no genuine issues of material fact to support the plaintiff’s claims of disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, retaliation or aiding and abetting. The defendants argue that even if the plaintiff were able to establish a prima facie case, she is unable to refute the defendants’ legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. The plaintiff objects on the grounds that there are genuine issues of material fact that exist.
FACTS
The plaintiff, Tanya Stubbs, alleges the following facts in her complaint. The defendants are iCare Management, LLC (iCare), which is a limited liability company that manages Silver Springs Care Center in Meriden, and Meriden Care Center, LLC (Meriden), which is a limited liability company that does business at Silver Springs Care Center (Silver Springs). Meriden and iCare jointly employed the plaintiff from April of 2015 until February 17, 2016. The plaintiff was employed as a certified nursing assistant (CNA) and worked twenty hours per week. The plaintiff was qualified for the job and performed her job at or above a satisfactory level. The plaintiff can perform the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation. The plaintiff has a physical disability from which she suffers chronic, degenerative changes of the right knee. On February 16, 2016, the plaintiff underwent total knee replacement surgery and was required to take a leave of absence from work because of the surgery. The plaintiff notified both defendants of the knee surgery and her leave of absence. Both defendants were aware that the leave of absence was for the plaintiff’s knee surgery and the leave of absence was for a period of approximately three months. The plaintiff went out on leave on February 10, 2016. The defendants told the plaintiff in advance of the leave that she did not have to come in to work because they were overbooked, that she was going out shortly to have surgery and to go ahead and take two sick days. The defendants notified the plaintiff that she was terminated via telephone while she was in the hospital recovering from knee surgery.
iCare and Meriden were both named as defendants in this action. Hereinafter, iCare and Meriden, collectively, are referred to as the defendants and individually are referred to by name where appropriate.
The plaintiff filed charges against the defendants with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) on May 5, 2016. On January 31, 2017, the plaintiff received a release of the jurisdiction from the CHRO. On March 30, 2017, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants. In her first two counts, the plaintiff alleged disability discrimination in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA) as to Meriden and iCare, respectively. In her third and fourth counts, the plaintiff alleged retaliation in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(4) as to Meriden and iCare, respectively. In her fifth and sixth counts, the plaintiff alleged failure to accommodate in violation of § 46a-60(a)(1) as to Meriden and iCare, respectively. In her seventh count, the plaintiff alleged aiding and abetting in violation of § 46a-60(a)(5) as to iCare.
On April 26, 2018, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint. The defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case to support any of her claims. Alternatively, the defendants also move for summary judgment on the ground that even if the plaintiff were able to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff’s employment was terminated for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. On August 8, 2018, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because genuine issues of material fact exist. On September 21, 2018, the defendants filed a reply in further support of their motion for summary judgment. The motions were heard at short calendar on September 24, 2018.
DISCUSSION
"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried ... However, since litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury ... the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard ... of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534-35, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). "In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ... As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tully, 322 Conn. 566, 573, 142 A.3d 1079 (2016).
I.
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
"The legal standards governing discrimination claims involving adverse employment actions are well established. The framework this court employs in assessing disparate treatment discrimination claims under Connecticut law was adapted from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and its progeny ... Furthermore, it is well settled that [w]e look to federal law for guidance on interpreting state employment discrimination law, and the analysis is the same under both." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 157 Conn.App. 312, 325-26, 115 A.3d 1143 (2015), aff’d, 324 Conn. 470, 153 A.3d 615 (2016).
"In general, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination [under the McDonnell Douglas Corp.-Burdine framework], the complainant must demonstrate that (1) he is in the protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination ... The level of proof required to establish a prima facie case is minimal and need not reach the level required to support a jury verdict in the plaintiff’s favor ... Under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine [framework], the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff ... Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, however, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating (not proving) some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s rejection ... Because the plaintiff’s initial prima facie case does not require proof of discriminatory intent, the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine [framework] does not shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant. Therefore, [t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons ... It is sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff ... Once the defendant offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff then has an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reason is pretextual." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomick v. United Parcel Services, Inc., supra, 157 Conn.App. 326-27.
"The pretext/McDonnell Douglas Corp.-Burdine framework is not an exclusive means of proving employment discrimination in Connecticut. Depending on the circumstances of the case, a plaintiff may be able to prove his claim under a different framework. A mixed-motive case exists when an employment decision is motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate reasons ... In such instances, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer’s decision was motivated by one or more prohibited statutory factors. Whether through direct evidence or circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must submit enough evidence that, if believed, could reasonably allow a [fact finder] to conclude that the adverse employment consequences resulted because of an impermissible factor ... The critical inquiry [in a mixed-motive case] is whether [a] discriminatory motive was a factor in the [employment] decision at the moment it was made ... Under this model, the plaintiff’s prima facie case requires that the plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is within a protected class and that an impermissible factor played a motivating or substantial role in the employment decision ... Once the plaintiff has established his prima facie case, the burden of production and persuasion shifts to the defendant. [T]he defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken [the impermissible factor] into account." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 157 Conn.App. 312, 325 n.5, 115, A.3d 1143 (2015), aff’d, 324 Conn. 470, 153 A.3d 615 (2016).
"Both the [Americans with Disability Act] ADA and [Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act] CFEPA prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability and apply the same legal framework to the discrimination analysis." Green v. Cellco Partnership, 218 F.Sup.3d 157, 162 (D.Conn. 2016). "These claims of disability discrimination are subject to the familiar McDonnell Douglas Corp[. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) ] burden-shifting standard ... Thus, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case for discrimination if he can show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) his employer is subject to the ADA/CFEPA; (2) he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA/CFEPA; (3) he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) he suffered adverse employment action because of his disability." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted.) Id.
"The burden of establishing a prima facie case [of discrimination] is a burden of production, not a burden of proof, and therefore involves no credibility assessment by the fact finder ... The level of proof required to establish a prima facie case is minimal and need not reach the level required to support a jury verdict in the plaintiff’s favor." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Phadnis v. Great Expression Dental Centers of Connecticut, P.C., 170 Conn.App. 79, 87, 153 A.3d 687 (2017).
The defendants contend that the plaintiff cannot satisfy her initial burden to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination because her deposition testimony directly contradicts an inference that the defendants took an adverse employment action against her because of her disability. The defendants argue that the plaintiff expressly admitted that she was treated like everyone else and therefore, concedes any argument that she faced adverse employment action based on her disability. Specifically, the defendants point to the plaintiff’s deposition testimony in which she testified that she was suing Silver Springs because they were unfair to her. The plaintiff testified that everyone was treated in a rude manner and when asked "[t]here is nothing in particular about you that they are mean, you just think they are bad people," the plaintiff responded "[y]eah."
All direct quotations attributed to the plaintiff are from her deposition testimony.
In her objection to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff argues that the defendants’ employees mocked the plaintiff for her disability and refused to help her reach items that were set too high for her. In her deposition the plaintiff testified that people were not really helpful when she couldn’t reach certain items due to her height. The plaintiff made the following statement. "Sometimes they go ‘I don’t have the time, ’ or "[w]ait for so and so," you know." The plaintiff stated that she complained to management at Silver Springs that people were not helpful, however, the plaintiff did not present evidence of a complaint regarding the matter to the court. The plaintiff also contends that the defendants terminated her after she went on a leave of absence so that she could have the surgery necessitated by her job as a CNA.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence showing she was terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Albeit thin, the plaintiff has produced evidence demonstrating a causal connection that can be inferred on the basis of temporal proximity. The plaintiff stated that she told the defendants "months before the surgery" that she was going to need knee surgery. Before the plaintiff was due to start her leave of absence, the plaintiff stated that she received a call not to come to work on the sixth and seventh of February 2016. The plaintiff was then terminated on February 17, 2016 due to a second occurrence of a no call/no show activity for not reporting to work on the sixth and seventh of February 2016. See O’Neil v. Woodbridge, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-16-6060577-S (December 7, 2017, Wahla, J.) ("[i]n regard to the fourth element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, circumstances that may give rise to an inference of discrimination are: (1) the employer’s continuing, after discharging the plaintiff, to seek applicants from persons of the plaintiff’s qualifications to fill that position; (2) the employer’s criticism of the plaintiff’s performance in ethnically degrading terms or invidious comments about others in the employee’s protected group; (3) the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group; or (4) the sequence of events leading to the plaintiff’s discharge or the timing of the discharge" [internal quotation marks omitted]).
The defendants have produced a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s termination. The defendants presented evidence to the court that shows the plaintiff violated its absenteeism policy on at least three separate occasions. The plaintiff argues that the nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s termination is pretextual because the defendant cannot demonstrate that the plaintiff was actually a no call/no show on both of the days in question. The plaintiff argues that the defendant’s records only indicate that the plaintiff was only absent on February 6, 2016. In her deposition, the plaintiff stated that she did not show up for work on the sixth and seventh of February 2016, and that her absence had nothing to do with her surgery. The plaintiff stated that she received a call not to come to work on the sixth and seventh of February 2016 and that the women in her workplace were called quite often and told that they were overbooked. The plaintiff, however, does not argue that the women in her workplace were similarly situated or has presented evidence establishing that the reason for the calls were motivated by illegal discriminatory bias.
The plaintiff’s statements during her deposition about whether the defendants’ treatment towards her was motivated by her disability, furthermore, do not establish a genuine issue of material fact that the defendants’ decision to terminate her was pretextual. The plaintiff testified that she did not believe that anything about her was a factor in the defendants’ treatment towards her. When asked why did she believe the defendants discriminated against her because of her disability, the plaintiff stated that she believed she was being discriminated against because of the "the way they treated me, kidded me." Upon the defense counsel’s inquiry that "[y]ou just told me they treated everyone poorly," the plaintiff stated "[n]o ... they put stuff on the top shelf, stuff like that." The plaintiff stated that she did not complain to management about the behavior because "it goes over their head anyways." When asked whether there were any accommodations for her height, the plaintiff responded that she would have to ask somebody and that people were not helpful. The plaintiff then stated that she complained to management, but "it flew over their head." The plaintiff did not produce evidence of the complaint to the court. Furthermore, the plaintiff stated that she never complained to anybody about not receiving help for her knee issues or her physical condition because it was not an issue for her.
In sum, there is a dearth of evidence that fails to demonstrate that the defendants’ decision to terminate the plaintiff was motivated by illegal discriminatory bias. The plaintiff’s unsubstantiated and conclusory statements along with the failure of the plaintiff to present evidence demonstrating that the defendants’ alleged calls to the plaintiff to inform her that they were overbooked was motivated in whole or in part by illegal discriminatory bias does not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants’ decision to terminate her was pretextual and was motivated by illegal discriminatory bias. Phadnis v. Great Expression Dental Centers of Connecticut, P.C., supra, 170 Conn.App. 97 ("[o]ur courts have long held that summary judgment may not be based on or opposed by inadmissible evidence of self-serving, unsubstantiated speculation or conclusory statements or denials" [emphasis omitted]).
The defendants argue, on another ground, that the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination because the plaintiff testified after surgery that she could not perform the job function of a CNA. During her deposition, the plaintiff testified on several occasions that she was unable to perform the job functions of a CNA following her surgery. When asked whether she disagreed with her orthopedist’s assessment that she can return to full duty immediately with no restrictions, the plaintiff testified that she did not know why the orthopedist made that assessment and that she disagreed with the assessment. The plaintiff contends that all of the evidence needs to be considered when analyzing the plaintiff’s actual ability to perform the essential functions of a CNA. The evidence shows that the plaintiff was unable to perform the essential functions of her job as a CNA at the time of the adverse employment action and remained unable to do so at least until the time of her deposition in March of 2018. Desmond v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc., 738 F.Supp.2d 331, 346 (D.Conn. 2010) ("[b]ased upon the foregoing evidence, including the repeated admissions of the Plaintiff, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff was unable to perform the essential functions of her job as a physician assistant at the time of her termination, and remained unable to so at least until the time of her continued deposition"); see also Daley v. Cablevision Systems Corporation, United States District Court, Docket No. 12-CV-6316 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y. March 7, 2016), aff’d, 675 Fed.Appx. 97 (2d Cir. 2017) ("During his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he suffered from muscle spasms, has not regained full use of his shoulder, is in continuous pain, and cannot work ... Clear[l]y then, Plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of an AFS Tech. Indeed, where an employee concedes that he is unable to work at all, he is per se unable to perform the essential functions of his position" [citation omitted]).
II. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
"In order to survive a motion for summary judgment on a reasonable accommodation claim, the plaintiff must produce enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the [statute], (2) he was able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation, and (3) [the defendant], despite knowing of [the plaintiff’s] disability, did not reasonably accommodate it ... If the employee has made such a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the employer to show that such an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on its business." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 415-16, 944 A.2d 925 (2008). Additionally, "[i]n order to survive summary judgment on a reasonable accommodation claim, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that an accommodation would enable him to perform the functions of the job and that, at least on the face of things, it is feasible for the employer to provide the accommodation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 419.
The defendant argues that there is no evidence in the record that plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation, other than time off for her knee surgery, which was granted and by her own admission unrelated to her no call/no show on the sixth and seventh of February 2016. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the defendants effectively denied the plaintiff the leave of absence accommodation because the defendants terminated the plaintiff shortly after her leave commenced. The plaintiff, however, has not provided evidence that the leave of absence accommodation would have ever allowed her to perform the essential functions of the job. As discussed previously in the memorandum, the evidence shows that the plaintiff was unable to perform the essential functions of her job as a CNA at the time of the adverse employment action and remained unable to do so at least until the time of her deposition in March of 2018. The plaintiff testified in her deposition that she was physically unable to work even after the alleged three-month period requested for the leave of absence. The plaintiff, therefore, is unable to establish a prima facie case for her reasonable accommodation claim.
III.
RETALIATION
The defendants next move for summary judgment as to counts three and four on the ground that the plaintiff cannot establish the first element of a retaliation claim. A prima facie case of retaliation requires a plaintiff to show (1) that he or she participated in a protected activity that was known to the defendant, (2) an employment action that disadvantaged the plaintiff, and (3) a causal relation between the protected activity and the disadvantageous employment action. See Hebrew Home & Hospital, Inc. v. Brewer, 92 Conn.App. 762, 770, 886 A.2d 1248 (2005). Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden then shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate reason for taking such employment action against the defendant. See Hill v. Pinkerton Security & Investigation Services, Inc., 977 F.Supp. 148, 157 (D.Conn. 1997). Once the defendant produces evidence of a legitimate reason, the plaintiff must then prove that the defendant acted with a retaliatory motive or animus, even if such a motive or animus was not the sole cause for the employment action. Id.
The defendant argues that the plaintiff is unable to establish a genuine issue of material fact that she participated in a protected activity because a request for medical leave is not a protected activity. The plaintiff contends that the plaintiff’s protected activity was her request to management for an accommodation for her disability. The plaintiff argues that Connecticut courts have recognized that asking for a reasonable accommodation is protected activity and cites Dwyer v. Waterfront Enterprises, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-12-6032894-S (May 24, 2013, Fischer, J.) (56 Conn. L. Rptr. 232) in support of her proposition.
There is a split amongst the Connecticut courts regarding the issue of whether a request for accommodation is a protected activity under § 46a-60(b)(4). The Dwyer v. Waterfront Enterprises, Inc. decision notes that "[t]he few Connecticut courts that have considered the issue have concluded that [General Statutes] § 46a-60(a)(4) does not protect an employee who makes a request for a reasonable accommodation." Dwyer v. Waterfront Enterprises, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-12-6032894-S. The Dwyer court, moreover, held that "[a]ccordingly, [the plaintiff’s] allegation that [the employer] terminated him for seeking a medical leave of absence, while not sufficient to establish a violation of § 46a-60(a)(4), is nonetheless sufficient to support a cause of action under 46a-60(a)(1)." Id. (noting in a footnote that the plaintiff’s allegation of retaliation was not grounded exclusively in General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(4); see also Sheehy v. Big Y Foods, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-12-6014260-S (October 31, 2012, Agati, J.) (54 Conn. L. Rptr. 887) ("this court cannot interpret the plaintiff’s request for reasonable accommodation for his disabilities ... as acts in opposition to unlawful employment practices by the defendants"); Setkoski v. University of Connecticut Health Center, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-10-6012794-S (May 10, 2012, Domnarski, J.) ("[t]aking leave was not an opposition to an unlawful employment practice and is not a protected activity"); but see Soyka-Knopf v. Bach Investments Plus, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-16-6073085-S (September 7, 2018, Dubay, J.) (a request for a reasonable accommodation is protected activity under § 46a-60(a)(4)); Perez v. State Judicial Dept., Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV-15-6009136-S (April 10, 2017, Calmar, J.) (64 Conn. L. Rptr. 303) ("Moreover, the CHRO has interpreted § 46a-60(a)(4) to include a request for reasonable accommodation as protected activity under the statute ... For the foregoing reasons, it is reasonable for the court to conclude, in line with federal precedent and the CHRO’s interpretation, that a request for a reasonable accommodation is protected activity under § 46a-60a(a)(4)." [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]); Reddick v. Southern Connecticut State University, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-11-6021301-S (December 3, 2015, Wilson, J.) ("Given the foregoing, it can be said that two principles control the court’s interpretation of the CFEPA. First, the legislature intended for the statute to be interpreted in line with its federal counterparts, and second, that in the rare case where the interpretation of the CFEPA differs from that of the federal antidiscrimination statutes, it is because the CFEPA offers greater, not less, remedial relief for the plaintiff. Under these principles, the restricted interpretation afforded the scope of protected activity for the purpose of a retaliation claim advanced under Setkosky, Sheehy, and Dwyer is unworkable, and it is reasonable for the court to conclude, in line with federal precedent, that a request for a reasonable accommodation is a protected activity under § 46a-60(a)(4)").
General Statutes § 46a-60(b)(4) provides: "It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section ... [f]or any person, employer, labor organization or employment agency to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because such person has opposed any discriminatory employment practice or because such person has filed a complaint or testified or assisted in any proceeding under [General Statutes §] 46a-82, 46a-83 or 46a-84 ..."
"[I]t is reasonable for the court to conclude, in line with federal precedent, that a request for a reasonable accommodation is a protected activity under § 46a-60(a)(4)." Reddick v. Southern Connecticut State University, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-11-6021301-S. "[C]ausation may be satisfied by showing a sufficiently close temporal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Soyka-Knopf v. Bach Investments Plus, LLC, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-16-6073085-S. Therefore, because the plaintiff was terminated within several months of her requesting a medical leave for her surgery, the plaintiff has established a prima facie case as to whether the defendants retaliated against the plaintiff.
As discussed previously in the memorandum, the defendants have produced a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s termination and the plaintiff has not shown that the defendants acted with a retaliatory motive or animus, even if such a motive or animus was not the sole cause for the termination. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to counts three and four are granted.
The plaintiff also argues in her objection that she engaged in a protected activity when she complained to management that other employees were not being helpful and the defendants did not respond to the plaintiff’s requests for help. Assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiff has established that her complaint constituted a protected activity, the plaintiff nonetheless fails to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because the evidence does not establish a causal relation between her termination and her requests for help. The plaintiff has not provided evidence of a complaint regarding her requests for help, nor has she presented evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her termination was motivated in any manner by her requests for help.
IV. AIDING AND ABETTING
The defendant, iCare, also moves for summary judgment as to count seven of the plaintiff’s complaint. iCare moves for summary judgment as to count seven on the grounds that (1) it cannot be liable for discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation under counts one through six, while at the same time be liable for aiding and abetting its own conduct, (2) it is not an appropriate defendant for a claim of aiding and abetting because it is not a person, and (3) the plaintiff failed to identify any individual at iCare Management who was alleged to have aided and abetted in any discriminatory conduct. The plaintiff contends that the defendant, Meriden, refused to help the plaintiff after she voiced her concerns regarding her disability to management and that the defendant, iCare, helped Meriden with that discrimination by managing Meriden’s facility and by doing nothing to stop the illegal discrimination that the plaintiff faced. The plaintiff argues that a reasonable juror could find that Meriden supervised the plaintiff and her coworkers, and by their actions, supported the discrimination the plaintiff faced.
"CFEPA makes it unlawful [f]or any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any act declared to be a discriminatory employment practice or to attempt to do so ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Farrar v. Town of Stratford, 537 F.Supp.2d 332, 356 (D.Conn. 2008). "The law in Connecticut is clear that while an individual employee may be held liable for aiding and abetting his employer’s discrimination, an employer cannot be liable for aiding and abetting its own discriminatory conduct." Id.
The defendant, iCare, is entitled to summary judgment as to count seven. In count seven, the plaintiff alleges that iCare aided and abetted illegal disability discrimination, illegal retaliation, and the failure to accommodate. Additionally, the plaintiff alleges in her complaint that both defendants jointly employed the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges further in counts two, four, and six that iCare discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of her disability, via retaliation for requesting a reasonable accommodation, and by failing to accommodate the plaintiff. The defendant, iCare, therefore, cannot have discriminated against the plaintiff, and, at the same time, aided and abetted itself in discriminating against the plaintiff. See Jansson v. Stamford Health, Inc., United States District Court, Docket No. 3:16-CV-260, (CHS) (D.Conn. April 11, 2018) ("If it is accepted that Stamford Hospital was the employer of Plaintiff, then it follows that Stamford Hospital cannot have discriminated against the Plaintiff and, at the same time, aided and abetted itself in discriminating against her. Plaintiff staunchly alleges that Stamford Hospital was her employer and that it discriminated against her").
CONCLUSION
The court grants the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety. The defendants have established there are no genuine issues of material fact to support the plaintiff’s claims of disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, retaliation, or aiding and abetting.