Stubbs v. Bordenkircher

19 Citing cases

  1. Clark v. State

    485 Md. 674 (Md. 2023)   Cited 3 times
    Disagreeing with the Majority’s decision to "mak[e] new constitutional law without the input of the parties"

    See Clark, 255 Md. App. at 360, 279 A.3d at 1140 (Nazarian, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that Bailey, 657 F.2d 21, was the basis for the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Stubbs v. Bordenkircher, 689 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1982), and, in turn, in Perry, which the Supreme Court rejected in that case. See Clark, 255 Md. App. at 360-62, 279 A.3d at 1140-41 (Nazarian, J., dissenting).

  2. Perry v. Leeke

    832 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987)   Cited 12 times

    In November of 1985, more than four years after his trial and more than two and one-half years after the denial of certiorari, Perry sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court granted relief on the basis of our earlier decisions in United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1179, 51 L.Ed.2d 584 (1977), and Stubbs v. Bordenkircher, 689 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907, 103 S.Ct. 1879, 76 L.Ed.2d 810 (1983), which held that it is always reversible error for a trial court to prevent a defendant and his counsel from conferring during a recess, no matter how brief. We granted en banc review to determine whether Allen and Stubbs continue to govern in light of the Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

  3. Crutchfield v. Wainwright

    803 F.2d 1103 (11th Cir. 1986)   Cited 54 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding Geders violation, without any discussion of whether petitioner renewed his objection, where court's overnight ban on consultation was extended for two days due to unforeseen events

    The Third and Fourth Circuits hold that no deprivation occurs in the absence of an objection. See Bailey v. Redman, 657 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1981), and Stubbs v. Bordenkircher, 689 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907, 103 S.Ct. 1879, 76 L.Ed.2d 810 (1983). As we noted above, Crutchfield's lawyers did not object, move for a mistrial, or ask to discuss testimonial or non-testimonial aspects of the case with him after the trial judge instructed them not to confer with Crutchfield. As to the first alleged violation, we are unable to find any evidence that Crutchfield's lawyers actually wanted to talk with him during the recess, or that Crutchfield desired to consult with his counsel. If the record reflected such a desire by either, we would find that the trial judge's admonition constituted reversible error.

  4. Perry v. Leeke

    488 U.S. 272 (1989)   Cited 386 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding no Sixth Amendment right to consult with attorney during a 15-minute recess in the middle of cross-examination

    "I agree with the Fourth Circuit decision in [United States] v. Allen, [ 542 F.2d 630 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908 (1977)], which held the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is so fundamental that it should never be interfered with for any length of time absent some compelling reason. See also Stubbs v. Bordenkircher, 689 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1982)[, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907 (1983)]. To allow defendants to be deprived of counsel during court-ordered recesses is to assume the worst of our system of criminal justice, i. e., that defense lawyers will urge their clients to lie under oath.

  5. United States v. Romano

    736 F.2d 1432 (11th Cir. 1984)   Cited 16 times
    Noting that Geders "did not indicate that a restricted prohibition against talking with a defendant about his testimony was a possibility"

    In United States v. Conway, 632 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1980), this Court held that a sequestration order issued to a defendant witness during a lunch recess which interrupted his cross-examination constituted grounds for reversal of his conviction under the rationale of Geders. See also Stubbs v. Bordenkircher, 689 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 1879, 76 L.Ed.2d 810 (1983) ("any restriction upon a defendant's access to his counsel during a recess, whether the recess be extended or brief, is constitutionally impermissible."); United States v. Bryant, 545 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir. 1976) (order directing defendant not to converse with anyone during a one-hour lunch break during direct examination held to be a violation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel); United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1179, 51 L.Ed.2d 584 (1977) (holding that "a restriction on a defendant's right to consult with his attorney during a brief routine recess is constitutionally impermissible," and reversing the conviction of a co-defendant witness ordered not to talk to her lawyer during an overnight recess); United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101, 102 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1978) (expressing in dicta the court's "grave doubts that even a brief restriction on a criminal defendant's

  6. State v. Mebane

    204 Conn. 585 (Conn. 1987)   Cited 19 times
    In State v. Mebane, 204 Conn. 585 [ 529 A.2d 680] (1987) [cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1046, 108 S. Ct. 784, 98 L. Ed. 2d 870 (1988)], before adjourning for a recess the prosecutor "requested that the defendant not talk to his counsel since the state was in the middle of cross-examination."

    The Third and Fourth Circuits hold that no deprivation occurs in the absence of an objection. See Bailey v. Redman, 657 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1981), [cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153, 102 S.Ct. 1024, 71 L.Ed.2d 310, reh. denied, 455 U.S. 995, 102 S.Ct. 1624, 71 L.Ed.2d 857 (1982),] and Stubbs v. Bordenkircher, 689 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907, 103 S.Ct. 1879, 76 L.Ed.2d 810 (1983)." Allen involved a routine recess.

  7. State v. Clark

    255 Md. App. 327 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2022)   Cited 4 times

    After exhausting his state appeals, Mr. Perry sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The district court granted Mr. Perry relief, citing United States v. Allen , 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), and Stubbs v. Bordenkircher , 689 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1982), "which held that it is always reversible error for a trial court to prevent a defendant and his counsel from conferring during a recess, no matter how brief." Perry v. Leeke , 832 F.2d 837, 839 (4th Cir. 1987).

  8. Mudd v. United States

    798 F.2d 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1986)   Cited 27 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that even an order only barring the defendant from discussing his upcoming testimony with his counsel—but not restricting any other topic of discussion—during a trial recess violates the Sixth Amendment and requires reversal without a showing of actual prejudice

    Relying on many of the factors just addressed, the Romano court found Geders controlling despite the testimonial limitation on the judge's order, and found a sixth amendment violation. 736 F.2d at 1436-37; see also Stubbs v. Bordenkircher, 689 F.2d 1205, 1206 (4th Cir. 1982) (trial court order not to discuss testimony during lunch hour held "constitutionally impermissible"), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907, 103 S.Ct. 1879, 76 L.Ed.2d 810 (1983). In short, the district judge's order violated the sixth amendment.

  9. State v. Ulestad

    127 Wn. App. 209 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 11 times
    In Ulestad, we recognized that the structural error analysis applies to interferences with the related right to confer with counsel: "except for a limited right to control attorney-client communication when the defendant is testifying, any interference with the defendant's right to continuously consult with his counsel during trial is reversible error without a showing of prejudice."

    ¶25 A Fourth Circuit case is instructive on the necessity of showing an actual deprivation of the right to consult with counsel in order to obtain reversal of a conviction based on a trial court's temporary limitation of the defendant's access to counsel. In Stubbs v. Bordenkircher, 689 F.2d 1205, 1207 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907 (1983), the trial court prevented the defendant's meeting with his attorney during a recess while the defendant was on the witness stand: [T]here was no objection by either counsel or the petitioner to the trial court's admonition nor does the record disclose that either the attorney or the petitioner at any time requested permission for a consultation.

  10. United States v. Nelson

    884 F.3d 1103 (11th Cir. 2018)   Cited 8 times
    Explaining that "the relationship between structural errors and the invited-error doctrine is murky"

    Id . It also, we note, squares with the decisions of two of our sister circuits. See Stubbs v. Bordenkircher , 689 F.2d 1205, 1207 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[I]n order to obtain relief a petitioner must show a ‘deprivation’ of his Sixth Amendment rights by demonstrating that he wanted to meet with his attorney but was prevented from doing so by the instruction of the trial judge."); Bailey v. Redman , 657 F.2d 21, 23–24 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding there was no Sixth Amendment violation where the defendant "fail[ed] to demonstrate that he was actually ‘deprived’ of his right to consult with his attorney").