Opinion
E033037.
11-17-2003
STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STEPHANIE RODRIGUEZ, Defendant and Respondent.
Hart, King & Coldren, Robert S. Coldren, Robert G. Williamson, Jr., and Andrew C. Kienle for Plaintiff and Appellant. Gary S. Redinger for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
The trial court awarded attorney fees to defendant and cross-complainant Stephanie Rodriguez against plaintiff and cross-defendant Stubblefield Properties (Stubblefield), on the theory that Rodriguez was the prevailing party in an action arising out of the Mobilehome Residency Law. (Civ. Code, § 798 et seq.)
Stubblefield challenges the award. It cites the trial courts comment that Rodriguezs rights against Stubblefield were based on equity, not on the Mobilehome Residency Law. Thus, it conveniently ignores the fact that its complaint against her was based almost entirely on the Mobilehome Residency Law. The trial court entered judgment on the complaint in favor of Rodriguez and against Stubblefield. Accordingly, Rodriguez was the prevailing party in an action arising out of the Mobilehome Residency Law.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Stubblefields complaint alleged that Stubblefield owned a mobilehome park called Mountain Shadows Mobilehome Community. Pursuant to the Mobilehome Residency Law, residency in Mountain Shadows was restricted to senior citizens. At least one owner and occupant of each mobilehome had to be 55 or older; all other occupants had to be approved by Stubblefield. Claud Richey, who was over 55, had once owned and occupied the mobilehome in space 11. Without Stubblefields permission, Rodriguez moved in with Richey. After Richey died, she continued to occupy the mobilehome. She also allowed other occupants — all under 55 — to move in with her, again without Stubblefields permission. Rodriguez had refused Stubblefields demand that she "either remove the mobilehome from space 11 or otherwise comply with the relevant provisions of the . . . Mobilehome Residency Law."
The complaint asserted nine causes of action, for: (1) trespass, (2) nuisance, (3) ejectment, (4) conversion, (5) violation of statute, (6) interference with prospective economic advantage, (7) "[a]bandonment of [m]obilehome," (8) injunction, and (9) declaratory relief. It prayed for attorney fees on all causes of action.
Rodriguezs cross-complaint alleged that she owned the mobilehome in space 11. She had entered into an agreement to sell it. Stubblefield, however, had prevented the sale by refusing to let Rodriguez into the park and by demanding payment of $ 4,700 in supposed rent arrearages to which it was not entitled.
The cross-complaint asserted three causes of action, for: (1) intentional interference with contractual relationship, (2) fraud, and (3) conversion. (It also asserted a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which Rodriguez later dismissed.)
After a bench trial, the trial court provided an oral tentative statement of decision. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 632; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 232(a).) In the course of doing so, it stated: "The defendants rights to property in this case do not arise from the Mobilehome Residency Law. They arise out of equity. [¶] . . . So she cant be deprived of her property interest in this mobilehome because of the Mobilehome Residency Law." It also stated that Stubblefield had a right to unpaid rent which was "to be considered an equitable lien. It does not arise because of the Mobilehome Residency Law."
Eventually, the trial court entered a final statement of decision and judgment, as follows:
1. On all causes of action in Stubblefields complaint, it found in favor of Rodriguez.
2. Based on the ninth cause of action in Stubblefields complaint (for declaratory relief), it required Rodriguez to transfer the mobilehome to Stubblefield; in return, it awarded her $ 6,275 against Stubblefield. It explained that this represented the value of the mobilehome, which it found to be $30,000, minus $23,725 in unpaid rent, which it found to be "an equitable lien on the mobilehome."
3. It noted that the ninth cause of action "incorporated all preceding paragraphs . . . and sought relief under the . . . Mobilehome Residency Law . . . ."
4. On all causes of action in Rodriguezs cross-complaint, it found in favor of Stubblefield.
5. It ordered that Rodriguez be awarded costs and "reasonable attorney fees pursuant to . . . the Mobilehome Residency Law, as the prevailing party."
Rodriguez duly filed a motion for attorney fees. Stubblefield opposed the motion, arguing that "since [Rodriguez]s claim does not arise from the Mobilehome Residency Law, she cannot, as a matter of law[,] be deemed the prevailing party" under the Mobilehome Residency Law. The trial court granted the motion. It found, once again, that Rodriguez was "the prevailing party [i]n the above[-]entitled action which is an action within the Mobile Home [sic] Residency Law . . . ." It therefore awarded Rodriguez $13,912 in attorney fees.
II
DISCUSSION
The attorney fee provision of the Mobilehome Residency Law provides that: "In any action arising out of the provisions of this chapter the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and costs. A party shall be deemed a prevailing party for the purposes of this section if the judgment is rendered in his or her favor . . . ." (Civ. Code, § 798.85.)
Another provision of the Mobilehome Residency Law allows the management of a mobilehome park to "require that a prospective purchaser comply with any rule or regulation limiting residency based on age requirements for housing for older persons . . . ." (Civ. Code, § 798.76.) The whole theory of Stubblefields complaint was that the rules and regulations it had adopted, under the authority of this provision, prohibited Rodriguez from owning or occupying the mobilehome. Accordingly, the complaint alleged that Rodriguez "has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse[,] to comply with the relevant provisions of the . . . Mobilehome Residency Law." This allegation was incorporated into all the other causes of action.
The fifth cause of action, for "[v]iolation of [s]tatute," was based entirely on an allegation that Rodriguez had violated the Mobilehome Residency Law. The eighth cause of action was based entirely on an allegation that she had "abandoned" the mobilehome within the meaning of the Mobilehome Residency Law. The complaint sought, among other relief, a declaratory judgment that Rodriguez had failed to comply with the Mobilehome Residency Law and an injunction requiring her to comply with the Mobilehome Residency Law. Thus, even under the narrowest imaginable construction of the words "arising out of," at least some of Stubblefields causes of action "aris[e] out of" the Mobilehome Residency Law.
Moreover, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Rodriguez on all causes of action in Stubblefields complaint. Thus, she was the prevailing party on these causes of action.
Stubblefields only argument is that Rodriguez did not recover on any cause of action arising under the Mobilehome Residency Law. This is specious. She prevailed as a defendant, not as a plaintiff. Hence, she was entitled to attorney fees — not because she recovered against Stubblefield, but because Stubblefield failed dismally to recover against her.
Unlike Stubblefields complaint, Rodriguezs cross-complaint did not arise under the Mobilehome Residency Law. It could even be argued that one or two of the causes of action in the complaint did not arise under the Mobilehome Residency Law. Thus, Stubblefield could have asked the trial court to apportion the attorney fees as between fee and nonfee causes of action. (See Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 686-689; but see Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 129-130 ["[a]ttorneys fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper and one in which they are not allowed"].) By failing to make such a request, however, it waived any right to apportionment. (Del Cerro Mobile Estates v. Proffer (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 943, 950-951.) Moreover, it has expressly disclaimed any contention involving apportionment, stating flatly that "apportionment is not at issue in this appeal." (Capitalization omitted.) Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court erred by failing to apportion the fee award.
Rodriguez has requested attorney fees on appeal. "`"A statute authorizing an attorney fee[s] award at the trial court level includes appellate attorney fees unless the statute specifically provides otherwise. [Citations.]" [Citation.]" (Rosenaur v. Scherer (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 260, 287, quoting Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 659, quoting Evans v. Unkow (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1499.) Rodriguez is the prevailing party in the appeal, as well as at trial. Therefore, she is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. We leave the amount to be determined, on proper motion, in the trial court. (Milman v. Shukhat (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 538, 546.)
III
DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is affirmed. Rodriguez is awarded costs, including attorney fees, on appeal.
We concur: GAUT J. and KING, J.