Opinion
No. 32328-1-II
Filed: May 10, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Pierce County. Docket No: 03-2-08527-3. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 03/12/2004. Judge signing: Hon. Kathryn J Nelson.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Barbara Stuart (Appearing Pro Se), 1986 Chestnut Ave, Longbeach, CA 90806.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Thomas Lether, Cole Lether Wathen Leid PC, 1000 2nd Ave Ste 1300, Seattle, WA 98104-1082.
Eric Jay Neal, Cole Lether Wathen Leid PC, 1000 2nd Ave Ste 1300, Seattle, WA 98104-1082.
Barbara A. Stuart challenges the trial court's ruling granting summary judgment and dismissing her complaint alleging that Western Pacific Investment Group, LLC (WPIG) committed abuse of process and other torts by filing unlawful detainer actions against her. She also appeals the trial court's denial of her reconsideration motion. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS A. Background
Stuart and her two children were tenants in two apartment buildings owned by WPIG. Stuart lived at the Laurel Gardens Apartments from October 2001 to April 2002. In June 2002, Stuart signed a one-year lease with the Willow Park Apartments. The Pierce County Housing Authority assisted Stuart with rent payments at all times; however, Stuart was always responsible for a portion of the rent.
During Stuart's tenancy at these apartment buildings, WPIG filed three separate unlawful detainer actions for Stuart's failure to pay her portion of rent in February, June, and August 2002. In each instance, WPIG provided Stuart a proper three-day notice to pay rent or vacate in compliance with the unlawful detainer statute, chapter 59.12 RCW. When she failed to pay the rent or vacate, WPIG filed an unlawful detainer action with the superior court.
In late February 2002, WPIG accepted a King Center Assistance Pledge as payment for her February rent and did not pursue the unlawful detainer action. Stuart wrote a bad check for her portion of the rent in June 2002 and failed to pay rent in August 2002. WPIG filed unlawful detainer actions against Stuart when she failed to remedy these breaches of her rental agreement, but WPIG accepted a rent credit in late August 2002 for these deficiencies and again did not pursue its unlawful detainer actions.
Stuart continued to reside at the Willow Park Apartments without incident. Then in April 2003, Stuart gave notice that she intended to leave Willow Park at the end of her lease in May. But in mid-May, Stuart wrote a letter to the Willow Park manager stating that she would remain a tenant if she received an upgraded apartment with furnishings such as 'granite counter tops, plush grey carpet, and small chandelier lighting throughout.' Clerk's Papers (CP) at 51. The apartment manager replied that her request was not possible and that he intended to honor her prior notice to terminate her lease.
At Stuart's request, WPIG voluntarily dismissed the abandoned unlawful detainer actions on May 22, 2003. Then, on May 28, Stuart requested that she be allowed to hold-over in the apartment. Her request was refused because the manager had already received a deposit from a new tenant on her apartment. Stuart's May 28 letter also threatened to sue WPIG for filing the unlawful detainer actions.
B. Procedural History
Acting pro se, Stuart sued WPIG for various torts, including reckless misconduct and negligence. After numerous amendments, Stuart's complaint included causes of action for abuse of process, negligence, and reckless, willful, and wanton misconduct. The factual basis for all of Stuart's claims centered on WPIG's three unlawful detainer actions for unpaid rent in February, June, and August 2002.
WPIG served interrogatories on Stuart in July 2003. In January 2004, WPIG moved for summary judgment and dismissal of Stuart's lawsuit. After extensive briefing by both parties and a hearing, the court granted WPIG's summary judgment motion and dismissed Stuart's complaint with prejudice. Stuart filed a motion for reconsideration. After a hearing, the court denied Stuart's motion.
Stuart appealed and filed a motion with our Supreme Court, who transferred the case here.
ANALYSIS I. Abuse of Process
Stuart argues that summary judgment is precluded because she provided evidence that WPIG committed the tort of abuse of process by filing unnecessary unlawful detainer actions with the intent to prohibit her from obtaining additional housing. Stuart also asserts that WPIG acted in bad faith in violation of RCW 59.18.020. WPIG responds that all of its unlawful detainer actions against Stuart were properly based on unpaid rent and were in compliance with the procedures of chapter 59.12 RCW. WPIG also emphasizes that it did not act improperly or with an ulterior purpose.
We review a summary judgment order de novo from the same position as the trial court. Retired Pub. Employees Council of Wash. v. Charles, 148 Wn.2d 602, 612, 62 P.3d 470 (2003). The trial court should grant summary judgment if it determines, after viewing the entire record and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c); Charles, 148 Wn.2d at 612. After the moving party demonstrates the absence of material facts, the nonmoving party must then establish material facts essential to the elements of their case. Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182 (1989). This rebuttal by the nonmoving party must involve specific facts, not speculative or conclusory statements. CR 56(e); Charles, 148 Wn.2d at 612.
The tort of abuse of process is disfavored in Washington. Batten v. Abrams, 28 Wn. App. 737, 745-46, 626 P.2d 984 (1981). To prevail on an abuse of process theory, the plaintiff must establish two elements: '(1) the existence of an ulterior purpose to accomplish an object not within the proper scope of the process and (2) an act in the use of legal process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings.' Batten, 28 Wn. App. at 745 (quoting Fite v. Lee, 11 Wn. App. 21, 27-28, 521 P.2d 964 (1974)). Further, '[t]he mere institution of a legal proceeding even with a malicious motive does not constitute an abuse of process.' Batten, 28 Wn. App. at 745 (quoting Fite, 11 Wn. App. at 27-28) (emphasis omitted); see also Loeffelholz v. Citizens for Leaders with Ethics Accountability Now (C.L.E.A.N.), 119 Wn. App. 665, 699-700, 82 P.3d 1199, review denied, 152 Wn.2d 1023 (2004) (discussing abuse of process and quoting with approval Batten and Fite).
Here, Stuart fails to demonstrate genuine issues of material fact that satisfy the elements of her abuse of process claim. WPIG filed unlawful detainer actions alleging unpaid rent on three occasions: February, June, and August 2002. Stuart provides no evidence that she timely paid her rent in August 2002 and she does not dispute that she timely received WPIG's notices under the unlawful detainer statute.
Regarding the February 2002 unpaid rent, Stuart proffers a voucher for this rent that she asserts is from Pierce County Community Services; however, there is no evidence that her landlord received this voucher. Further, both the record and the parties' trial motions establish that (1) WPIG received the King Center Rental Assistance Pledge for the February rent weeks after WPIG's delinquency notice to Stuart; and (2) upon receiving this pledge, WPIG took no further action on its unlawful detainer action.
Regarding the June 2002 unpaid rent, Stuart concedes that she wrote a bad check for rent during this time period. See CP at 59 ('This action [July 2002 unlawful detainer] stemmed from the fact that Plaintiff had written a bad check to cover her June 2002 rent.'). Further, she points to a money order that her landlord received in mid-June that covers only $200 of her $625 rent. There is no other evidence that Stuart attempted to pay her June rent. Finally, WPIG accepted a rent credit in August 2002 and voluntarily dismissed all three unlawful detainer actions in May 2003.
Thus, Stuart fails to demonstrate that WPIG's unlawful detainer actions were unjustified. Each of WPIG's unlawful detainer actions followed RCW 59.12.030's procedural notice requirements. The record demonstrates that WPIG was acting within the scope of the unlawful detainer statute at all times. See generally, Housing Res. Group v. Price, 92 Wn. App. 394, 401, 958 P.2d 327 (1998) ('The unlawful detainer statute authorizes a summary proceeding to resolve the right to possession of property. The statute provides a method of process, and compliance with the method is jurisdictional') (footnotes omitted). On each occasion, WPIG took no further action on the unlawful detainer suit after accommodation was reached regarding Stuart's failure to pay her portion of the overdue rent. Indeed, WPIG voluntarily dismissed all three causes of action. Thus, nothing in the record before us demonstrates that WPIG acted with an ulterior purpose or acted improperly in filing the unlawful detainer actions.
Stuart asserts that WPIG improperly sought court costs and related fees in each case. But both the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act and the terms of her lease with WPIG allow recovery of such fees. RCW 59.18.365. In any event, WPIG waived any recovery of these fees by voluntarily dismissing the unlawful detainer actions.
Without reference to any specific evidence, Stuart baldly asserts that WPIG terminated her tenancy with the intent to make her homeless. But Stuart voluntarily gave notice to terminate her tenancy at WPIG's property. When she later changed her mind and asked for an upgraded apartment, WPIG did not have an apartment that met her request and had already received a deposit on her apartment from a new tenant.
Thus, the trial court did not err in granting WPIG's summary judgment motion and dismissing Stuart's complaint asserting abuse of process.
II. Additional Tort Claims
Stuart's amended complaint asserts additional causes of action for negligence and reckless, willful, and wanton misconduct. Stuart asserts that WPIG committed these torts by filing meritless unlawful detainer actions, by not immediately dismissing these actions, and by refusing her request to hold-over her tenancy in the Willow Park Apartments.
But Stuart's argument here neither discusses legal authority nor references pertinent facts in the record to support her claims. Thus, Stuart has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. RAP 10.3(a); State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315, 321, 893 P.2d 629 (1995). Nonetheless, a brief review of the record demonstrates that the court did not err in granting summary judgment to WPIG. Stuart's arguments challenge the validity of the unlawful detainer actions; however, as previously discussed, WPIG's unlawful detainer actions were justified and WPIG voluntarily dismissed the actions. And Stuart fails to provide any additional evidence that demonstrates WPIG acted in a reckless, negligent, or improper manner.
III. Motion for Reconsideration
Stuart's notice of appeal challenges the trial court's denial of her reconsideration motion under CR 59. Stuart sought direct review by our Supreme Court on the denial of her reconsideration motion; however, the court transferred the appeal to us. Stuart's appellate brief fails to mention her reconsideration motion; however, the record before us includes the parties' briefing under CR 59. Although Stuart's failure to raise the CR 59 motion precludes appellate review under RAP 2.5 and 10.3, we evaluate the court's denial of Stuart's reconsideration motion because of this dispute's highly litigious history and the adequate record before us.
We review a trial court's decision to deny a reconsideration motion for an abuse of discretion. Rivers v. Wash. State Conference of Mason Contractors, 145 Wn.2d 674, 685, 41 P.3d 1175 (2002).
Stuart's CR 59 motion primarily repeats the argument she made in her summary judgment motion that she demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment and dismissal of her complaint. Stuart's reconsideration motion also asserts that the court proceedings were improper and did not allow her to fully present her arguments and evidence because she was a pro se litigant. Thus, although Stuart's reconsideration motion did not identify a section under CR 59, her arguments encompass CR 59(a)(1), irregularity of the court proceeding, and CR 59(a)(9), a lack of substantial justice.
Stuart's allegations are unpersuasive. The court allowed Stuart to amend her complaint numerous times, despite WPIG's objections. After the parties filed lengthy briefs on the summary judgment motion, the court held a hearing with both parties present. The court also held a hearing on Stuart's reconsideration motion after receiving and considering the parties' briefs. The trial court denied WPIG's request for sanctions.
Stuart fails to provide specific evidence of any irregularity in the court's proceedings or that the court abused its broad discretion in denying her reconsideration motion. The court did not err in denying Stuart's use of her reconsideration motion to relitigate the summary judgment motion. Thus, the court did not err in denying Stuart's motion for reconsideration.
We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
ARMSTRONG, P.J. and HUNT, J., Concur.