We conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the district court's findings of fact and affirm the denial of Martinez' motion to suppress. An area's propensity for crime, State v. Stinnett, 104 Nev. 398, 401–02, 760 P.2d 124, 127 (1988), the time of day, Lisenbee, 116 Nev. at 1129, 13 P.3d at 950, and an officer's personal experience, Stuart v. State, 94 Nev. 721, 722, 587 P.2d 33, 34 (1978), are all factors that can and should be considered by a court in determining the totality of the circumstances. Lisenbee, 116 Nev. at 1128, 13 P.3d at 950, (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) ).
While we acknowledge that NRS 62C.070(1) does not provide a basis for custody, nothing in that statute precludes an officer from detaining a criminal suspect, juvenile or otherwise, based on NRS 171.123, "under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime." NRS 171.123(1); Morgan v. State, 120 Nev. 219, 88 P.3d 837 (2004); State v. Bayard. 119 Nev. 241, 71 P.3d 498 (2003); see also Stuart v. State, 94 Nev. 721, 722, 587 P.2d 33, 34 (1978). Here, Officer DeVitte located Ford on his moped after learning that a person named Mark Ford, of Ford's age, build, and dress was a suspect in Gomes' death and was driving a moped.
Pursuant to this standard, in order to justify a stop and detention, the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, lead the officer reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity may be afoot. Stuart v. State, 94 Nev. 721, 722, 587 P.2d 33, 34 (1978) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 592 U.S. 1 (1968), and Jackson v. State, 90 Nev. 266, 523 P.2d 850 (1974)). In Terry, the United States Supreme Court articulated a two-prong test for determining whether an investigative detention passes constitutional muster:
This constituted a manifestly reasonable ground for stopping the car. See, e.g., Stuart v. State, 94 Nev. 721, 587 P.2d 33 (1978) (officer who observed missing trunk lock on vehicle and thus inferred that vehicle might be stolen acted reasonably in stopping vehicle for investigation). Scott asserts that this was not the true reason the vehicle was stopped, noting that no citation issued for the improperly affixed, improper license plate.
A stop is lawful if police reasonably suspect that the persons or vehicles stopped have been involved in criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981); Stuart v. State, 94 Nev. 721, 587 P.2d 33 (1978); Ildefonso v. State, 88 Nev. 307, 496 P.2d 752 (1972); NRS 171.123. Officers Kravetz and Sheffer reasonably relied on a police report which stated that a 1974 black over white Ford Torino had been involved in a robbery.
Even though probable cause may not exist to place a person under arrest, a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in a proper manner, approach and detain a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behavior. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); Stuart v. State, 94 Nev. 721, 722, 587 P.2d 33, 34 (1978); Jackson v. State, 90 Nev. 266, 267, 523 P.2d 850, 851 (1974); Wright v. State, 88 Nev. 460, 464, 499 P.2d 1216, 1219 (1972); NRS 171.123(1). Appellant emerged from the area where the police officers had reason to believe the suspect was lurking; he matched the description broadcast by Officer Harber. Officer Shelton was, therefore, justified in approaching appellant and stopping him for the purpose of further investigation.
An officer may stop and question an individual if the officer reasonably believes, in light of his or her experience and based upon specific, articulable facts, that criminal activity is afoot. Stuart v. State, 94 Nev. 721, 587 P.2d 33 (1978); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); NRS 171.123. Probable cause to stop a motorist exists when officers have reason to believe that a felony was committed in the area, and the vehicle is similar to the broadcast description of the getaway car.