Ex parte United States, and most of the other cases cited in note 2, supra, were decided at a time when members of the Court's committee responsible for the 1925 Act were still members of the Court. The Court's unanimous concurrence in the existence of its jurisdiction in the cases subsequent to the 1925 Act establishes a practice (cf. Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299, 309) which would be beyond explanation if there had been any thought that any provision of the Act had placed such a restriction on the Court's jurisdiction to issue the writs. Nor can it be said that this legislative history gives any support to the suggestion that the failure of the 1925 Act to cut off the jurisdiction of this Court to issue the common-law writs to district courts was inadvertent, and that the Act should therefore be construed as though it had done what it failed to do. The jurisdiction of this Court to issue such writs, like its jurisdiction to grant certiorari, is discretionary.

But the Court later upheld the constitutionality of circuit riding, reasoning that the practice's continuation for a decade had "fixed" the Constitution's "construction." Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299, 309, 1 Cranch 299, 2 L.Ed. 115 (1803).

Brennan v. United States, 136 F. 743, 746, 69 C.C.A. 395; De Forest v. Lawrence, 13 How. 274, 281, 282, 14 L. Ed. 143; Edward's Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 209, 6 L. Ed. 603; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 23, 11 S. Ct. 699, 35 L. Ed. 363; Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch. 299, 309, 2 L. Ed. 115; United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472, 473, 35 S. Ct. 309, 59 L. Ed. 673. The rule that established administrative practice shall be given great weight in determining the meaning of doubtful statutes or regulations is a wise one and founded on sound principle.

pointed and has qualified"); 16 U.S.C. § 792 (member of the Federal Power Commission "shall be appointed . . . until his successor is appointed and has qualified"); 49 U.S.C. § 10301 (Interstate Commerce Commission member "may continue to serve until a successor is appointed and qualified"); 15 U.S.C. § 41 (Federal Trade Commission member "upon the expiration of his term of office . . . shall continue to serve until his successor shall have been appointed and shall have qualified"); 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (member of the Securities and Exchange Commission "shall hold office . . . until his successor is appointed and has qualified")). McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 481 (1921) ("It therefore comes within the rule that the practical construction given to an act of Congress, fairly susceptible of different constructions, by those charged with the duty of executing it is entitled to great respect and, if acted upon for a number of years, will not be disturbed except for cogent reasons."); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 ("[I]t is sufficient to observe, that practice and acquiescence under [the act] for a period of several years . . . has indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible nature.

While some of these precedents are stronger than others, in their application to the case before us, they all show that, in the judgment of the legislative branch of the government, it is often desirable, if not essential for the protection of the interests of our people against the unfriendly or discriminating regulations established by foreign governments, in the interest of their people, to invest the president with large discretion in matters arising out of the execution of statutes relating to trade and commerce with other nations. If the decision in the case of The Brig Aurora had never been rendered, the practical construction of the constitution, as given by so many acts of congress, and embracing almost the entire period of our national existence, should not be overruled, unless upon a conviction that such legislation was clearly incompatible with the supreme law of the land. Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299, 309, 5 U.S. 299, 309 [ 2 L.Ed. 115, 118]; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 351, 14 U.S. 304, 351 [ 4 L.Ed. 97, 109]; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 315, 53 U.S. 299, 315 [ 13 L.Ed. 996, 1003]; Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57, 4 S.Ct. 279 [ 28 L.Ed. 349, 350]; The Laura, 114 U.S. 411, 416, 5 S.Ct. 881 [ 29 L.Ed. 147, 148]. The Court upheld the provisions of the Tariff Act of 1890, which were under attack.

The Supreme Court of the United States has applied the rule of contemporaneous and practical construction in determining questions as to the authority of its members and the jurisdiction of the court. Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch (U.S.) 299, 2 L. ed. 115; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. (U.S.) 304, 351, 4 L. ed. 97, 109; Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. (U.S.) 264, 418, 5 L. ed. 257, 294. The contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the highest officers in the executive department of the government charged with the duty of administering it is entitled to weight, and "should not be disregarded or overturned except for the most cogent reasons, and unless clearly erroneous."

If the statute creating the state industrial accident commission had been declared unconstitutional upon the ground urged before this court, it would have thrown the Irrigation Code, the Minimum Wage Act, the Public Utilities Act and much other legislation into hopeless disarray: Evanhoff v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 78 Or. 503 ( 154 P. 106). Most serious confusion would have ensued if the federal supreme court had declared the work of the circuit courts unauthorized because the supreme court judges serving as circuit judges had no right to do so: Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch (U.S.) 299 ( 2 L.Ed. 115). The same comment is applicable to the holding of the Ohio court refusing to declare legislative divorces invalid.

This general acceptance of the Act by the courts is also entitled to weight. In Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch. 95 (299), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a practical exposition of the constitution by the courts — little, if any, more pronounced than in this case — was "too strong to be shaken or controlled." We need not go so far, but we do say that the exposition of the legislature and of the courts cumulate considerations in favor of the Act, with "a plausibility and force" which we cannot resist.

As the statute is remedial in its nature, it is to be construed liberally. Thrift v. Thrift, 30 R.I. 357. Practice and acquiescence for a number of years have fixed the construction ( Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299) and we think an order for alimony pendente lite is included within the provisions of Section 14. Second.

Where the practical construction is opposed to the clear meaning, it will not be adopted, Stuart v. Wrightson, 56 N.J. L., 126, though some courts, even in such a case, have given preference to the legislative view. Johnson v. Joliet, etc., R. R. Co., 23 Ill. 202; Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio, 446; Rogers (682) v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. 475; Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch (U.S.), 299. But this course may be considered as of doubtful wisdom or expediency.