In the instant case it is clear that delivery of the dismissal to the court clerk constituted proper entry thereof (Kelly v. Maupin, 177 Okla. 44, 58 P. [2d] 116), and was effective as a dismissal of the action without payment of costs (Mashunkashey v. Brewer, supra), and an order of court was not necessary to its validity. Stuart v. Hicks, 52 Okla. 665, 153 P. 143. The divorce action was no longer pending, and the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the order requiring the defendant therein to pay attorney fees. Its order, therefore, against the defendant therein to show cause as for contempt constituted an attempt to make unauthorized application of judicial force.

" Consequently this court is without power or authority to deny dismissal, "but can only acquiesce in dismissal," "upon such terms as the court may impose." 18 C. J. 1148; Davis v. Mimey, 60 Okla. 244, 159 P. 1112; Okla. Coal Co. v. Corrigan, 67 Okla. 90, 168 P. 1024; Stuart v. Hicks, 52 Okla. 665, 153 P. 143, and two early cases cited therein; Mullen v. Noah, 64 Okla. 181, 166 P. 742; Inter-State Crude Oil Co. v. Young, 29 Okla. 465, 118 P. 257; Long v. Bagwell, 38 Okla. 312, 133 P. 50; Kolp v. Parsons, 50 Okla. 372, 150 P. 1043; Brown et al. v. Massey, 19 Okla. 482, 92 P. 246; Oberlander et al. v. Confrey, 38 Kan. 462, 17 P. 88; McIntosh v. Lynch, 78 Okla. 85, 188 P. 1079. What are proper terms that may be, in the discretion of the court, imposed? The first is that the court marshal the facts and recite the status of proceedings in the causes, warranting dismissal, for, it is by the Constitution, section 5, art. 7, provided:

No petition of intervention or answer praying for affirmative relief is filed in this cause. By a long line of decisions the statute, supra, has heretofore meant exactly what it says. Davis v. Mimey, 60 Okla. 244, 159 P. 1112; Okla. Coal Co. v. Corrigan, 67 Okla. 90, 168 P. 1024; Stuart v. Hicks, 52 Okla. 665, 153 P. 143, and two early cases cited therein; Mullen v. Noah, supra; Interstate Crude Oil Co. v. Young, 29 Okla. 465, 118 P. 257; Long v. Bagwell, 38 Okla. 312, 133 P. 50; Kolp v. Parsons, 50 Okla. 372, 150 P. 1043; Brown v. Massey, 19 Okla. 482, 92 P. 246; Oberlander et al. v. Confrey, 38 Kan. 462, 17 P. 88; McIntosh v. Lynch, 78 Okla. 85, 188 P. 1079. From a consideration of cases relied upon by the supplemental opinion it is obvious the only one of the two cited from this jurisdiction touching dismissal on motion of plaintiff is Taylor v. Green, 119 Okla. 297, 249 P. 393.

There was no subject-matter on which the court's jurisdiction could further operate. Turner v. Fleming, 37 Okla. 75, 130 P. 551; Stuart v. Hicks, 52 Okla. 665, 153 P. 143. In Turner v. Fleming, supra, it is said:

While the clerk should make some record of the dismissal when the same is filed by the plaintiff, yet the mere filing of the written dismissal acts automatically to dismiss the action, and it does not take an order of the court to render the same effective. Long v. Bagwell, 38 Okla. 312, 133 P. 50; Stuart v. Hicks, 52 Okla. 665, 153 P. 143; Harjo v. Black, 49 Okla. 566, 153 P. 1137. But in the case at bar the plaintiff did not pay the costs as the statute requires when she attempted to dismiss her action, and for that reason her attempted dismissal did not become effective, and therefore the court retained jurisdiction of the case.