Accordingly, Americredit's statutory interpretation argument is unavailing. Finally, we conclude that the superior court erred by relying on OCGA § 40-3-31 (4) and our decision in Strother Ford, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Maryland, 132 Ga. App. 268 ( 208 SE2d 25) (1974), instead of OCGA § 11-9-337 (1). OCGA § 40-3-31 by its terms only applies when a certificate of title has been "lost, stolen, mutilated, or destroyed or becomes illegible," and none of those circumstances occurred here. Furthermore, Strother is distinguishable from the instant action.
Accordingly, the trial court erred by finding that Kean was not domiciled in Alabama. Strother Ford, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank c., 132 Ga. App. 268, 270 ( 208 SE2d 25) (1974) (under doctrine of presumption of continuity, a status proved to exist will be presumed to have continued to exist; "until evidence is introduced to the contrary, it is presumed a person has not changed his residence or domicile") (citations omitted). Therefore, the court erred in denying Kean's motion to dismiss the modification action.
Contrary to appellant's contention, the doctrine of presumption of continuity (a status when proved to have existed will be presumed to have continued to exist) does not apply here because appellees expressly denied that such a policy existed. See Strother Ford v. First Nat. Bank, 132 Ga. App. 268, 270 ( 208 S.E.2d 25) (1974).
There is no evidence suggesting that Allen's request was not made in good faith. Further, the letter from his commanding officer states that leave was not granted because of the needs of the Navy. Since it is presumed that Allen's commanding officer performed his duties lawfully and in good faith ( Hudson v. State, 185 Ga. App. 508, 509 ( 364 S.E.2d 635); Strother Ford v. First Nat. Bank, 132 Ga. App. 268, 270 ( 208 S.E.2d 25)), we cannot conclude from this record that the leave was denied for any other reasons. Allen cannot be held responsible for the lawful actions of his commanding officer. Further, for Allen to depart his duty station without (proper leave) authority is a criminal offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice ( 10 U.S.C. § 886).
See Jarrells v. State, 258 Ga. 833, 836 (5) (b) ( 375 S.E.2d 842). Qualified jurors, under oath, are presumed in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary to follow the procedural directives of and to honestly respond to questions of the trial judge. Cf. Strother Ford v. First Nat. Bank, 132 Ga. App. 268, 270 ( 208 S.E.2d 25) (presumption of performance of official and social duties). Accordingly, it is apparent that only one juror examined this map, and this juror acknowledged on the record that he looked for but could not find the crime scene area thereon. Under these circumstances "`nothing more than an irregularity is shown.
Moreover, once servicemember's status as a resident attending naval school was established, such status could be presumed to continue until the contrary was established. See OCGA § 24-4-21; Strother Ford v. First Nat. Bank, 132 Ga. App. 268, 270 ( 208 S.E.2d 25) (presumption of continuity; a status when proved to exist will be presumed to have continued to exist; until evidence is introduced to the contrary, it is presumed a person has not changed his residence or domicile) and cases cited therein. Accordingly, we find this assignment of error is without merit.
nt could not have proceeded against the transferee in personam on the account owed by the debtor, this being an action on contract ( Albertson v. Williams, 108 Ga. App. 627 ( 133 S.E.2d 897); McInvale v. Tifton Air Service, 119 Ga. App. 821 ( 168 S.E.2d 898); American Express S. A. I. v. Bomar Shoe Co., 125 Ga. App. 408, ( 187 S.E.2d 922)) and could not, in the Civil Court of Fulton County, a court without equity jurisdiction, have enforced an implied trust against the transferee ( Leachman v. Cobb Development Co., 226 Ga. 103 ( 172 S.E.2d 688)), it could proceed under the basis of its security interest in the property transferred by the debtor, of which the transferee had record notice and possibly actual notice, on the theory of conversion and recover the value of the converted property, but not to exceed the amount of the debt. See Title 107, Chapter 1 of the Georgia Code; International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Commercial Credit Equipment Corp., 125 Ga. App. 477 ( 188 S.E.2d 110); Strother Ford v. First National Bank of Maryland, 132 Ga. App. 268 ( 208 S.E.2d 25); see also, Mitchell v. Ga. Ala. R., 111 Ga. 760 ( 36 S.E. 971) as to the nature of an action for conversion. The complaint, as amended, was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of Section 111 of the C. P. A. (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 675; Code Ann. § 81A-311).