Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-3358-KHV
December 12, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Michael Lee Strope, an inmate in the Kansas State Penitentiary at Lansing, Kansas, brings suit against James Barkley, Lee Gibbens, James Kelly Jones, Rod Karlin, David McKune, Rhonda Phelps, Kim Pritchett, Charles Simmons and Terry Steen Woods. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff claims that defendants violated his rights under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff's Motion For Default Judgment In Accordance To F.R.C.P. Rule 54 And All Applicable Rules/Statutes (Doc. #55) filed August 21, 2002 and plaintiff's Motion For Declaratory Relief (Doc. #65) filed October 1, 2002. For reasons set forth below, the Court finds that plaintiff's motions should be overruled.
Background
On August 27, 2001, plaintiff filed his first complaint in this matter. Seven months later, on April 9, 2002, plaintiff filed a supplement to his complaint. See Supplemental Complaint (Doc. #20). On May 22, 2002, he filed an amended complaint. See Amended Complaint — Pursuant To Rule 15a Of The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure (Doc. #27).
Highly summarized, plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that prison officials violated his First Amendment right to free speech and his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process by not processing his grievances and conspiring to retaliate against him for filing grievances; violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and exercise of religion by returning mail sent to plaintiff in his current legal name and forcing plaintiff to use his prior legal name; and violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by harassing him and ransacking his cell, strip-searching him and requiring him to submit to urinalysis.
Plaintiff alleges that Gordon Eugene Strope is equivalent to 666, "the mark of the beast," and that he legally changed his name from Gordon Eugene Strope to Michael Lee Strope. Complaint (Doc. #1) at 9.
The Court's Memorandum and Order (Doc. #53) filed August 8, 2002, includes a more detailed list of plaintiff's claims.
On October 3, 2001, plaintiff sought an injunction that would require defendants to use his current legal name on all identifying paperwork and allow him to send and receive mail in that name. See Motion For A Mandatory Injunction In Accordance to Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure — Rule 65 (Doc. #3). On January 16, 2002, plaintiff sought a hearing on the legal issues in this case and an injunction that would require defendants to (1) stop subjecting him to illegal and retaliatory sanctions for filing grievances, (2) move him out of B-1 cellhouse, and (3) allow him to use his current legal name without adverse consequences. See Motion For A Preliminary Injunction And Request For Hearing In Accordance To F.R.C.P. Rule 65 (Doc. #9).
On March 27, 2002, the Court denied plaintiff's motion for a mandatory injunction. See Order (Doc. #15) filed March 27, 2002. The Court found that injunctive relief was not warranted because the Department of Corrections is not obligated to use plaintiff's new name. It also denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and a hearing. The Court found that the relief which plaintiff sought would require an unwarranted intrusion into daily prison management because cell searches, housing reassignment and mail inspection are all incidents of daily prison life. The Court noted that it gives broad deference to the decisions of prison officials and that the record at that time did not warrant preliminary injunctive relief.
On April 15, 2002, plaintiff filed a Motion For Declaratory Judgment (Doc. #22), seeking a declaratory judgment that (1) the First Amendment protects his right to receive mail addressed in his current legal name; (2) the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect his right to receive money and mail order packages addressed in his current legal name; (3) he has a legal right to access his prison trust fund account and withdraw funds for approved legal expenses in his current legal name; (4) K.S.A. § 60-1401 applies to every citizen in the State of Kansas and makes a new name legal once a district court judge has entered an appropriate journal entry;
K.S.A. § 60-1401 provides that "[t]he district court shall have authority to change the name of any person, township, town or city within this state at the cost of the petitioner without affecting any legal right."
(5) Kansas law does not allow any agency to violate, withhold, interfere, hinder, deny or delete legal rights with regard to a legally changed name, or provide exceptions for inmates incarcerated in the Kansas Department of Corrections; (6) the Kansas Department of Corrections is not legally allowed to seize and destroy incoming mail addressed to plaintiff in his current legal name without first providing notice of seizure and/or returning the mail to the sender; (7) plaintiff has a legal and constitutional right to send and receive mail through the United States Postal Service; (8) plaintiff's legal rights are violated when prison officials confiscate and destroy mail addressed to him in his current legal name; and (9) prison officials cannot force inmates to break federal or state laws or enact rules, policies or orders which force them to break laws just because they are prisoners. The Court overruled plaintiff's motion for a declaratory judgment, stating that "[t]o award such relief before an adjudication of the merits of this case would be premature." Memorandum And Order (Doc. #53) filed August 8, 2002.
On April 25, 2002, plaintiff filed a Motion For Reconsideration Of Denial Of Injunctive Relief Or In The Alternative, Notice Of Appeal (Doc. #24) seeking reconsideration of the Court's order of March 27, 2002, and its denial of injunctive relief that would have required prison officials to use plaintiff's current legal name and let him send and receive mail in that name. See Order (Doc. #15). Plaintiff argued that (1) the denial of relief was inappropriate in light of the facts; (2) he continues to suffer an unlawful denial of his First Amendment right to receive mail, money orders and packages; (3) prison officials unlawfully open his legal mail outside his presence; and (4) prison officials unlawfully deny him the use of his current legal name. Plaintiff sought relief appropriate to his claims, or appointment of legal counsel and a hearing. In the alternative, he appealed the denial of his motion for injunctive relief.
In addressing plaintiff's motion to reconsider, the Court noted that although plaintiff's motion alluded to a new factual situation — that prison officials had unlawfully opened his legal mail outside his presence — that allegation did not bear on the motion for which plaintiff sought reconsideration or his claim that prison officials had unlawfully prevented him from using his current legal name and required that he use the name under which he was convicted. Therefore the Court declined to reconsider its order of March 27, 2002. Order (Doc. #15). In the alternative, because plaintiff sought to appeal the order of March 27, 2002, the Court ordered the Clerk of Court to docket plaintiff's motion as a notice of appeal effective April 25, 2002, to allow plaintiff to pursue relief through the Tenth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
Motion For Injunction
Plaintiff now seeks an injunction or hearing or trial on his claims related to the prison mail system. In his statement of facts, plaintiff asserts that prison officials have (1) refused to add his legal name to his prison title; (2) refused to deliver mail addressed in plaintiff's legal name even when the name of conviction appears in parenthesis; (3) returned or even destroyed mail that was properly sent; and (4) mis-handled his mail (including money orders) in retaliation for plaintiff's lawsuit. Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to have his legal name added to his file and to receive money and mail in his legal name.
The Court first notes in seeking an injunction, plaintiff seeks the very relief that the Court has previously denied. See Order (Doc. #15) filed March 27, 2002 (injunctive relief not warranted because Department of Corrections not obligated to use plaintiff's new name). Further, plaintiff has not met the standards for entitlement to a preliminary injunction. To prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiff must establish (1) that he will suffer irreparable injury unless the preliminary injunction issues; (2) that the threatened injury outweighs whatever damage the proposed preliminary injunction may cause defendants; (3) that the preliminary injunction, if issued, will not be adverse to the public interest; and (4) a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will eventually prevail on the merits. Tri-State Generation and Transmission Ass'n. Inc. v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d 351, 355 (10th Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff has not established any of these factors. He has not shown that he will suffer irreparable injury without the requested relief. The burden of an injunction on defendants therefore outweighs any demonstrated injury that plaintiff may suffer. The courts generally accord broad deference to decisions by prison officials concerning matters that touch on prison security. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974) (recognizing that prison administration is "at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking"). Finally, the Court does not find a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits. As the Court has pointed out, case law supports a requirement that plaintiff use the name under which he was convicted. See, e.g., Matthews v. Morales, 23 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff has also requested a trial on the merits. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. #76) which is not yet fully briefed. The Court overrules plaintiff's request for a trial on the merits without prejudice, pending a ruling on the summary judgment motion.
II. Motion For Default Judgment
On May 22, 2002, defendant filed his amended complaint. That same day, Magistrate Judge Catherine Walter ordered defendants to answer plaintiff's amended complaint within 60 days of the mailing of requests for waivers of service. See Doc. #28. On July 2, 2002, she sustained defendants' motion to extend the time to answer, to 20 days after defendants received the Martinez report. See Doc. #46. The Special Assistant Attorney General sent the Martinez report to defendants' attorney on July 22, 2002, and filed it with the Court on August 1, 2002. See Doc. #50. That same day, defendants Lee Gibbens, Rhonda Phelps, Jane Doe, Mailroom staff, John Doe, shakedown staff, Jane Doe, shakedown Staff, David McKune and Charles Simmons, filed an answer to the complaint filed a year earlier, on August 27, 2001. See Doc. #49. On August 21, 2002, plaintiff filed his motion for default judgment against defendants McKune, Barkley and Woods, asserting that they had not timely answered. See Doc. #55.
On September 6, 2002, Barkley and Woods (along with Rod Karlin, Kim Pritchard, and James Kelly Jones) responded to plaintiff's motion for default judgment, stating that defendants' attorney had mistakenly answered the original complaint (which had been filed a year earlier, on August 27, 2001), rather than the amended complaint filed May 22, 2002, and had thus inadvertently failed to answer on behalf of Barkley and Woods, as well as Karlin, Pritchard and Jones, none of whom had been named in the original complaint. Defendants further noted that contrary to plaintiff's contention, McKune had answered on August 1, 2002. Defendants asserted that the answer of August 1, 2002 actually listed Barkley and Woods by title (e.g., "shakedown Staff") and that because of a pending telephone scheduling conference with the magistrate judge, allowing Barkley and Woods (as well as Karlin, Pritchard and Jones) to file an answer out of time would not prejudice the case. On September 6, 2002, Barkley, Woods, Karlin, Pritchard and Jones formally filed their Motion To File Answer For Defendant's [sic] Out Of Time. See Doc. #60.
Plaintiff did not include Karlin, Pritchard or Jones in his motion for default judgment, even though the amended complaint also named them as defendants and they did not join in the answer filed August 1, 2002. The response to the motion for default judgment, however, was filed on behalf of Barkley, Woods, Karlin, Pritchard and Jones.
On September 19, 2002, Magistrate Walter issued an order addressing discovery and other pretrial matters in this case. Judge Walter stated that "[s]everal defendants have filed a motion to file an answer out of time (Doc. #60). Plaintiff does not oppose this motion. The motion is granted and defendants' answer is due on or before September 27, 2002." See Order (Doc. #62) at 1. On September 27, 2002 defendants Gibbens, McKune, Simmons, Phelps, Barkley, Woods, Karlin, Pritchard, Woods and Jones filed their answer with leave of the Court. Plaintiff's motion for default judgment is therefore overruled.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion For Declaratory Relief (Doc. #65) filed October 1, 2002 be and hereby is OVERRULED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion For Default Judgment In Accordance To F.R.C.P. Rule 54 And All Applicable Rules/Statutes (Doc. #55) filed August 21, 2002, be and hereby is OVERRULED as moot.