See Watkins v. State, 289 Ga. 359, 362(3)(a), 711 S.E.2d 655 (2011) (“[T]o demonstrate prejudice from trial counsel's alleged failure to elicit favorable testimony at trial, the defendant may not rely on hearsay or speculation[,] but must either call the witness or introduce a legally recognized substitute for the uncalled witness's testimony.”) (citations and punctuation omitted); Strong v. State, 275 Ga. 465, 466(2)(a), 569 S.E.2d 523 (2002) (Because the defendant did not produce the witness or the witness' affidavit at the hearing on his motion for new trial, he failed to present any probative evidence that the witness would have testified for the defense at trial and that his testimony would have been exculpatory.). Under such circumstances, we need not evaluate whether counsel's performance was deficient for failing to call the witnesses at trial, because Gant has failed to establish the second prong of the Strickland test, which is that counsel's performance prejudiced his defense. Goodwin v. Cruz–Padillo, 265 Ga. 614, 615, 458 S.E.2d 623 (1995); McRae v. State, 289 Ga.App. 418, 420(2), 657 S.E.2d 323 (2008).

Accordingly, even assuming counsel's deficiency in failing to request a continuance, "there was no showing of any resulting prejudice." Strong v. State, 275 Ga. 465, 466 (2) (a) ( 569 SE2d 523) (2002). (b) Wells also contends that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request a bifurcated trial on felony murder and on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

Numerous cases have indicated in the context of a motion for new trial that a defendant can introduce the substance of an uncalled witness's testimony by means of an affidavit. See, e.g., Strong v. State, 275 Ga. 465 (2) (a) ( 569 SE2d 523) (2002); Dye v. State, 266 Ga. App. 825 (2) (c) ( 598 SE2d 95) (2004); Prather v. State, supra, 259 Ga. App. at 444 (4). While an affidavit need not necessarily contain hearsay, in that the information recited in the affidavit may be within the personal knowledge of the affiant, nevertheless the affidavit itself is hearsay, because it is an extrajudicial statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

He certainly did not make a proffer of their exculpatory testimony, which would be necessary in order to show that the failure to interview and to call them as defense witnesses was a prejudicial deficiency in the representation. Strong v. State, 275 Ga. 465, 466 (2) (a) ( 569 SE2d 523) (2002); Goodwin v. Cruz-Padillo, 265 Ga. 614, 615 ( 458 SE2d 623) (1995). The contentions concerning the adequacy of defense counsel's trial preparation related to the existence of a certain woman whom Simpson urges might have provided him with an alibi.

Third, Fann argues that his trial counsel's failure to interview Easley before trial deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Easley. Fann, however, has failed to show what information trial counsel would have obtained from a pretrial interview of Easley, much less that the results of his trial would have been different.Strong v. State, 275 Ga. 465 ( 569 S.E.2d 523) (2002);Butler v. State, 273 Ga. 380, 385 ( 541 S.E.2d 653) (2001). 3. Finally, Fann enumerates as error the trial court's admission of testimony that showed (i) a day or two before the shooting, Fann had discussed robbing a nearby gas station with his revolver to get money, and (ii) Fann was using cocaine and marijuana on these same days. Evidence of the defendant's motive is relevant, even though it may incidentally place the defendant's character in evidence, and evidence of motive is not subject to the notice and hearing requirements of Uniform Superior Court Rules 31.1 and 31.3.

See Strong v. State, 275 Ga. 465 , 466 (2) (a) (569 SE2d 523 ) (2002) (The Appellant “did not produce [a potential defense] witness or his affidavit at the hearing on the motion for new trial, and thus did not present any probative evidence that he would have testified for the defense or that, if so, his testimony would have been exculpatory. Without a proper proffer of the *308 testimony, Appellant cannot show a reasonable probability that the missing witness’ appearance at trial would have resulted in a different verdict.”

Clements v. State, 299 Ga.App. 561, 564(2), 683 S.E.2d 127 (2009) (citation and footnote omitted); see Gibson v. State, 290 Ga. 6, 9(4), 717 S.E.2d 447 (2011) (courts have no duty to advise a defendant of the right to testify or to determine on the record whether the defendant's decision is voluntary, knowing, and intentional; courts are under no obligation to place a defendant's decision whether to testify on the record). See Strong v. State, 275 Ga. 465, 466–467(2)(b), 569 S.E.2d 523 (2002) (rejecting claim that counsel failed to adequately prepare defendant for testifying in his own defense, where defendant failed to offer any specific reason why his preparation was inadequate or how it might have been improved and where defendant failed to point out anything in his trial testimony which was harmful to his case); Donald v. State, 312 Ga.App. 222, 229–230(4)(f), 718 S.E.2d 81 (2011). See Morgan, supra;Strong, supra;Donald, supra;Howard v. State, 310 Ga.App. 659, 665–666(3)(b), 714 S.E.2d 255 (2011); Bunn, supra;Clements, supra.

However, Boykins-White failed to call the potential witnesses to testify at the motion for new trial hearing or otherwise make a proffer as to the substance of their testimony in order to show that the witnesses' testimony would have been relevant, admissible and favorable to his defense. See Strong v. State, 275 Ga. 465, 466 (2) (a) ( 569 SE2d 523) (2002) (because the defendant failed to produce the witness or the witness' affidavit at the motion for new trial hearing, there was no probative evidence that the witness would have testified for the defense at trial and that his testimony would have been exculpatory). In light of this failure, it is unnecessary to evaluate whether counsel's performance was deficient for failing to interview witnesses or subpoena them prior to trial, because Boykins-White has not established the second prong of the Strick-land test, that counsel's performance was prejudicial to his defense.

Moreover, even if counsel had raised a timely objection, Zipperer did not produce the witness or the witness' affidavit at the hearing on her motion for new trial and, therefore, she failed to present any probative evidence that the witness would have testified for the defense at trial and that his testimony would have been helpful to her defense. Strong v. State, 275 Ga. 465, 466 (2) (a) ( 569 SE2d 523) (2002). Thus, she has failed to demonstrate any prejudice that resulted from the court's exclusion of the witness.

Thus, he cannot show a reasonable probability that these witnesses' testimony would have resulted in a different verdict. See Strong v. State, 275 Ga. 465, 466(2)(a) ( 569 S.E.2d 523) (2002). See id.