As a receiver, he was an officer of the court which had appointed him, held the property entrusted to him in custodia legis, and had to be most fair and frank in all of his dealings with the court. Strong v. Friedman, 261 Ill. App. 602, 620 (1931). The record clearly demonstrates that Keefe did not deal with the court fairly and frankly in this case.
The authority of the witness Whalen, when he was sent to Quincy by appellee, was expressly limited to securing information and investigation and reporting back. Whalen was plant superintendent for appellee and had no authority to speak or negotiate for appellee. Any statement that he made was not binding upon appellee. No tender of proof was made as to what this witness would testify to, and there was, therefore, no error. ( Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Carroll, 206 Ill. 318, 328; Strong v. Friedman, 261 Ill. App. 602, 618; Wigmore on Evidence, 2d Ed., vol. 3, sec. 1769.) There was some testimony offered quoting Whalen and Ohlin that the catalogues could be used without charge and that appellee would reprint. Under no theory could this promise be held as binding on appellee for Whalen was merely a plant superintendent or foreman, and not an official of the corporation, and as such, had no implied authority to make any promise binding upon appellee.