The latest New Jersey case involving "absolute discretion" requires taking into consideration the "standard" laid down in the trust and imposes upon the trustee the obligation of acting in the state of mind contemplated by the settlor. Conlin v. Murdock, Ch., 1945, 137 N.J. Eq. 12, 43 A.2d 218; compare Strong v. Dann, Ch., 1919, 90 N.J. Eq. 329, 108 A. 86. Thus, the mere fact that petitioner's husband may not be in a position to compel payments to himself would not necessarily exclude the possibility, under the New Jersey law, of preventing the petitioner from arbitrarily appropriating the income to her own use. This is particularly true in view of the provision in the trusts requiring the trustee to accumulate and add to principal the balance of income not disbursed to meet the "respective needs" of the beneficiaries.

It is clear from this language that the testator intended to place no further restriction on William T. Lees other than that imposed by law, namely, that he act in good faith in the exercise of his discretion. Strong v. Dann, 90 N.J. Eq. 329. After considering the will as a whole, we are of the opinion that the testator intended by the inclusion of the so-called "spendthrift" provision in clause Tenth to limit the discretionary power already vested expressly and broadly in the trustee by clause Fifth B (b) only if the contingency as specifically provided in said provision had been shown to exist before the exercise of the original power.

There is an implication in the language used, that principal should be utilized by means of a series of "payments," rather than a single payment of the whole; but this is not thought to be so far controlling as to override the primary purpose to eliminate suffering by any use of the fund reasonably consistent with the honest exercise of sound discretion. Cf. Strong v. Dann, 90 N.J. Eq. 329, 331, 332. The trustees are entitled to transfer the entire trust estate by a single payment to the life beneficiaries only if as a matter of fact this is a reasonable disposition to make in the light of all the pertinent surrounding circumstances.

The invocation of the supervisory and remedial jurisdiction of Chancery by a testamentary life annuitant who desires to inaugurate a judicial inquiry concerning the good faith of the trustee in the exercise of his discretionary authority to determine the adequacy of a maintenance annuity in ensuing eventualities is not neoteric. One needs only to achieve an acquaintance with the alleged causes of action in such cases as Holcomb v. Executors of Holcomb, 11 N.J. Eq. 476, 485 ( Ch. 1858); Read v. Patterson, 47 N.J. Eq. 595 ( E. A. 1890); Crocheron v. Savage, 75 N.J. Eq. 589 ( E. A. 1909); O'Gorman v. Crowley, 81 N.J. Eq. 520 ( E. A. 1913); Turnure v. Turnure, 89 N.J. Eq. 197 ( E. A. 1918); Strong v. Dann, 90 N.J. Eq. 329 ( Ch. 1919); Swetland v. Swetland, 100 N.J. Eq. 196 ( Ch. 1926), affirmed 102 N.J. Eq. 294 ( E. A. 1928); Titsworth v. Titsworth, 107 N.J. Eq. 436, 443 ( Ch. 1931); Tansey v. New Brunswick Trust Co., 124 N.J. Eq. 558 ( Ch. 1938); Camden Safe Deposit Trust Co. v. Read, 124 N.J. Eq. 599 ( Ch. 1939); Commonwealth-Merchants Trust Co. v. Seglie, 127 N.J. Eq. 160 ( Ch. 1940); Conlin v. Murdock, 137 N.J. Eq. 12 ( Ch. 1945). Particularly informative are Scott on Trusts (2 d ed.), § 187 and § 575 et seq., and 6 N.J. Practice ( Clapp, Wills and Administration), § 575; Restatement on Trusts, § 187.