Opinion
C. A. 1:24-698-CMC-SVH
02-16-2024
Shaneeka Stroman, Petitioner, v. Calhoun County Sheriff's Department and St. Matthews Magistrate Court, Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge
Shaneeka Stroman (“Petitioner”), proceeding in forma pauperis, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 224i. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(i)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss the petition. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be summarily dismissed.
I. Procedural and Factual Background
On February 8, 2024, Petitioner was arrested on charges of trespassing and harassment, [ECF No. i at i], and she was released on an unsecured bond. [ECF No. i-i5]. Petitioner filed this habeas petition challenging the basis for her arrest. [ECF No. i]. She seeks dismissal of her underlying charges, in addition to monetary and injunctive relief.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings for the United States District Court,the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and other habeas corpus statutes. Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which a pro se party could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dept of Soc. Servs. 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
The Rules Governing Section 2254 are applicable to habeas actions brought under § 2241. See Rule 1(b).
B. Analysis
Pretrial petitions for habeas corpus are properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, “which applies to persons in custody regardless of whether final judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present status of the case pending against him.” United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987)).However, federal habeas relief is available under § 2241 only if exceptional circumstances justify the provision of federal review. Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 227.
Use of habeas corpus in the United States has not been limited to situations in which the petitioner is in actual, physical custody. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239 (1963). Individuals under parole or probation supervision, which involve significant restraints on a person's liberty, are deemed “in custody” for habeas purposes. Id. at 242. Likewise, a person who is on bond pending appeal or other post-conviction remedies is “in custody” for habeas purposes. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973). In both situations, the restraints on a person's liberty exceed those imposed by the state on the general public. Jones, 371 U.S. at 242. In Hensley, the Court observed that its decision would not “open the doors of the district courts to the habeas corpus petitions of all persons released on bail,” because a state defendant released on bail pending trial must still contend with exhaustion requirements before seeking relief in federal court. Hensley, 411 U.S. at 353.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). The Younger Court noted courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 43-44 (citation omitted). From Younger and its progeny, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals (“Fourth Circuit”) has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
The petition is based on Petitioner's pending state criminal charges. The second part of the test is met because the Supreme Court has noted “the States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Fourth Circuit has addressed the third criterion in noting “‘that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.'” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)). Petitioner can pursue her claims related to the validity of the criminal charges against her in state court. Accordingly, the petition is subject to summary dismissal. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
Because Petitioner has failed to allege sufficient facts to meet the
Younger test, the undersigned recommends the district court summarily dismiss this action.
The undersigned recommends dismissal without leave to amend because any attempt to cure the deficiencies in the complaint would be futile for the reasons stated herein. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 2015).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).