Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District

121 Citing cases

  1. Flanagan v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities

    54 Conn. App. 89 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999)   Cited 24 times

    Any assignment of error as to the dismissal of his claims for monetary damages under § § 1983 and 1985 are waived because they have not been raised in the plaintiff's appeal to this court. See Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 292 n. 2, 533 A.2d 208 (1987); Furtney v. Zoning Commission, 159 Conn. 585, 589, 271 A.2d 319 (1970); Nazarko v. Conservation Commission, 50 Conn. App. 548, 550 n. 2, 717 A.2d 850, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 940, 723 A.2d 318 (1998). "Exhaustion of administrative remedies . . . is not required before bringing a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

  2. Hryniewicz v. Wilson

    51 Conn. App. 440 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999)   Cited 65 times
    Stating that "[t]he trial court has the power to take judicial notice of court files of other actions between the same parties"

    This issue was waived because it was not raised in their initial appeal to this court. See Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 292 n. 2, 533 A.2d 208 (1987); Furtney v. Zoning Commission, 159 Conn. 585, 589, 271 A.2d 319 (1970); Nazarko v. Conservation Commission, 50 Conn. App. 548, 550 n. 2, 717 A.2d 850 (1998).

  3. Nazarko v. Conservation Commission

    717 A.2d 850 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998)   Cited 24 times
    In Nazarko, abutting property owners appealed a decision by the commission which had granted an application by a sportsman club to relocate a skeet shooting range on certain of its property on the ground that a town selectman who had been appointed as an ex officio member of the commission failed to disqualify himself from the proceedings despite having a personal interest in the outcome because the selectman was a member of the sportsman club, owned the only gun shop in the town, and may have sold guns and shotgun shells to fellow members.

    Because that issue was not briefed, however, it is deemed to be abandoned. See Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 292 n. 2, 533 A.2d 208 (1987). "`The scope of our appellate review depends upon the proper characterization of the rulings made by the trial court.

  4. Griswold Housing Authority v. Kowal

    CV176102489S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jul. 25, 2017)

    Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. See Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 533 A.2d 208, 210 (Conn. 1987); CONN. PRAC. BOOK, SUPER.CT. R.& R. APP. PROC. § 10-33 (2017).

  5. Pollard v. Pollard

    1995 Ct. Sup. 1142 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995)

    Standing goes to the court's subject matter jurisdiction." Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 294 533 A.2d 208 (1987). "Lack of standing is properly raised in a motion to dismiss because `standing goes to the court's subject matter jurisdiction.

  6. O'Brien v. Klebanoff

    1991 Ct. Sup. 5055 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991)

    The court now considers the motion to dismiss in view of the foregoing history. A motion to dismiss may be used by a defendant to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the court at any time. Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 294 (1987). "Standing goes to the court's subject matter jurisdiction."

  7. In re Westport Transit Dist.

    165 B.R. 93 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994)   Cited 6 times
    Finding that entity was municipality rested in part on the entity's power of eminent domain, the power to directly issue bonds, and the power to set its own fares

    Woodridge Lake Sewer Dist, 218 Conn. at 148, 588 A.2d 176 (The principal of limited municipal governance "applies with equal force to quasi-municipal corporations" created by municipal authorities acts. A sewer district is a quasi-municipal corporation.); Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax Dist., 205 Conn. 290, 294, 533 A.2d 208 (1987) ("Quasi-municipal corporations are governed by the law applicable to municipal corporations."). Conn.Gen.Stat. § 7-273b(d) grants the following general powers to transit districts:

  8. Lippold v. Meade Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs

    2018 S.D. 7 (S.D. 2018)   Cited 8 times
    In Lippold, we held that only the State has standing to challenge the incorporation of a municipality, relying on SDCL 9-3-20.

    [¶ 26.] Additionally, many courts have reached the same conclusion that the validity of acting municipalities may only be challenged by the state. See, e.g., Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Shepard, 185 U.S. 1, 14, 22 S.Ct. 531, 536, 46 L.Ed. 773 (1902) ; Nat'l Life Ins. Co. of Montpelier v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Huron, 62 F. 778, 787 (8th Cir. 1894) ; Jefferson v. State , 527 P.2d 37, 41 (Alaska 1974) ; Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax Dist., 205 Conn. 290, 533 A.2d 208, 210 (1987) ; Bishop v. Shawnee & Mission Twps. Turkey Creek Main Sewer Dist. No. 1, Johnson Cty., 184 Kan. 376, 336 P.2d 815, 818 (1959) ; State v. Bailey, 106 Minn. 138, 118 N.W. 676, 677-78 (1908). Here, it is undisputed that Buffalo Chip City is an acting municipality and that Sturgis, Lippold, and Murphy are not appealing on behalf of the State of South Dakota. Because the appeal from the County's decision inquired into the regularity of the organization of Buffalo Chip City, SDCL 9-3-20 deprived Appellees of standing and thus the circuit court could not exercise its subject-matter jurisdiction.

  9. Jordan v. Knox County

    213 S.W.3d 751 (Tenn. 2007)   Cited 53 times
    Holding that the county election commission has standing to seek declaratory judgment as to eligibility of those who filed qualifying petitions

    Several states have followed the course of Minnesota in the recognition of a de facto public corporation. See Cherry v. City of Hayti Heights, 563 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1978); Fox v. Personnel Appeal Bd. of City of Cranston, 99 E.I. 566, 209 A.2d 447 (1965); Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax Dist, 205 Conn. 290, 533 A.2d 208 (1987); City of Bethany v. Mason, 202 Okla. 66, 210 P.2d 353 (1949); Smith v. City of Emporia, 168 Kan. 187, 211 P.2d 101 (1949); Clemens v. Pinehurst Water Dist, 81 Idaho 213, 339 P.2d 665 (1959). Even in quo warranto actions where a state, because of the defects in the incorporation process, has challenged a local governmental entity, courts have typically refused to nullify governmental actions based upon the rationale that whatever the legislative body had the power to do, it could ratify based upon a period of recognition of the improperly organized entity.

  10. Goodson v. State

    232 Conn. 175 (Conn. 1995)   Cited 41 times
    Providing that prejudgment relief under § 52-422 may be granted only when an arbitration is pending

    In addition to its original claims that the trial court's order was contrary to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and § 52-422, the defendant now contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to have considered the plaintiffs' petition. Although this claim was raised by the defendant for the first time just prior to oral argument before this court, a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction may be made at any time. Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 294, 533 A.2d 208 (1987). Because the jurisdictional issue had to be resolved before a decision on the merits could be rendered; Galland v. Bronson, 204 Conn. 330, 333, 527 A.2d 1192 (1987); we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs to aid us in deciding the question of jurisdiction.