Any assignment of error as to the dismissal of his claims for monetary damages under § § 1983 and 1985 are waived because they have not been raised in the plaintiff's appeal to this court. See Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 292 n. 2, 533 A.2d 208 (1987); Furtney v. Zoning Commission, 159 Conn. 585, 589, 271 A.2d 319 (1970); Nazarko v. Conservation Commission, 50 Conn. App. 548, 550 n. 2, 717 A.2d 850, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 940, 723 A.2d 318 (1998). "Exhaustion of administrative remedies . . . is not required before bringing a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This issue was waived because it was not raised in their initial appeal to this court. See Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 292 n. 2, 533 A.2d 208 (1987); Furtney v. Zoning Commission, 159 Conn. 585, 589, 271 A.2d 319 (1970); Nazarko v. Conservation Commission, 50 Conn. App. 548, 550 n. 2, 717 A.2d 850 (1998).
Because that issue was not briefed, however, it is deemed to be abandoned. See Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 292 n. 2, 533 A.2d 208 (1987). "`The scope of our appellate review depends upon the proper characterization of the rulings made by the trial court.
Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. See Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 533 A.2d 208, 210 (Conn. 1987); CONN. PRAC. BOOK, SUPER.CT. R.& R. APP. PROC. § 10-33 (2017).
Standing goes to the court's subject matter jurisdiction." Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 294 533 A.2d 208 (1987). "Lack of standing is properly raised in a motion to dismiss because `standing goes to the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
The court now considers the motion to dismiss in view of the foregoing history. A motion to dismiss may be used by a defendant to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the court at any time. Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 294 (1987). "Standing goes to the court's subject matter jurisdiction."
Woodridge Lake Sewer Dist, 218 Conn. at 148, 588 A.2d 176 (The principal of limited municipal governance "applies with equal force to quasi-municipal corporations" created by municipal authorities acts. A sewer district is a quasi-municipal corporation.); Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax Dist., 205 Conn. 290, 294, 533 A.2d 208 (1987) ("Quasi-municipal corporations are governed by the law applicable to municipal corporations."). Conn.Gen.Stat. § 7-273b(d) grants the following general powers to transit districts:
[¶ 26.] Additionally, many courts have reached the same conclusion that the validity of acting municipalities may only be challenged by the state. See, e.g., Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Shepard, 185 U.S. 1, 14, 22 S.Ct. 531, 536, 46 L.Ed. 773 (1902) ; Nat'l Life Ins. Co. of Montpelier v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Huron, 62 F. 778, 787 (8th Cir. 1894) ; Jefferson v. State , 527 P.2d 37, 41 (Alaska 1974) ; Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax Dist., 205 Conn. 290, 533 A.2d 208, 210 (1987) ; Bishop v. Shawnee & Mission Twps. Turkey Creek Main Sewer Dist. No. 1, Johnson Cty., 184 Kan. 376, 336 P.2d 815, 818 (1959) ; State v. Bailey, 106 Minn. 138, 118 N.W. 676, 677-78 (1908). Here, it is undisputed that Buffalo Chip City is an acting municipality and that Sturgis, Lippold, and Murphy are not appealing on behalf of the State of South Dakota. Because the appeal from the County's decision inquired into the regularity of the organization of Buffalo Chip City, SDCL 9-3-20 deprived Appellees of standing and thus the circuit court could not exercise its subject-matter jurisdiction.
Several states have followed the course of Minnesota in the recognition of a de facto public corporation. See Cherry v. City of Hayti Heights, 563 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1978); Fox v. Personnel Appeal Bd. of City of Cranston, 99 E.I. 566, 209 A.2d 447 (1965); Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax Dist, 205 Conn. 290, 533 A.2d 208 (1987); City of Bethany v. Mason, 202 Okla. 66, 210 P.2d 353 (1949); Smith v. City of Emporia, 168 Kan. 187, 211 P.2d 101 (1949); Clemens v. Pinehurst Water Dist, 81 Idaho 213, 339 P.2d 665 (1959). Even in quo warranto actions where a state, because of the defects in the incorporation process, has challenged a local governmental entity, courts have typically refused to nullify governmental actions based upon the rationale that whatever the legislative body had the power to do, it could ratify based upon a period of recognition of the improperly organized entity.
In addition to its original claims that the trial court's order was contrary to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and § 52-422, the defendant now contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to have considered the plaintiffs' petition. Although this claim was raised by the defendant for the first time just prior to oral argument before this court, a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction may be made at any time. Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 294, 533 A.2d 208 (1987). Because the jurisdictional issue had to be resolved before a decision on the merits could be rendered; Galland v. Bronson, 204 Conn. 330, 333, 527 A.2d 1192 (1987); we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs to aid us in deciding the question of jurisdiction.