Opinion
No. C-00-3008 WHO
September 13, 2001
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
In this gender discrimination action brought by plaintiff Linda Strohn ("Strohn") against defendant Associates Financial Services Company, Inc. ("Associates"), Associates now moves for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth hereinafter, Associates' motion is granted.
I.
Between 1975 and 1999, Strohn was employed by Avco Financial Services ("Avco"), a consumer lending company, as branch manager for Avco's King City, California branch office. (Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts ("UF") 2.) In January 1999, Associates, also a consumer lending company, purchased Avco. (Id. 1.) Associates' purchase of Avco did not become operational until approximately July 1, 1999, at which time Strohn became aware that she was an Associates employee. (UF 4.)
Steve Hauser, who had been Strohn's supervisor at Avco, remained her supervisor until July 1999, when he left Associates. (Reply Ex. A, Strohn Dep. at 50:13-20.) Following Hauser's departure, Strohn was supervised briefly by Ray Montoya and Scott Brackett. (Id. at 51:17-20; 52:7-9.) Strohn testified that she got along well with all three supervisors, although Brackett occasionally called to inquire as to her failure to make enough loans to meet Associates' expectations. (UF 12.) On October 1, 1999, the regional vice president of Associates, Rey Maninang ("Maninang"), became Strohn's direct supervisor. (Id. 13.)
For the next month-and-a-half, Maninang repeatedly questioned Strohn's performance. On October 5, 1999, Maninang called Strohn to ask why she had not made a loan the previous day, and told her that she was expected to make at least one loan per day. (Reply Ex. A, Strohn Dep. at 70:17-21.) Strohn replied that her failure to meet the one-loan-per-day expectation was due to lack of training and staff support, and suggested to Maninang that his dissatisfaction with her was due to Strohn's age. (UF 16; Reply Ex. A, Strohn Dep. at 1:12-14.) Strohn was fifty-one years old at the time, although she did not know whether Maninang was aware of her age. (UF 17.) Maninang told Strohn that age did not matter and that her age had nothing to do with his dissatisfaction with her performance. (Id. 16.) Maninang also told Strohn, "[y]ou need to make a decision whether you're going to keep your job or not." (Id. 16.)
The relationship between Strohn and Maninang continued to deteriorate. Maninang and other Associates' managers made a number of attempts to assist Strohn to improve her branch's performance. (Id. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25.) As of October 15, 1999, however, Strohn's branch had incurred more days without making a loan than any of the other branches that Maninang managed. (Id. 26.) Strohn attended five days of training in Atlanta, Georgia from November 1 to 5, 1999. (Id. 28.) On November 9, 1999, Maninang sent Strohn a fax in which he expressed his dissatisfaction and informed her that he would be reviewing her performance at the end of November. (Id. 29.)
Shortly after sending the fax, Maninang called Strohn to confirm that she had received it. (Id. 30.) Strohn told Maninang that everything in the fax was lies, and requested a meeting to discuss it. (Id. 31, 32.) Strohn initially asked that Maninang come to her office in King City, but then agreed to meet him at his office in Campbell at 8:30 the next morning. (Id. 33, 34.) Shortly after agreeing to meet Maninang at his office, Strohn sent Maninang an e-mail message stating that she was not going to meet with him as planned. (Id. 35.) When Maninang called for an explanation, Strohn told him that she did not feel comfortable meeting with him on such short notice. (Id. 37.) Maninang informed Strohn that he was placing her on paid administrative leave and told her to go home and wait for his call. (Id. 39.) On November 10, 1999, Maninang telephoned Strohn at her home and informed her that she was terminated for insubordination. (Id. 40.)
Strohn filed a claim with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing on March 29, 2000, and received a right-to-sue letter on April 13, 2000.
Strohn alleges ten causes of action against Associates. They are (1) gender discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), Cal. Gov't Code § 12900 et seq.; (2) gender discrimination in violation of public policy; (3) age discrimination in violation of public policy; (4) age discrimination in violation of the FEHA; (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (6) retaliation; (7) harassment in violation of the FEHA; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (9) breach of an implied contract not to terminate without good cause; and (10) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
II.
Associates now moves for summary judgment on each of Strohn's causes of action.
A.
Associates argues first that Strohn's claims for gender and age discrimination must be dismissed because she cannot prove that gender and/or age was a motivating factor for any of the adverse employment actions taken against her. Associates further argues that Strohn cannot rebut Associates' legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Strohn must provide evidence that (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was performing competently in the position she held; (3) she was terminated despite her qualifications; and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive. Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 355, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 379 (2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). The prima facie burden is light, but Strohn must at least show "actions taken by the employer from which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions were `based on a [prohibited] discriminatory criterion[.]'" Id. (quoting Ibarbia v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 191 Cal.App.3d 1318, 1327-28, 237 Cal.Rptr. 92, 97 (1987)).
Because of the similarity between state and federal employment discrimination laws, California courts follow federal precedent in applying the FEHA. Guz, 24 Cal.4th at 354, 100 Cal.Rptr. at 378.
Establishment of a prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The defendant must produce admissible evidence of the reasons for plaintiff's rejection sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55. The defendant must submit evidence that, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993). If the defendant does so, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted and disappears. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
If the defendant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection, plaintiff must show that the defendant's proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
1.
Strohn's first two causes of action are for gender discrimination in violation of the FEHA and in violation of public policy. Strohn is a woman. (Strohn Decl. ¶ 2.) Thus, she is a member of a protected class and has satisfied the first of the four elements of a prima facie case of age discrimination. As to whether she was qualified for the job at issue, Strohn worked as branch manager for Avco for over twenty-eight years prior to its acquisition by Associates. (Id. 2.) Strohn also attests that she received numerous awards and only positive written performance reviews. (Id. ¶ 10.) Associates points to evidence that Strohn failed to meet performance expectations despite many attempts to help her. (UF 19-27.) Viewing this contradictory evidence in the light most favorable to Strohn, as the Court must do in deciding a motion for summary judgment, Strohn has raised a triable issue as to whether she was qualified for the position from which she was terminated.
It is undisputed that Strohn was fired from her position as branch manager. (Id. 40.) Thus, the third element of the prima facie case is satisfied. Finally, Strohn was replaced on the day of her termination by Rick Hernandez, who was replaced by Geary Galousha ("Galousha"), who was replaced by Ray Flores, who was replaced by Patrick Mandujano, who currently holds the position. All are male. (Reply Ex. C, Maninang Dep. at 25:1-6; 27:23-25; 28:1-22.) The fact that Strohn was replaced by four men suggests a discriminatory motive. Thus, she has satisfied the fourth and final element of the prima facie case of gender discrimination.
The burden now shifts to Associates to advance a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Strohn's termination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Associates asserts that Maninang fired Strohn because she failed to meet performance expectations and was insubordinate when she refused to meet Maninang at his office. Associates relies on undisputed evidence that Maninang warned Strohn that her performance was unsatisfactory on a number of occasions, and that many attempts were made to assist her. (UF 14, 16, 19-25.) Moreover, it is undisputed that Strohn's branch incurred more days without making a loan than any of the other branches that Maninang managed. (Id. 26.) Finally, Strohn admits that she first agreed to meet Maninang on the morning of November 10, 1999, but then changed her mind. (Id. 34-37.) Thus, Associates has provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Strohn's termination, and the burden shifts back to Strohn to demonstrate that the proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
A plaintiff may establish pretext "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. At the pretext stage, "a plaintiff must produce evidence in addition to that which was sufficient for her prima facie case in order to rebut the defendant's showing." Godwin v. Hunt Wesson. Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998). When a plaintiff produces direct evidence of discrimination, however, "a triable issue as to the actual motivation of the employer is created even if the evidence is not substantial." Id. "[B]ecause of the inherently factual nature of the inquiry, the plaintiff need produce very little evidence of discriminatory motive to raise a genuine issue of fact." Lindahi v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1991).
In contrast, when a plaintiff attempts to show indirectly that the employer's proffered explanation is not credible, the plaintiff must produce "specific, substantial evidence of pretext." Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221 (quoting Bradley v. Hartcourt, Brace Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Tarin v. County of Los Angeles, 123 F.3d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[P]laintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reasons are pretexts."). Thus, it is necessary to examine Strohn's evidence of pretext to determine whether it is direct or indirect.
Direct evidence is "evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [of discriminatory animus] without inference or presumption." Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221 (quoting Davis v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1085 (5th Cir. 1994)). Strohn has not produced any direct evidence of gender-based discrimination. Instead she relies on indirect, or circumstantial, evidence that she was treated less favorably than male managers. After Strohn was terminated, her position went to a succession of male managers. (Reply Ex. C, Maninang Dep. at 25:1-6; 27:23-25; 28:1-22.) of the eleven branch offices under Maninang's supervision, however, six are managed by men and five are managed by women. (Id. at 30:23-24.) There is no evidence in the record that Maninang was reluctant to hire or supervise women, or that he treated female managers differently from male managers. There is some dispute with regard to whether the one-loan-a-day standard was imposed on all Associates branches, or just some of them, and whether Maninang gave all his managers "a hard time." (Sharpe Decl. Ex. B, Strohn Dep. at 138:19-22.) Strohn testified, however, that she had no knowledge of how Maninang treated his other branch managers. (Id. at 139:14-19; 140:14-22).
In short, there is no evidence of disparate treatment on the basis of sex other than the fact that Strohn was terminated while other managers were not. Strohn argues that Maninang never fired any other managers for failing to meet the one-loan-a-day standard. (Reply Ex. C, Maninang Dep. at 157:11-16.) Associates' proffered explanation, however, is that Strohn was fired not merely because she failed to make a loan every day, but because she generally had poor performance and was insubordinate. (UF 26, 27, 40.) Once Associates proffered this legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation, the burden was on Strohn to produce "specific, substantial evidence of pretext." Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221. In the absence of direct evidence of gender discrimination, "plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reasons are pretexts[.]" Tarin, 123 F.3d at 1264 (quoting EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.3d 1504, 1514 (9th Cir. 1989)). This she has not done. Thus, there is no triable issue with regard to Strohn's claims of gender discrimination. Associates' motion for summary judgment on Strohn's first and second causes of action for gender discrimination in violation of the FEHA and in violation of public policy is granted.
2.
Strohn's third and fourth causes of action are for age discrimination in violation of the FEHA and in violation of public policy. Strohn was over forty when she was terminated, so she is a member of a protected class. (Strohn Decl. ¶ 2.) As noted above, Strohn has raised a triable issue with regard to her qualifications, and it is undisputed that she was terminated. Finally, the four men who replaced Strohn were all in their twenties and thirties. (Reply Ex. C, Maninang Dep. at 25:1-6; 27:23-25; 28:1-22.) Thus, Strohn has established a prima facie case of age discrimination. Associates asserts that Strohn was fired not because of her age, but because she failed to perform and was insubordinate. Thus, the burden is on Strohn to establish that Associates' explanation is a pretext.
Associates argues that Strohn has no direct evidence of age discrimination. It is true that Strohn has no evidence, nor even alleges, that Maninang ever made any remarks to her regarding her age or gender. The only time Strohn and Maninang discussed her age was during the October 5, 1999 phone call in which Strohn suggested to Maninang that he was dissatisfied with her performance because of her age. (UF 16.) Maninang responded that age did not matter, and Strohn admits that she is not even sure that Maninang knew how old she was at the time the conversation took place. (Id. 16, 17.)
Strohn, however, does claim that Galousha, a branch manager, told her on October 6 or 8, 1999 that Maninang "likes young women managers because he can control them." (Reply Ex. A, Strohn Dep. at 122:17-18.) Associates argues that this comment is inadmissible hearsay. An admission by an agent within the scope of his employment, however, is admissible against the employer. Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220; Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). Furthermore, similar statements have been held sufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221 (finding direct evidence of discrimination where employer stated that he "did not want to deal with another female"); Lindahl, 930 F.2d at 1439 (finding direct evidence of sexual stereotyping where employer believed that female candidates get "nervous" and "easily upset"); Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 124 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding direct evidence of racial discrimination where employer referred to Mexican-American employee as a "dumb Mexican") Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Cmty. Coll. Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding direct evidence of sexual stereotype where employer referred to female plaintiff as "an old warhorse" and to her students as "little old ladies")
In Godwin and the other cases cited, however, the incriminating statements were made by individuals who had decision-making authority with regard to the plaintiffs' employment. In this case, Strohn does not allege that Maninang himself made any statements expressing bias. She claims only that Galousha ascribed a discriminatory attitude to Maninang. There is nothing in the record that provides a foundation for Galousha's opinion that Maninang prefers to employ young women. As noted in Godwin, the Ninth Circuit has held that "a triable issue as to the actual motivation of the employer is created even if the [direct] evidence is not substantial." 150 F.3d at 1220. Here, however, the probative value of Galousha's apparently unfounded opinion is less than insubstantial; it is quite nearly nonexistent. Thus, Strohn's direct evidence of discrimination is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
Nor has Strohn adduced much indirect evidence of age discrimination. Her position is currently held by a younger manager. That fact may establish an element of the prima facie case, but at the pretext stage, Strohn must produce additional evidence to rebut Associates' legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation. Id. at 1220. The only additional evidence of age discrimination in the record is that ten of the eleven Associate managers under Maninang's supervision are under forty years old. (Reply Ex. C., Maninang Dep. at 29-32.) This is not "specific, substantial evidence of pretext." Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221. Thus, Associates' motion for summary judgment on Strohn's third and forth causes of action for age-based discrimination in violation of the FEHA and in violation of public policy is granted.
B.
Strohn's fifth cause of action is for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Strohn's wrongful termination claim succeeds or fails based entirely on the success or failure of her discrimination claims. Strohn's discrimination claims having failed, Associates' motion for summary judgment on her fifth cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is granted.
C.
Strohn's sixth cause of action is for retaliation in violation of the FEHA.
Retaliation claims brought under the FEHA are analogous to federal Title VII claims and evaluated under federal law interpreting Title VII cases. Flait v. North American Watch Corp., 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 476, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 522, 528 (1992). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment decision, and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision. EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1513-14 (9th Cir. 1989). Once she has done so, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. Id. at 1514. If the defendant does so, the plaintiff must then show that the proffered reasons are actually a pretext for retaliation. Id.
Associates argues that Strohn did not engage in any protected activity because she never complained to Maninang that he was discriminating against her based on her age or gender. Strohn testified that she complained of Maninang's "harassment" on October 26, 1999 and November 8, 1999. (Reply Ex. A, Strohn Dep. at 431:4-9; 424:18-21.) Associates concedes that Strohn accused Maninang of "harassing" her, but contends that she used the word in its "plain dictionary meaning," rather than in its legal sense. That is, Strohn merely complained that Maninang was critical of her performance, not that he was discriminating against her based on her age or gender. It is undisputed, however, that Strohn suggested to Maninang that his dissatisfaction with her performance was because of her age. (UF 16.) Moreover, a reasonable person could find that Strohn was in fact complaining of age and/or gender discrimination when she accused Maninang of harassment. Thus, Strohn has raised a triable issue with regard to whether she engaged in a protected activity.
Strohn was terminated, so she suffered an adverse employment decision. The remaining question is whether Strohn has produced evidence establishing a causal link between her complaints and Maninang's decision to fire her. Strohn must show "by a preponderance of the evidence that engaging in the protected activity was one of the reasons for the firing and that but for such activity the plaintiff would not have been fired." Ruggles v. California Polytechnic State Univ., 797 F.2d 782, 785 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Kaufman v. Sidereal Corp., 695 F.2d 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1982)). Strohn has little evidence that she would not have been fired had she not complained.
In one phone conversation, after Strohn suggested that Maninang was unsatisfied with her performance because of her age, Maninang told Strohn, "[y]ou need to make a decision whether you're going to keep your job or not." (UF 16.) Strohn also testified that Maninang told her he was "losing his patience [with Strohn and] couldn't tolerate it anymore." (Reply Ex. A, Strohn Dep. at 431:10-24.) These statements suggest that Maninang was frustrated with Strohn's performance, but not that he fired her because she complained of harassment. As noted previously, Associates has asserted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Strohn's termination. That puts the burden on Strohn to produce substantial and specific evidence that Associates' explanation was a pretext for retaliation. Strohn has not met this burden. Maninang's statements are insufficient, and the record contains no other evidence that Strohn was fired because she complained rather than because she failed to perform and was insubordinate. Associates' motion for summary judgment on Strohn's sixth cause of action for retaliation is granted.
D.
Strohn's seventh cause of action is for harassment in violation of the FEHA.
To state a prima facie case of harassment under the FEHA, Strohn must show that she was subject to unwelcome harassment due to her age or gender, the harassment was sufficiently severe so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment, and there is some basis for holding Associates liable. See Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 608, 262 Cal.Rptr. 842, 851 (1989).
Strohn's claim fails because the conduct she complains of does not constitute harassment. "[H]arassment consists of conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance . . . . Harassment is not conduct of a type necessary for management of the employer's business or performance of the supervisory employee's job." Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal.4th 640, 645-46, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 502 (1998) (quoting Janken v. GM Hughes Elecs., 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 62-63, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 (1996)). Strohn alleges that Maninang criticized her job performance and ultimately terminated her due to her age and/or gender. "[C]ommonly necessary personnel management actions such as hiring and firing [and] . . . performance evaluations . . . do not come within the meaning of harassment. These are actions of a type necessary to carry out the duties of business and personnel management." Id. at 646-47. Allegations that Maninang criticized Strohn's performance or fired her based on her age or gender may support a discrimination cause of action, but they do not support a claim of harassment. Associates' motion for summary judgment on Strohn's seventh cause of action for harassment in violation of the FEHA is granted.
E.
Strohn's eighth cause of action is for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
As a threshold matter, Strohn's emotional distress claim is not, as Associates argues, barred by California's workers compensation statute. In Fretland v. County of Humboldt, 69 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1491-92, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 359, 368 (1999), the court held that an employee's emotional distress claim is not barred by the exclusivity provision of California's Worker's Compensation Act (Cal. Lab. Code § 3600 et seq.), to the extent it seeks damages for a discrimination claim.
The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 868, 903, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 79, 100 (1991) (quoting Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 209, 185 Cal.Rptr. 252, 259 (1982). The conduct must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. Id.
Summary judgment is proper if a claim cannot reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery. Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 1991). Where reasonable people may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity, 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1123, 252 Cal.Rptr. 122, 139 (1988) (quoting Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g. Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493, 499, 86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 91 (1970).
Here Strohn claims that Maninang acted with reckless disregard of the possibility of causing her severe emotional distress when he repeatedly criticized her job performance and ultimately fired her. Maninang's conduct did not rise to the level of open hostility. of course, discrimination is no less outrageous simply because it occurs in a covert manner. Here, however, all of Maninang's allegedly outrageous conduct consisted of criticisms of Strohn's performance. Even if one accepts that Maninang's criticisms were unfair or motivated by discriminatory animus, Strohn has produced no evidence of behavior that could be regarded as so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. Associates' motion for summary judgment on Strohn's eighth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is granted.
F.
Strohn's ninth and tenth causes of action are for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
1.
Strohn alleges that she had an implied contract with Associates that she would not be terminated except for cause, based on her years of service for Avco. In California, employment having no specified term is presumed to be at will. Cal. Labor Code § 2922. An implied-in-fact employment contract, however, may arise based on longevity of service, exemplary service, lack of criticism of the employee's performance, assurances by the employer, and the employer's acknowledged policies and practices. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 327, 171 Cal.Rptr. 917 (1981)), overruled on other grounds Guz, 24 Cal.4th 317, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352. Here, Associates had an express written at-will policy during the time that Strohn was an employee, and Strohn does not allege that anyone made representations to her that altered that policy. (UF 6, 7, 8.) Strohn has produced little evidence of an implied contract apart from the fact that she worked for Avco for a long period of time. She attests that she won a number of awards and received positive performance evaluations, but there is no evidence to suggest that either Avco or Associates ever gave Strohn any guaranty that she would not be fired without cause.
2.
Strohn's final claim is for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, however, cannot "impose substantive terms and conditions beyond those to which the contract parties actually agreed." Guz, 24 Cal.4th at 349, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d at 375. Thus, because Strohn had no implied employment contract with Associates, she cannot sustain her claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Associates' motion for summary judgment on Strohn's tenth cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is granted.
III.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Associates' motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety, and this action is dismissed with prejudice.
JUDGMENT
This matter having come before the Court, and the issues having been duly presented, and a decision having been duly rendered,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendant Associates Financial Services Company, Inc. "s motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Linda Strohn is granted, and this action is dismissed with prejudice.