Opinion
4:20-cv-00382-SMR-SHL
2022-01-03
Edward STROBL III, Plaintiff, v. WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC. and Marlon Harris, Defendants.
James Robert Lawyer, Robert Conklin, Lawyer, Lawyer, Dutton, Drake & Conklin, LLP, Urbandale, IA, for Plaintiff. Aaron Jason Redinbaugh, Finley Law Firm, Des Moines, IA, Agnieszka Malgorzata Gaertner, Pro Hac Vice, Frederick T. Harris, Lamson, Dugan & Murray, LLP, West Des Moines, IA, Jackson Edward Stokes, Pro Hac Vice, Lamson Dugan & Murray LLP, Omaha, NE, for Defendant Werner Enterprises, Inc. Aaron Jason Redinbaugh, Finley Law Firm, Des Moines, IA, Frederick T. Harris, Lamson, Dugan & Murray, LLP, West Des Moines, IA, Jackson Edward Stokes, Pro Hac Vice, Lamson Dugan & Murray LLP, Omaha, NE, for Defendant Marlon Harris.
James Robert Lawyer, Robert Conklin, Lawyer, Lawyer, Dutton, Drake & Conklin, LLP, Urbandale, IA, for Plaintiff.
Aaron Jason Redinbaugh, Finley Law Firm, Des Moines, IA, Agnieszka Malgorzata Gaertner, Pro Hac Vice, Frederick T. Harris, Lamson, Dugan & Murray, LLP, West Des Moines, IA, Jackson Edward Stokes, Pro Hac Vice, Lamson Dugan & Murray LLP, Omaha, NE, for Defendant Werner Enterprises, Inc.
Aaron Jason Redinbaugh, Finley Law Firm, Des Moines, IA, Frederick T. Harris, Lamson, Dugan & Murray, LLP, West Des Moines, IA, Jackson Edward Stokes, Pro Hac Vice, Lamson Dugan & Murray LLP, Omaha, NE, for Defendant Marlon Harris.
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL
Stephen H. Locher, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
A physician performed a neuropsychological evaluation of Plaintiff at the request of Plaintiff's attorneys in anticipation of litigation. Plaintiff did not identify the physician during discovery and does not intend to call him as an expert at trial, and thus argues the evaluation report and related data are protected from disclosure. Ordinarily, this would be an open-and-shut case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(D), and Defendants would be forbidden from discovering facts known to, or opinions held by, the physician absent a showing of exceptional circumstances.
But there's a twist: some of Plaintiff's treating medical providers knew he would be receiving the neuropsychological evaluation and referred to it in their own records as part of the "plan" for his injuries. These treating providers also expected to receive the results of the evaluation after it was finished (although this never actually happened).
The Court concludes that because Plaintiff's treating providers never received the evaluation report or underlying data, those materials remain protected by Rule 26(b)(4)(D), notwithstanding the references to the evaluation in the treating providers’ records. The Court further concludes Defendants have not met their burden of providing waiver or exceptional circumstances under Rule 26(b)(4)(D). The Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order and DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Compel.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Edward Strobl III ("Strobl") seeks damages for physical and emotional pain arising out of a collision with Defendant Marlon Harris's semi-trailer on December 11, 2018. (ECF 1-1 ¶¶ 7-18.) Defendant Harris was a driver for Defendant Werner Enterprises, Inc., at the time of the accident, and thus Strobl brought claims against both. (Id., ¶ 6.) Discovery closed on December 10, 2021, and the dispositive motion deadline is January 21, 2022. (ECF 7.) Trial is set to begin on June 20, 2022. (ECF 8.)
On October 1, 2019, at the request of Strobl's attorneys, Dr. David Demarest conducted a neuropsychological evaluation of Strobl. (ECF 28-1, p. 2.) Strobl argues, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(D), that Dr. Demarest was retained in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and will not serve as a trial witness. (ECF 28-2, p. 2.) Strobl's discovery materials back this up: he did not identify Dr. Demarest as an "individual likely to have discoverable information" in his Initial Disclosures, nor has he identified Dr. Demarest as an expert witness. (See generally ECF 28-1, pp. 10-15.) Moreover, Dr. Demarest's report itself states that Strobl was "referred for neuropsychological evaluation by his attorneys" and says, "Mr. Strobl has released this report to go to Attorney Conklin." (ECF 28-1, p. 2.) Strobl's attorneys paid for Dr. Demarest's work. (Id., pp. 28-31.)
Strobl filed a contested motion on December 9, 2021, seeking to have his medical records and portions of the parties’ briefs placed under seal. (ECF 36.) Given the nature of the request, the Court granted the motion the same day without prejudice to further consideration of whether the materials needed to remain under seal. (ECF 37.) Having now considered the matter further, the Court agrees with Strobl that his medical records largely should remain under seal for now. This Order, however, is not being filed under seal because the only quotations from Strobl's medical records revolve around the neuropsychological evaluation from Dr. Demarest. The fact that this evaluation occurred and was mentioned in treating provider records is already reflected in the parties’ unsealed Joint Agenda filed on November 26, 2021. (ECF 22.)
In the months leading up to October 1, 2019, Strobl was receiving treatment from other medical professionals, including a primary care provider, neurologist, and physical therapist. He disclosed to all of them that he would be meeting with Dr. Demarest and having an MRI performed. For example, the Encounter Note dated July 30, 2019, from Strobl's treating neurologist, Dr. Irving Wolfe, states: "Plan Notes : MRI of brain non-contrast ... Neuropsychological evaluation: Per Liam being arranged by his Attorney Mr. Lawyer ..." (ECF 28-1, p. 26 (emphasis in original).) Notes dated August 13, 2019, from Strobl's physical therapist, Kelan D. Krohe, PT, state: "Patient also has appointment next month with a neuropsychologist." (ECF 35-4, pp. 27-28.) Likewise, the note dated August 14, 2019, from ARNP Leslie Fenimore states that Strobl's "lawyer is coordinating a neuropsychologist at On With Life in Ankeny, IA for an appointment to evaluate the patient, and an MRI of the brain. He will have those records sent to our office." (ECF 35-5, p. 4.)
Records submitted to the Court reflect that Plaintiff recently underwent a name change. His prior name, "Liam," frequently appears in medical records but refers to the same person.
Strobl asserts that the neuropsychological evaluation report was never actually shared with his treating providers. (ECF 38-1, p. 5.). Defendants have not presented any evidence to the contrary, instead relying on statements from before the evaluation that the treating providers expected to receive the results. The Court accepts Strobl's counsel's representation that Dr. Demarest's report was never shared with Strobl's treating providers.
Defendants had one of their own retained experts, Dr. David Friedgood, perform an Independent Medical Examination ("IME") of Strobl in the morning on October 13, 2021. (ECF 35-5, p. 9.) At the time, Defendants did not have Dr. Demarest's report from his October 1, 2019, encounter with Strobl, although they did have the treating medical records from before October 1, 2019, that mentioned Strobl's appointment for the evaluation. Based on the references in the treating records, Defendants sent a subpoena to On With Life in the afternoon on October 13, 2021, to obtain Dr. Demarest's report and related records. (ECF 28-1, p. 34-35.) On With Life provided the report and records the same day, without first consulting Strobl's attorneys. (Id.)
Defendants’ expert witnesses later relied, in part, on Dr. Demarest's analysis in their own expert reports. (ECF 33, pp. 5, 8.) Dr. Friedgood's five-page, single-spaced report included four sentences about Dr. Demarest's evaluation as part of a summary of Strobl's treatment following the accident. (ECF 35-5, pp. 10-11.) Dr. Terry A. Davis, a forensic psychiatrist, included eight paragraphs (amounting to about one page) of discussion about Dr. Demarest's evaluation in his ten-page, single-spaced opinion report. (ECF 35-5, pp. 19-20.)
Strobl's counsel learned for the first time that Defendants had obtained Dr. Demarest's report when Defendants disclosed their expert reports on October 26, 2021. (ECF 38-1, p. 10.) Approximately two-and-one-half weeks later, Strobl's counsel informed Defendants’ counsel that Dr. Demarest's report was protected by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(D) and demanded that Defendants return or sequester all copies of the report and scrub any reference to it from their files. (ECF 35-6, p. 1.) Defendants denied any obligation to do so, and this motion practice followed.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standards.
The Court has broad discretion to resolve discovery disputes. Haviland v. Cath. Health Initiatives-Iowa, Corp. , 692 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1043 (S.D. Iowa 2010). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) authorizes discovery of "any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case." Discovery is meant to be used as "a[n] investigatory tool .. to help litigants gain an understanding of the key persons, relationships, and evidence in a case." Sentis Grp., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co. , 763 F.3d 919, 926 (8th Cir. 2014).
The Court likewise has broad discretion to determine whether a protective order is appropriate and the scope of such protection. Heller v. HRB Tax Grp., Inc. , 287 F.R.D. 483, 485 (E.D. Mo. 2012). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), a court may enter a protective order when the party seeking it has "shown good cause for the issuance of the order." Id. The Court must balance the prejudice or harm to the moving party if no protective order is entered with the hardship the non-moving party may experience if a protective order is issued. Id.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(D) governs consulting experts and states: "Ordinarily, a party may not, by interrogatories or deposition, discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial." The purpose of the rule is "to promote fairness by precluding a party from using an opponent's expert to build his own case." Precision of New Hampton, Inc. v. Tri Component Products Corp. , No. C12-2020, 2013 WL 2444047, at *3 (N.D. Iowa June 5, 2013). "The rule also protects an ‘important interest in allowing counsel to obtain the expert advice they need ... without fear that every consultation with an expert may yield grist for the adversary's mill.’ " Id. (quoting Rubel v. Eli Lilly & Co. , 160 F.R.D. 458, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (ellipses in original)). If information is protected by Rule 26(b)(4)(D), the opposing party nonetheless can obtain it upon "showing exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(D)(ii).
"The party claiming the protection [of Rule 26(b)(4)(D) ] bears the initial burden of proving that the Rule applies." In re Commodity Exch., Inc., Gold Futures and Options Trading Litig. , 14-MD-2548 (VEC), 2021 WL 2481835, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2021). "But the party seeking discovery bears the burden of proving any claimed waiver of the protection." Id. Similarly, the party seeking discovery bears the "heavy burden" of proving "exceptional circumstances" under Rule 26(b)(4)(D)(ii). See McClendon v. City of Albuquerque , 328 F.R.D. 567, 577 (D.N.M. 2018) ; Disidore v. Mail Contractors of Am., Inc. , 196 F.R.D. 410, 415 (D. Kan. 2000).
B. Legal Analysis.
1. Dr. Demarest Is a Consulting Physician, Not a Treating Physician.
This dispute requires the Court to examine the sometimes-unclear boundary between treating and consulting physicians. At first glance, Dr. Demarest carries all the hallmarks of a consulting expert under Rule 26(b)(4)(D). He was retained by counsel in anticipation of litigation, paid by counsel for his work, and has not been identified by Strobl as a fact or expert witness. Strobl also did not produce Dr. Demarest's report to Defendants during discovery, nor, apparently, was the report provided to any of his treating physicians or relied upon by any non-treating expert witness Strobl intends to call at trial. These facts line up neatly with the protections afforded by Rule 26(b)(4)(D). See Eliasen v. Hamilton , 111 F.R.D. 396, 401 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
Some courts refer to consulting physicians as "non-testifying" physicians.
What makes the situation complicated, however, is that Strobl's treating physicians knew in 2019 that he was going to get the neuropsychological evaluation. Medical records show, for example, that Strobl's primary care provider (ARNP Fenimore) and neuropsychologist (Dr. Wolfe) identified the neuropsychological evaluation as part of the "plan" for addressing the injuries Strobl suffered in the accident and wanted to receive a copy of the results. (ECF 35-5, p. 4; ECF 28-1, p. 26.) Accordingly, Defendants argue Dr. Demarest's evaluation was part of Strobl's treatment and not protected by Rule 26(b)(4)(D).
The Court has been unable to locate any cases with the exact fact pattern presented here—i.e., where a patient's treating physicians expected the patient to obtain some type of evaluation, but the evaluation was performed by a consulting expert retained by attorneys and the results ultimately were not shared with the treating physicians. The Court has, however, located analogous authority, which teaches that the consulting physician's work is discoverable only if it is integrated in some way into the work of a treating physician or testifying expert. For example, when a so-called "consulting" physician's work is "reviewed, considered, and relied upon ... in assessing [the patient's] condition and prescribing treatment," the consulting physician's reports are not protected by Rule 26(b)(4)(D). Harris v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. , 198 F.R.D. 26, 32 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). Similarly, "when there is evidence of substantial collaborative work between a testifying expert and a non-testifying expert," the non-testifying expert's work is discoverable to the extent of the collaboration. Long-Term Cap. Holdings, LP v. United States , No. 01-CV-1290(JBA), 2003 WL 21269586, at *2 (D. Conn. May 6, 2003). Finally, the protections of Rule 26(b)(4)(D) can be overcome if a consulting physician "recommends a proposed treatment different from that of any of Plaintiff's prior health providers." Jones v. Celebration Cruise Operator, Inc. , No. 11-61308-CIV, 2012 WL 1029469, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2012).
The Eastern District of Louisiana has characterized the issue as whether the consulting physician "became part of the factual narrative of the case." In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) Prod. Liab. Litig. , No. MDL 16-2740, 2018 WL 5669019, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 1, 2018). The Court agrees with this characterization and finds it helpful to resolving the instant dispute. If Dr. Demarest "became part of the factual narrative of the case" with respect to Strobl's treatment, his work is discoverable to the extent of such involvement.
The Court concludes that Dr. Demarest may have "become part of the factual narrative of the case" in the very limited sense that Strobl's treating providers knew he would be receiving a neuropsychological evaluation and wanted to obtain the results. To the extent Defendants (or their experts) wanted to make an issue of the fact that no results were ever provided, they likely could do so.
This does not mean, however, that Dr. Demarest's report itself ever became part of the "factual narrative." Strobl's treating providers appear not even to have known Dr. Demarest's name, much less the substance of his report. Defendants also do not provide any evidence that the substance (or absence) of Dr. Demarest's report affected future decisions by Strobl's treating providers, nor did Dr. Demarest himself recommend any treatment. In these circumstances, the report remains protected by Rule 26(b)(4)(D), notwithstanding the awareness of Strobl's treating providers that the evaluation had been scheduled. See U.S. ex rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc. , 288 F.R.D. 222, 229-30 (D.D.C. 2012) (refusing to compel consulting expert to produce test results when results were never shared with testifying expert); In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) Prod. Liab. Litig. , 2018 WL 5669019, at *6 (experts were not "treating physicians" where they met with plaintiff only once and communicated their opinions only to counsel).
2. Strobl Did Not Waive the Protections of Rule 26(b)(4)(D) by Failing to Include Dr. Demarest's Report on a Privilege Log.
The Court also rejects Defendants’ argument that Strobl waived Rule 26(b)(4)(D) protections by failing to include Dr. Demarest's report on a privilege log. (ECF 39, p. 7.) " Rule 26(b)(4)(D) does not require a privilege log, only information that ‘describes the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed—and do so in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim.’ " Genesco, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. , 302 F.R.D. 168, 191 (M.D. Tenn. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A) ); see also Netjumper Software, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc. , No. M19-138, 2005 WL 3046271, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2005) (finding privilege log unnecessary under Rule 26(b)(4)(D) ). The affidavit and other information submitted by Strobl's counsel in connection with this motion practice are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A). See Genesco , 302 F.R.D. at 191 ("[T]he affidavits of Genesco's counsel and other documents provide an ample basis to assess the privilege issues raised by the parties’ discovery motions."). Requiring more—i.e., making a party disclose the existence of a non-testifying expert's report on a privilege log—would threaten the purpose of the privilege. If a party is forced to reveal that it received a report from an expert the party has chosen not to use as a trial witness, it will be obvious the expert said something unfavorable. Armed with this knowledge, the opposing party likely would try to talk to the consulting expert or search for its own expert in the same field; meaning, in effect, the first party's consultation with the expert will have "yield[ed] grist for the adversary's mill." Precision of New Hampton , 2013 WL 2444047, at *3 (quoting Rubel , 160 F.R.D. at 460 ). This is exactly what Rule 26(b)(4)(D) is designed to prevent. See id. See also Genesco , 302 F.R.D. at 192 (requiring extensive privilege log "would itself violate the work product privilege"); Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc. , 300 F.R.D. 120, 124-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("[A] contrary holding would allow parties to play games during discovery with consulting experts"). Indeed, courts in analogous circumstances have held that an opposing party must establish "exceptional circumstances" before it is entitled even to learn the identity of a consulting expert. See, e.g. , Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp. & Training Sch. for Nurses , 622 F.2d 496, 503 (10th Cir. 1980) ; Brown v. Ringstad , 142 F.R.D. 461, 464 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (same). The same logic compels the conclusion that, in most circumstances, a party does not waive the protections of Rule 26(b)(4)(D) by failing to identify communications with, or a report from, a consulting expert on a privilege log.
Defendants also argue waiver based on Strobl's inaccurate response to a Request for Production from Defendants seeking "[a]ll reports and/or correspondence written by any doctor concerning the physical condition of the Plaintiff, including but not limited to reports written to Plaintiff's attorneys." (ECF 39-1, p. 1.) Strobl responded, in relevant part, by asserting privilege under Iowa Code § 622.10 and stating that he is "not in possession of such medical files, which are retained by physicians." (ECF 39-1, p. 2.) He further stated: "Per Rule 34, no responsive documents in Plaintiff's possession are being withheld." (Id.) As Strobl's counsel presumably was in possession of Dr. Demarest's report at the time of this discovery response, the response was inaccurate and misleading.
Although the inaccurate response is troubling, the Court will not use it as a basis for ordering production of the report. Defendants offer no authority for the proposition that an inaccurate discovery response should give rise to a finding of waiver of privilege, nor is the Court aware of any such authority. Moreover, the inaccuracy had no material impact on the arc of discovery. As noted above, courts have held that a party is not required to disclose a consulting expert's identity absent exceptional circumstances. See, e.g. , Ager , 622 F.2d at 503 ; Ringstad , 142 F.R.D. at 464 ; Hajek v. Kumho Tire Co. , No. 4:08CV3157, 2009 WL 2229902, at *6 (D. Neb. July 23, 2009). It follows that even if Strobl had stated that "no responsive non-privileged documents in Plaintiff's possession are being withheld," he would not have been required to disclose Dr. Demarest's name or the subject-matter of his report. Finally, and in any event, Defendants were made aware of Dr. Demarest's report through Strobl's other medical records. In these circumstances, the inaccurate discovery response does not entitle Defendants to the report.
3. Defendants Have Not Established Exceptional Circumstances for Production of Dr. Demarest's Report.
Defendants’ final argument is that there are "exceptional circumstances" to justify production of the report even if it is protected under Rule 26(b)(4)(D). The Court disagrees.
Defendants argue the report is discoverable because it "shows there is no brain injury" and is "vital to the Defendants’ case." (ECF 39, p. 8.) To the extent Defendants are arguing that they should be entitled to receive and use the report because it is favorable to them, the argument is unpersuasive because it flips Rule 26(b)(4)(D) on its head. The Rule intentionally allows parties to consult with experts to help evaluate the merits of their claims without being required to share the results with an adversary. See Precision of New Hampton , 2013 WL 2444047, at *3. Requiring disclosure when a consulting expert's opinion is unfavorable to the party that obtained it would cause the purpose of the rule to become a basis for defeating it. See Eliasen , 111 F.R.D. at 401 ("Even if we assume that plaintiff chose not to use [the expert] because he did not tell them what they wanted to hear, this is not only perfectly permissible, but, as indicated above, the very purpose of the rule ..."). The Court declines to reach such a holding.
The Court instead will focus on what it believes to be the two primary scenarios in which "exceptional circumstances" properly may be found to exist: (1) when "the object or condition observed by the non-testifying expert is no longer observable by an expert of the party seeking discovery"; or (2) "where it is possible to replicate expert discovery on a contested issue, but the costs would be judicially prohibitive." Bank Brussels Lambert v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. , 175 F.R.D. 34, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The Court concludes Defendants have failed to meet their "heavy burden" of providing that either of these scenarios is present. See McClendon v. City of Albuquerque , 328 F.R.D. 567, 577 (D.N.M. 2018) (applying "heavy burden" standard); Disidore v. Mail Contractors of Am., Inc. , 196 F.R.D. 410, 415 (D. Kan. 2000) (same).
With respect to whether Strobl's neurological condition is still "observable," the answer is clearly "yes." Even setting aside Dr. Demarest's report, the record is replete with information and assessments from medical professionals regarding Strobl's cognitive abilities—including the IME performed by Defendant's own retained neurologist, Dr. Friedgood, on October 13, 2021. Defendants could have retained someone to perform neuropsychological testing during that IME but apparently chose not to do so. There is nothing in Dr. Demarest's report that Defendants did not have the opportunity to discover through other means.
With respect to whether it is "possible" to replicate Dr. Demarest's work, the analysis is more complicated. Defendants argue that once they obtained Dr. Demarest's report, they chose "not [to] secure their own neuropsychological expert and evaluation of the Plaintiff." (ECF 39, p. 8.) With discovery now having closed, Defendants argue it is too late for them to fill this gap.
While not unsympathetic to this argument, the Court concludes Defendants have not satisfied their "heavy burden" of proving exceptional circumstances. See McClendon , 328 F.R.D. at 577 ; Disidore , 196 F.R.D. at 415. As noted above, Defendants and their experts chose not to include neuropsychological testing in their IME of Strobl even though the IME occurred before they had Dr. Demarest's report. This indicates Defendants did not believe they needed neuropsychological testing. To the extent Defendants are asserting they would have asked for a second IME, the Court finds nothing in the record to support this assertion. There is no suggestion, for example, that Defendants discussed the possibility of a second IME with Strobl's counsel, much less that a second IME would have been permissible under the Federal Rules. Finally, the two experts retained by Defendants include a neurologist and forensic psychiatrist whose combined work covers most of the waterfront of neurological and psychiatric issues. The Court is not persuaded that Defendants would have done something more but for the disclosure of Dr. Demarest's report. The Court therefore declines to find exceptional circumstances as a basis for allowing discovery or use of Dr. Demarest's report.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court concludes Strobl has satisfied his burden of proving that Dr. Demarest's report is protected by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(D). The Court further concludes Defendants have not satisfied their burden of proving either waiver of the protections of the Rule or "exceptional circumstances" warranting production of the report despite those protections. The Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order and DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Compel.
Within seven (7) days of this Order, Defendants must serve revised expert reports on Strobl's counsel that remove all references, direct or indirect, to Dr. Demarest's report or analysis. The discovery deadline is extended to January 10, 2022, for the limited purpose of allowing for these revised reports to be prepared and served. In all other respects, case deadlines remain as previously ordered.
IT IS SO ORDERED.