It seeks to avoid excessive compensation for one beneficiary at the expense of the remaining beneficiaries. See, e.g., Strickland v. Roosevelt County Rural Elec. Coop., 103 N.M. 63, 64, 65, 702 P.2d 1008, 1009, 1010 (Ct.App. 1984) (holding that the proceeds of a wrongful death award should be divided into equal shares and each beneficiary should reimburse the compensation carrier from his equal share of the total judgment "the amount of workers compensation benefits received by that beneficiary," and noting that "[t]his makes each beneficiary whole and avoids double recovery by either"). For the purpose of clarity we repeat: Rebecca is not entitled to any of the economic loss component of the award.
See Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 805, 808 (E.D.Va. 1960); Brocker Mfg. Supply Co. v. Mashburn, 17 Md. App. 327, 340, 301 A.2d 501, 507-08 (1973); Rascop v. Nationwide Carriers, 281 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Minn. 1979); Enghusen v. H. Christiansen Sons, Inc., 259 Minn. 442, 446-47, 107 N.W.2d 843, 847 (1961); Tarr v. Republic Corp., 116 N.H. 99, 103-04, 352 A.2d 708, 712 (1976); Brumfield v. Gallo Wine Sales of New Jersey, Inc., 183 N.J. Super. 159, 165-66, 443 A.2d 731, 734 (1982); Strickland v. Roosevelt County Rural Elec. Coop., 103 N.M. 63, 64, 702 P.2d 1008, 1009 (Ct.App. 1984); Anderson v. Greenville Borough, 442 Pa. 11, 17, 273 A.2d 512, 515 (1971); Reese v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 95 Pa. Commw. 325, 327, 505 A.2d 405, 406 (1986); Oliveras v. Caribou-Four Corners, Inc., 598 P.2d 1320, 1325 (Utah 1979); DeMeulenaere v. Transport Ins. Co., 116 Wis.2d 322, 328, 342 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Ct.App. 1983). We choose to follow the rule of these jurisdictions.
Under these circumstances, the trial court must be affirmed. See Strickland v. Roosevelt County Rural Elec. Coop., 103 N.M. 63, 702 P.2d 1008 (Ct.App. 1984). In light of the foregoing, we do not discuss plaintiff's second issue since the issue of fact concerning defendants' misleading statements is not dispositive of the appeal.
The statute not only preserves the right of action against a third party, but it also is intended to prevent double recovery by the worker and to provide reimbursement for employers. Strickland v. Roosevelt County Rural Elec. Coop., 103 N.M. 63, 702 P.2d 1008 (Ct.App. 1984); Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 99 N.M. 802, 664 P.2d 1000 (Ct.App. 1983). Our statute appears to follow the typical pattern, 2A A. Larson, supra, at Section 71.21, although the methods of providing for reimbursement to the employer or insurance carrier vary among the states.