Strickland v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.

18 Citing cases

  1. Baca v. Complete Drywall Co.

    131 N.M. 413 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 13 times
    Concluding an injury to the right knee resulting in a 20 percent loss of use of knee is a scheduled injury to one leg at or above the knee entitling worker to 150 weeks of benefits under Subsection

    It is the disability caused by the accident — not the accident itself — that triggers liability for compensation benefits. Salinas-Kendrick v. Mario Esparza Law Office, 118 N.M. 164, 165-66, 879 P.2d 796, 797-98 (Ct.App. 1994); Strickland v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 107 N.M. 500, 502, 760 P.2d 793, 795 (Ct.App. 1988). Generally, a worker becomes disabled on the day the accident occurs.

  2. Barnett Casbarian, Inc. v. Ortiz

    114 N.M. 322 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 4 times
    Directing remand for redetermination of extent of worker's disability because of workers' compensation judge's application of incorrect legal standard

    In other words, the job market by which disability is to be measured should be the general market in which workers are being employed. Although no case is directly in point, Strickland v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 107 N.M. 500, 760 P.2d 793 (Ct.App. 1988), supports this view. That opinion considered a claim of disability under the 1986 amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act, commonly referred to as the Interim Act.

  3. Carpenter v. Arkansas Best Corp.

    112 N.M. 22 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 3 times

    See NMSA 1978, §§ 52-1-1 to -69 (Orig.Pamp. Cum.Supp. 1986) (Interim Act); Strickland v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 107 N.M. 500, 760 P.2d 793 (Ct.App. 1988). We affirm.

  4. Herman v. Miners' Hosp

    111 N.M. 550 (N.M. 1991)   Cited 52 times
    Holding a claim was not time barred when the employer had actual notice of an injury but failed to file the required report

    The relevant statute, and that considered by the hearing examiner and the court of appeals, is the one in effect at the time the cause of action accrued, i.e. when the employee knew or should have known of the existence of a compensable injury. Noffsker v. Barnett Sons, 72 N.M. 471, 384 P.2d 1022 (1963); Strickland v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 107 N.M. 500, 760 P.2d 793 (Ct.App.), cert. denied 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 200 (1988). Accordingly, we apply the statutory provisions in effect on July 1, 1986, and statutory references are to provisions contained in the original 1978 compilation.

  5. Cass v. Timberman Corp.

    111 N.M. 184 (N.M. 1990)   Cited 1 times

    This case arises under the Workers' Compensation Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 52-1-1 to -69 (Cum.Supp. 1986) [hereinafter Interim Act of 1986], as the disability occurred on May 11, 1987. See Strickland v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 107 N.M. 500, 760 P.2d 793 (Ct.App.) (applicable law is one in effect on date disability begins), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 200 (1988). We granted the petition of claimant, Robert E. Cass, to issue a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals to review those portions of the opinion that reverse (1) the hearing officer's determination that the employer's insurer acted in bad faith and (2) the award of $10,000.00 attorney fees for representation at the trial level.

  6. Moya v. City of Albuquerque

    141 N.M. 617 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 3 times
    Recognizing that Section 52-1-25.1(B) "absolves an employer from paying [TTD] benefits if the worker accepts employment with another employer at the worker's pre-injury wage"

    We disagree because the law in effect at the time of injury applies. See Strickland v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 107 N.M. 500, 502, 760 P.2d 793, 795 (Ct.App. 1988) (stating that the provisions of the Act in force at the time the cause of action accrues govern). Worker was injured in 2004.

  7. Garnsey v. Concrete Inc. of Hobbs

    122 N.M. 195 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 9 times
    Rejecting literal approach to workers' compensation statute of limitations running from "accidental injury" as leading to "absurd consequences"

    The interpretation of the amended provision is what is at issue in this appeal. Strickland v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 107 N.M. 500, 502, 760 P.2d 793, 795 (Ct.App.) (legislative scheme in effect at time cause of action arose controls worker's right to compensation), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 200 (1988). Employer contends that, because the legislature deleted the word injury, the amended provision required notice to be given within fifteen days of the accidental occurrence, regardless of whether the injury was evident at the time of the occurrence.

  8. Flint v. Town of Bernalillo

    118 N.M. 65 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 5 times

    1991) (Effective January 1, 1991) [hereinafter Section 52-1-29] is the applicable law governing the requirement of notice of accidents. See Herman, 111 N.M. at 552 n. 1, 807 P.2d at 736 n. 1 (The law to be applied in a Workers' Compensation proceeding is that "in effect at the time the cause of action accrued, i.e. when the employee knew or should have known of the existence of a compensable injury."); see also Strickland v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 107 N.M. 500, 502, 760 P.2d 793, 795 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 200 (1988). Under Section 52-1-29(A), a worker is required to

  9. Salinas-Kendrick v. Mario Esparza Law

    879 P.2d 796 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 5 times
    Upholding a finding that a worker was not disabled during continued performance of pre-injury duties

    Compensation is paid only when a work-related accidental injury becomes disabling. See id., 112 N.M. at 599-600, 817 P.2d at 1241-42; see also Strickland v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 107 N.M. 500, 502, 760 P.2d 793, 795 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 200 (1988); Pena v. New Mexico Highway Dep't, Mountain States Mut. Ins. Co., 100 N.M. 408, 412, 671 P.2d 656, 660 (Ct.App. 1983). See generally 4 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 95.00 at 17-115 (1993) ("When a disability develops gradually, or when it comes as the result of a succession of accidents, the insurance earlier covering the risk at the time of the most recent injury or exposure bearing a causal relation to the disability is usually liable for the entire compensation.").

  10. Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque

    116 N.M. 640 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 8 times
    Finding will be set aside if reviewing court cannot conscientiously say that the evidence supporting the finding is substantial under whole record standard of review

    Pamp. 1987); see also NMSA 1978, § 52-1-48 (Repl.Pamp. 1987); Strickland v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 107 N.M. 500, 502, 760 P.2d 793, 795 (Ct.App.) (claim for workers' compensation benefits is controlled by legislative provisions in force at time cause of action accrued), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 200 (1988). Absent misapplication of law or lack of substantial evidence, the determination of the degree of disability is a factual issue to be decided by the judge in a workers' compensation proceeding, and a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge.