Opinion
20-12990
06-03-2024
DARREN STRIBLING, Plaintiff, v. HEIDI WASHINGTON, JODI L. DEANGELO, JANE DOE, and JOHN DOE, Defendants.
Judith E. Levy United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 100)
Curtis Ivy, Jr. United States Magistrate Judge
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Darren Stribling filed this pro se prisoner civil rights suit on October 30, 2020, amended his complaint on May 12, 2022, and filed a verified supplemental complaint on March 14, 2023. (ECF Nos. 1, 59, 72). Because the Court granted leave to file the supplemental complaint, it will be treated as the operative complaint. (ECF No. 70). Defendants Jodi L. DeAngelo and Heidi Washington filed a motion for summary judgment on January 10, 2024. (ECF No. 100). The motion is fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 104, 105). This matter was referred to the undersigned for all pretrial matters. (ECF No. 12).
For the reasons below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.
II. BACKGROUND
At the time of this suit, Plaintiff was incarcerated in Woodland Center Corrections Facility (“WCC”). (ECF No. 59, PageID.495). Before WCC, Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Ryan Correctional Facility (“RCF”). (ECF No. 1, PageID.19). Plaintiff is “chronically ill with kidney failure and heart disease.” (ECF No. 59, PageID.495). DeAngelo was a Warden at WCC, and Washington was director of the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”). (Id. at PageID.498). Both were responsible for making sure Plaintiff “receives humane condition[s] of confinement while in their supervision.” (ECF No. 59, PageID.498). In particular, “[i]t is the Warden's duty to ensure a safe and secure environment for all staff and prisoner[s].” (ECF No. 100-3, PageID.906). That said, Wardens are “not made aware of every single decision that happens in the facility,” and “rely on their staff to follow policy and procedure to sufficiently run all facility operations.” (Id.). Plaintiff claims DeAngelo “ran [the] prison . . . with an iron fist” and “[n]othing moved without her consent or her approval.” (ECF No. 100-4, PageID.925). He also claims DeAngelo “ignored” his complaints and “even penalized [him] . . . for making . . . complaints.” (Id.). He states that Washington was DeAngelo's boss. (Id.).
Plaintiff also claims two unknown Defendants, John and Jane Doe, a healthcare supervisor and medical provider, were responsible for his health and safety. (ECF No. 59, PageID.499); (ECF No. 100-4, PageID.923)
On September 22, 2020, Plaintiff received a memorandum from Washington stating that RCF was closing on January 20, 2021, and inmates in the dialysis unit would be transferred to WCC. (ECF No. 1, PageID.19, 24). The memorandum acknowledged that “[t]he initial purpose of [RCF] was” for “housing a small number of prisoners needing dialysis treatment,” and that the transfer was necessary because of a declining prisoner population and staffing issues. (Id. at PageID.24-25).
Plaintiff filed his first grievance after this memo was issued, on September 23, 2020. (Id. at PageID.19). This grievance was denied on September 24, 2020. (Id.). It was rejected because “[t]he content of Department-Wide policy and Director's Office Memoranda are non-grievable.” (Id. at PageID.27).
On September 25, 2020, Plaintiff submitted questions, asking how WCC would accommodate the medical needs of dialysis patients during the transfer. (Id. at PageID.20). He was informed that DeAngelo received his questions, but Plaintiff received no responses. (Id.).
Once the transfer was initiated, Plaintiff was temporarily housed in a unit with a separate wing for Covid-19 positive prisoners. (ECF No. 100-3, PageID.909). The positive prisoners' doors were not locked, and they were able to come out of their cells and enter common areas with other prisoners. (Id.). Plaintiff also claims his “property which possessed all his chronic care medications,” including “blood pressure meds, parathyroid meds, and hygienes [sic],” was withheld, and it “took seven days and a collective protest by all dialysis patients before property was returned.” (ECF No. 72, PageID.649). Plaintiff was hospitalized because his “blood pressure elevated.” (Id.).; (ECF No. 59, PageID.496). At the time of filing, Plaintiff said he was “still experiencing unnecessary delayes [sic] in medication refills up to two weeks at a time,” and that his dialysis machine was inoperable and in need of replacement. (ECF No. 59, PageID.496).
On June 21, 2021, dialysis patients were given two special units, one of which was the Cedar unit. (ECF No. 100-3, PageID.908). This unit had a “48 bed open floor setting . . . with no area of privacy.” (ECF No. 59, PageID.497). There were three toilets, three urinals, and four “rusted out” showers, all of which were equipped with backup batteries in case of power outages. (ECF No. 100-3, PageID.908). Whenever there was a power outage, there was no way to flush toilets or use sinks and showers. (ECF No. 72, PageID.653). Plaintiff could not control the light in his area, nor was he able to control the excessive noise or temperature. (ECF No. 56, PageID.497). He claims this led to “frigid” temperatures in the winter and “unbearable heat” in the summer. (ECF No. 59, PageID.497).
The other unit was a dialysis unit, in which there were multiple dialysis machines, a separate water filtration room, and individuals providing dialysis services and maintaining equipment. (ECF No. 100-3, PageID.908). On August 15, 2021 and October 3, 2021, WCC reported low water pressure because of pump controls, which were replaced as soon as possible. (Id. at PageID.910). On October 7, 2021, there was a water leak that delayed dialysis treatment by a few hours. (Id.). On November 19, 2022, the heating unit failed, and a mobile heater was provided while a contractor was brought in to repair the heater. (ECF No. 100-4, PageID.939). Even with the mobile heater, the temperatures dropped and Plaintiff slept in his “coats and hats” for more than one week and was “freezing.” (Id.). Dialysis treatments were unaffected. (ECF No. 100-3, PageID.912). Though inmates were offered the opportunity to move to a temporary housing location, they chose not to. (ECF No. 100-4, PageID.939). The system was restored one month later. (ECF No. 100-3, PageID.913). On December 15, 2022, there was a watermain break, and patients were taken off site for dialysis for three days. (Id. at PageID.910).
Plaintiff was also housed in an “eight bed cubicle with no way to social distance” and, when he hung “a blanket or towel over his bed for protection [from] Covid-19,” he was penalized. (ECF No. 72, PageID.652).
Plaintiff also stated the water at WCC was unclean and “had a foul odor,” was “discolored” and had a bad taste. (Id. at PageID.650). He claims staff members brought their own water and were told not to drink the prison water. (Id.); (ECF No. 59, PageID.497). His compound was “flooded with raw sewage water several times” and the water he was given to drink, cook, and shower in was full of arsenic, calcium, excessive salt, and rust, and that he developed fungus, swelling, nausea, diarrhea, and stomach cramps because of the water. (ECF No. 59, PageID.496-497); (ECF No. 72, PageID.650).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court “views the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pure Tech Sys., Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 95 Fed.Appx. 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2004).
“The moving party has the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists....” Stansberry v. Air Wis. Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) (providing if a party “fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact,” then the court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion”). “Once the moving party satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue.'” Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). The nonmoving party must “make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion.” Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Lee v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 432 Fed.Appx. 435, 441 (6th Cir. 2011) (“The nonmovant must, however, do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, there must be evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party to create a genuine dispute.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, summary judgment is appropriate when “a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported and the nonmoving party fails to respond with a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of its case....” Stansberry, 651 F.3d at 486 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
That Plaintiff is pro se does not reduce his obligations under Rule 56. Rather, “liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require lenient treatment of substantive law.” Durante v. Fairlane Town Ctr., 201 Fed.Appx. 338, 344 (6th Cir. 2006). Further, “[o]nce a case has progressed to the summary judgment stage, . . . ‘the liberal pleading standards under Swierkiewicz [v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13 (2002)] and [the Federal Rules] are inapplicable.'” Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees, 407 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004)). The Sixth Circuit has made clear that, when opposing summary judgment, a party cannot rely on allegations or denials in unsworn filings and that a party's “status as a pro se litigant does not alter [this] duty on a summary judgment motion.” Viergutz v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 375 Fed.Appx. 482, 485 (6th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Brown, 7 Fed.Appx. 353, 354 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming grant of summary judgment against a pro se plaintiff because he “failed to present any evidence to defeat the government's motion”).
C. Analysis
i. Claims Dismissed by Agreement Both parties agree that Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief should be denied, that the Doe Defendants should be dismissed because they have not been identified, and that the claims against Washington and DeAngelo in their official capacities should be dismissed because they are entitled to sovereign immunity. (ECF No. 100, PageID.874, 876, 881); (ECF No. 104, PageID.104-106).
Though Plaintiff admits his request for injunctive relief should be dismissed, and that his “entire [original] complaint” should not be rendered moot because many of his claims, including “the deni[al] of Serious Medical Needs, Unsafe Drinking Water, exposure to COVID-19 Virus, delays in Chronic Care Medications, and Dialysis Treatment defic[iencies]” show deliberate indifference. (ECF No. 104, PageID.1176). “[A] moot preliminary injunction does not necessarily render a case moot in its entirety.” Doster v. Kendall, 2024 WL 1156426, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 18, 2024) (citing Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 394-95 (1981)). A case becomes moot if “the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988). This is the case here.
The claims of denial of medical needs, unsafe drinking water, exposure to Covid-19, delays in medications, and dialysis treatment deficiencies are not actually included in the original complaint. (ECF No. 1). In fact, the events of these allegations - including any deficiencies in the dialysis treatment or medications at RCF, and the alleged unsafe drinking water or exposure to Covid-19, had not occurred at the time of the original complaint. (Id.).
In his original complaint, Plaintiff sought injunctive relief against Defendants' plans to transfer inmates to RCF during the Covid-19 pandemic. (Id.). He specifically wanted Defendants to provide a “comprehensive transfer plan that addresses all issues of medical treatment” before the transfer. (Id. at PageID.18). He claimed that transfer without a comprehensive plan would violate the prisoners' “fundamentally protected Eighth Amendment rights as . . . [they would] not have their serious medical needs treated.” (Id. at PageID.4-5). Plaintiff also requested “the construction of a new dialysis unit . . . equipped with a climate control system with a[n] in-unit control thermostat” and a backup generator. (Id. at PageID.11). He also expressed concern over “the well water system” and requested “the EPA to monitor-Measure the quality . . . of the Well-Water.” (Id. at PageID.12). Finally, Plaintiff requested vehicles for transportation to clinics and appointments, and a larger dialysis unit. (Id.).
Because the transfer has already taken place, the claims from his original complaint are moot. Hanrahan v. Mohr, 905 F.3d 947, 960 (6th Cir. 2018) (“The test for mootness is whether the relief sought would, if granted, make a difference to the legal interests of the parties.”). Given that his requests for injunctive relief no longer apply because the transfer has already occurred, and because the only relief Plaintiff requested in his original compliant was injunctive relief, conceding that he is not entitled to injunctive relief renders the original complaint moot.
“The exercise of judicial power under Art. III of the Constitution depends on the existence of a case or controversy,” and a “federal court has neither the power to render advisory opinions nor ‘to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.'” Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401-03 (1975) (citing North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)); e.g., Keel v. Ray, 2011 WL 5511899, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 10, 2011) (when “Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief [became] moot,” and it was his only “substantive request for relief,” Plaintiff's claim was dismissed.). Consideration of Plaintiff's original complaint is inappropriate.
The claims in the supplemental complaint, for which Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, will still go forward.
ii. Exhaustion
Defendants argue that the claims in Plaintiff's supplemental complaint should be dismissed for failure to exhaust. In particular, they claim he exhausted only one of his grievances, and that grievance does not reference Washington or DeAngelo.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq., a prisoner may not bring an action “with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Congress enacted the provision to address the “outsized share” of prisoner litigation filings and to ensure that “the flood of nonmeritorious claims does not submerge and effectively preclude consideration of the allegations with merit.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203-04 (2007). Put another way, the purpose of § 1997e(a) is to “reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits[.]” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). Exhaustion also “gives an agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into federal court, and it discourages disregard of [the agency's] procedures.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 211. The prison's grievance process determines when a prisoner has properly exhausted his or her claim. Id. at 218 (“The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”). Even where a prisoner has made some attempts to go through the prison's grievance process, “[t]he plain language of the statute makes exhaustion a precondition to filing an action in federal court.” Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999).
The prisoner “may not exhaust administrative remedies during the pendency of the federal suit.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 95 (“A prisoner who does not want to participate in the prison grievance system will have little incentive to comply with the system's procedural rules unless noncompliance carries a sanction....”). That said, “the PLRA and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 permit a plaintiff to amend his complaint to add claims that were exhausted after the commencement of the lawsuit, provided that the plaintiff's original complaint contained at least one fully exhausted claim.” Mattox v. Edelman, 851 F.3d 583, 595 (6th Cir. 2017).
Finally, “inmates are not required to specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. Instead, failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense under the PLRA. Id. As a result, defendants bear the burden of proof on exhaustion. Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 2012) (“A PLRA defendant bears the burden of proving that a PLRA plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies.”).
Pursuant to Policy Directive 03.02.130, dated March 18, 2019, the administrative remedies available at the MDOC are as follows. First, the inmate must attempt to resolve issues with the staff member involved within two business days of becoming aware of a grievable issue. (ECF 25, PageID.170, at ¶ Q). If the issues are not resolved within five business days, the inmate may file a Step I grievance using the appropriate form. (Id.). If the inmate is dissatisfied with the Step I disposition, or does not receive a response by ten business days after the due date, he or she may file a Step II grievance using the appropriate form. (Id. at PageID.167, ¶ DD). Similarly, if the inmate is dissatisfied with the Step II response or does not receive a response by ten business days after the due date, the inmate may file a Step III grievance. (Id. at PageID.173, ¶ HH). The matter is fully exhausted after the disposition of the Step III grievance. Surles, 678 F.3d at 455 (“A grievant must undertake all steps of the MDOC process for his grievance to be considered fully exhausted.”).
Defendants argue the supplemental complaint should be dismissed. Because the Court granted leave to file the supplemental complaint, it will be accepted as the operative complaint. (ECF No. 70). The supplemental complaint also repeats the claims in the amended complaint. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff brought claims arguing his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when Defendants placed him in a dialysis unit with unclean water, he was placed in close contact with Covid-19 in open bay and smaller units, and he had to wait sixteen months for a “pop machine” with bottled water. (ECF No. 59, PageID.495-501). In his supplemental complaint, Plaintiff again brings claims of Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference based on Defendants' failure to provide living quarters without Covid-19 positive patients, delays in providing his medications leading him to be hospitalized, faulty ventilation systems, and dirty water. (ECF No. 72, PageID.648-656). Plaintiff must have filed grievances targeting the listed issues and defendants in order to have fully exhausted the claims. Harris v. Erdos, 2022 WL 787851 (S.D. Ohio, Mar. 15, 2022) (when grievance did not include Plaintiff's claim, “Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on [the] issue . . . warranting its dismissal.”).
Defendants attach grievance WCC-21-12-1047-22Z, which was filed on November 10, 2020. (ECF No. 100-14, PageID.1133). Within the grievance, Plaintiff states:
While in segregation . . . I was denied the essential needs, requirements, and accommodations required by MDOC Policy Directives and by the law.
1. I was denied essential chronic care medications.
2. I was denied meals periodically throughout my state.
3. I was denied showers.
4. I was denied outside exercise.
5. I was denied telephone use.
6. I was denied use of mail services.
7. I was denied clean clothing.(Id. at PageID.1134).
In the Step I decision summary, the respondent says no evidence supported these claims. (Id. at PageID.1135). The grievance was appealed to Step II, in which Plaintiff stated “[s]everal days the nurse said she could not find my meds . . . At least three days I was not provided with my meal . . . At no time was I offered a shower, outside exercise, a phone call, clean clothing, or mail, including writing material.” (Id. at PageID.1137-38). DeAngelo was the respondent to this grievance. (Id.). This grievance was then taken to Step III. (Id. at PageID.1134-1136). It was again denied. (Id.).
At no stage did Plaintiff reference the current Defendants or the claims from his supplemental complaint. Even though Plaintiff mentioned he was denied “chronic care medications,” his grievance is about treatment during segregation, not during the events of his complaints. It does not exhaust the claims within any of the complaints. Also, According to MDOC policy, “staff who may be involved in the issue being grieved shall not participate in any capacity in the grievance investigation, review, or response.” (ECF No. 25, PageID.170). An officer who responds to a grievance is not the one being grieved. Burnett v. Eelbode, 2021 WL 1152998 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2021). Because DeAngelo was the respondent at Step II, “[he] was not involved in the grievance.” Id. at *5 (internal citations omitted).
Because of this, “Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies as to [these] Defendants.” Id. (when Plaintiff failed to reference Defendants in initial grievances, he did not exhaust his claims) (citing Bird v. Mansfield, 2013 WL 4782369, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 15, 2014) (when “Plaintiff clearly did not name Defendant Mansfield in a Step I grievance,” did not “[submit] any other papers that indicate that Defendant Mansfield was being grieved,” Plaintiff failed to exhaust his claims.)); see also Vandiver v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 326 Fed.Appx. 885, 890 (6th Cir. 2009) (grievance that did not name Defendants “failed to give the Defendants fair notice that the grievance was directed against them.”).
Plaintiff then attaches another grievance, number PRF200900162027. (ECF No. 1, PageID.22). In this grievance, he states “[t]he genesis of this grievance is found in the Respondents' September 22, 2020 Directors' Office Memorandum 2020 announcement of the closure of Ryan Correctional Fac[ility].” (ECF No. 1, PageID.22). He maintains this grievance is about “transferring . . . Dialysis patients to the Woodland Correctional Center.” (Id.). This grievance was returned as non-grievable. (Id.) Though plaintiffs are not “required to exhaust administrative remedies regarding non-grievable issues,” this grievance references neither Defendant, nor does it implicate the allegations in the amended or supplemental complaints about Covid-19 exposure, unsafe water, denial of medications, and delayed dialysis treatment. Figel v. Bouchard, 89 Fed.Appx. 970, 971 (6th Cir. 2004). It may relate to Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief in the original complaint, but that request was dismissed by agreement of the parties. As a result, the supplemental and amended complaint allegations have not been exhausted.
Because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust the issues in his supplemental complaint, his claims cannot proceed.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 100) be GRANTED.
The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Loc. 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge.
Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” “Objection No. 2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the objections in length and complexity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), Local Rule 72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without merit, it may rule without awaiting the response.