Both motions raise questions of law which are reviewed de novo. Hodge, 156 Ill.2d 112, 619 N.E.2d 732; Doe v. TCF Bank Illinois, FSB, 302 Ill. App.3d 839, 707 N.E.2d 220 (1999); Village of Evergreen Park v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 296 Ill. App.3d 810, 695 N.E.2d 1339 (1998). The requirement under the Transit Act to file notice within six months of an accident "in the office of the secretary of the Board and also in the office of the General Attorney for the Authority" ( 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1996)) is mandatory ( Streeter v. Chicago Transit Authority, 272 Ill. App.3d 921, 651 N.E.2d 579 (1995)); and the plaintiff has the burden of strictly complying with that requirement. Niziolek v. Chicago Transit Authority, 251 Ill. App.3d 537, 620 N.E.2d 1097 (1993); Sanders v. Chicago Transit Authority, 220 Ill. App.3d 505, 581 N.E.2d 211 (1991).
In dictum, the court noted that "[i]t is true that in some instances the failure to give proper notice may be cured, such as when a plaintiff files the actual complaint within the six-month period." Murphy,191 Ill.App.3d at 921, 139 Ill.Dec. 18, 548 N.E.2d 403; see also Streeter v. Chicago Transit AuthoritVy, 272 Ill.App.3d 921, 923, 209 Ill.Dec. 401, 651 N.E.2d 579 (1995) ( although the notice requirements are mandatory and cannot be waived or lightly excused, "[p]laintiff could have cured the failure to give notice by filing his lawsuit within the six-month period"). In Joseph, the court considered whether the plaintiff's complaint, which was filed during the six-month notice period but served after the expiration of that period, satisfied the section 41 notice requirements.
Joseph, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 937. In reaching this conclusion, we discussed the case of Saragusa v. City of Chicago, 63 Ill. 2d 288 (1976), as well as the dicta based thereon in Streeter v. Chicago Transit Authority, 272 Ill. App. 3d 921 (1995), and Murphy v. Chicago Transit Authority, 191 Ill. App. 3d 918 (1989), which stated that the failure to give timely statutory notice could be cured by the filing of a complaint within the proscribed statutory period. Saragusa, 63 Ill. 2d at 294; Streeter, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 923; Murphy, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 921.
The claimant's notice must strictly comply with each of the elements designated in the statute. Streeter v. Chicago Transit Authority, 272 Ill. App.3d 921, 924 (1995). Generally, the CTA's actual knowledge about an injury is irrelevant when considering the adequacy of a section 41 notice (Repaskey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 60 Ill.2d 185, 187-88 (1975); Margolis v. Chicago Transit Authority, 69 Ill. App.3d 1028, 1031-32 (1979)), and it is solely the plaintiff's burden to comply with the section 41 notice requirements.
Under section 2-619(a)(5), dismissal may be had upon a showing that the plaintiffs' action was not commenced within the time limit provided by law. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(5) (West 1992); Streeter v. Chicago Transit Authority, 272 Ill. App. 3d 921, 923, 651 N.E.2d 579, 580 (1995). The statute of limitations for an action under the Consumer Fraud Act is three years and begins to run when the cause of action accrues.
"[I]t is solely the plaintiff's burden to comply with the section 41 notice requirements." Dimeo, 311 Ill. App.3d at 155, citing Streeter v. Chicago Transit Authority, 272 Ill. App.3d 921, 924 (1995). In conclusion, we find that the result here is clear.
We do note, however, that several cases have so indicated in dicta. Joseph v. Chicago Transit Authority, 306 Ill. App.3d 927, 933, 715 N.E.2d 733 (1999); Streeter v. Chicago Transit Authority, 272 Ill. App.3d 921, 923, 651 N.E.2d 579 (1995); Murphy v. Chicago Transit Authority, 191 Ill. App.3d 918, 921, 548 N.E.2d 403 (1989). We conclude that there is no classification in section 41 that "discriminates in favor of a select group, let alone one that does so arbitrarily or without a sound, reasonable basis."