§ 90.616(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2006). We have recognized that in applying the exception in section 90.616(2)(c) for those persons whose presence is shown to be essential to the presentation of the cause of one of the parties, "the trial court `has wide discretion in determining which witnesses are essential'" Knight, 746 So.2d at 430 (quoting Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 616.1, at 509 (1998 ed.)); see also Strausser v. State, 682 So.2d 539, 541 (Fla. 1996) (citing § 90.616(2)(c) and finding no abuse of discretion in allowing the mental health expert to remain present in the courtroom while the defendant testified). Under section 90.616(2)(c), the burden is on the party seeking to avoid sequestration of a witness to demonstrate why the presence of the witness is essential.
In that manner, the narrow inquiry to which we are bound honors the underlying principle that this jury's advisory sentence reflected the "conscience of the community" at the time of this trial. See Strausser v. State, 682 So.2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1996); Dolinsky v. State, 576 So.2d 271, 274 (Fla. 1991); Richardson v. State, 437 So.2d 1091, 1095 (Fla. 1983). The trial judge's sentencing order is thoughtful and well written; he obviously considered his decision in a very deliberative, serious manner.
In that manner, the narrow inquiry to which we are bound honors the underlying principle that this jury's advisory sentence reflected the "conscience of the community" at the time of this trial. See Strausser v. State, 682 So.2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1996); Dolinsky v. State, 576 So.2d 271, 274 (Fla. 1991); Richardson v. State, 437 So.2d 1091, 1095 (Fla. 1983). The trial judge's sentencing order is thoughtful and well written; he obviously considered his decision in a very deliberative, serious manner.
Id. , 642 So.2d at 1080 (emphasis supplied). Similarly, in Strausser v. State , 682 So.2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1996), we found that the trial court's override failed the Tedder standard because "there was vast mitigation to support the jury's recommendation." Likewise, we have just recently again reaffirmed this enduring standard in reversing the trial court's override of the jury's recommendation of a life sentence in Pomeranz v. State , 703 So.2d 465, 471 (Fla. 1997), the latest of a series of recent cases wherein we have consistently reaffirmed Tedder .
"It is a well established principle of law in this state that an otherwise qualified witness who is not a medical expert can testify about a person's mental condition, provided the testimony is based on personal knowledge or observation." Rivers v. State, 458 So.2d 762, 765 (Fla. 1984); see also Strausser v. State, 682 So.2d 539, 541 (Fla. 1996) (finding no error in permitting lay witness who knew the defendant to express an opinion as to the defendant's mental condition when it was based entirely on his personal observations). Thus, the lower court's summary denial of this claim was proper.
"It is a well established principle of law in this state that an otherwise qualified witness who is not a medical expert can testify about a person's mental condition, provided the testimony is based on personal knowledge or observation." Rivers v. State, 458 So.2d 762, 765 (Fla. 1984); see also Strausser v. State, 682 So.2d 539, 541 (Fla. 1996) (finding no error in permitting lay witness who knew the defendant to express an opinion as to the defendant's mental condition when it was based entirely on his personal observations). Thus, the lower court's summary denial of this claim was proper.
For instance, defense counsel asked the following questions on cross-examination: "And that's because you were looking out for Ozzie, because he acted like a kid, correct?"; "You treated him like a kid because he was big and he seemed like he didn't understand the consequences of what was going on, correct?"; "You thought Mr. Almieda acted pretty crazy on November 14th or 15th, that night when [he] told you what he did, didn't you?"; "You thought he acted irrationally doing what he did?"; "Was it your impression that Mr. Almeida was becoming paranoid, isn't that the term you used?"; "And now, Mr. Salmon, with respect to Mr. Almeida's behavior, especially the behavior that you were observing that night on November 14th, 1993, can you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury if you thought that behavior was just an act, if you will, or just an attempt to, you know, look a certain way?"See also Strausser v. State, 682 So.2d 539 (Fla. 1996) ("[I]t is a well established principle of law in this state that an otherwise qualified witness who is not a medical expert can testify about a person's mental condition, provided the testimony is based on personal knowledge or observation." Id. at 541 (quoting Rivers v. State, 458 So.2d 762, 765 (Fla. 1984)).
642 So.2d at 1080 (emphasis supplied). Similarly, in Strausser v. State, 682 So.2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1996), we found that the trial court's override failed the Tedder standard because "there was vast mitigation to support the jury's recommendation." Likewise, we have just recently again reaffirmed this enduring standard in reversing the trial court's override of the jury's recommendation of a life sentence in Pomeranz v. State, 705 So.2d 465, 471 (Fla. 1997), the latest of a series of recent cases wherein we have consistently reaffirmed Tedder.