This rule imputing knowledge to an invitee of the danger posed by a premises feature is limited, however, “to cases involving a static condition that is readily discernable to a person exercising reasonable care for his own safety.” Strauss v. City of Lilburn, 329 Ga.App. 361, 364, 765 S.E.2d 49 (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original); see also Perkins, 305 Ga.App. at 128–129, 699 S.E.2d 380; Rutherford v. Revco Discount Drug Centers, 301 Ga.App. 702, 704, 689 S.E.2d 59 (2009); Cocklin, 296 Ga.App. at 180, 674 S.E.2d 48; Newell, 222 Ga.App. at 885, 476 S.E.2d 631. This limitation of the rule imputing knowledge of a hazard is simply a restatement of the truism, still applied, that a plaintiff is held to have knowledge of “an open and obvious condition.” See Wright v. K–Mart Corp., 286 Ga.App. 765, 650 S.E.2d 300 (2007) (no error in granting a store summary judgment as to plaintiff's claim arising from a trip over store's shelf corner) (emphasis supplied); Music v. Steamco, Inc., 265 Ga.App. 185, 186, 593 S.E.2d 370 (2004) (plaintiff was held to have had equal knowledge of water on steps leading from restaurant); Becton v. Tire King of North Columbus, 246 Ga.App. 57, 59, 539 S.E.2d 551 (2000) (plaintiff was held not to have exercised due care when she walked ba

There is Georgia authority that supports Cook’s argument. For example, in Strauss v. City of Lilburn, 329 Ga. App. 361, 362, 765 S.E.2d 49 (2014), the plaintiff fell when she "just didn’t see" a single step leading down to a sidewalk outside a restaurant. The plaintiff had actual knowledge that "there was a step in the area" but she had not actually traversed that step before her fall.

Where the plaintiff alleges that a static condition (a condition that does not change and is dangerous only if someone fails to see it and walks into it) caused her to fall, the landowner's notice of the hazard is presumed. See Strauss v. City of Lilburn , 329 Ga. App. 361, 363, 765 S.E.2d 49 (2014). However, a landowner's constructive knowledge presumption can be rebutted with evidence that there was nothing readily observable indicating a defect.

As in Perkins , then, which also involved a step down from a curb into a parking lot, these defendants were "charged with notice of the [step’s] height in relation to the parking lot, the lighting conditions, the view of the curb for someone descending the stairs, and the absence of any paint or warning signs" in the area, such that their superior knowledge of the hazard posed by the final step is a jury question. 305 Ga. App. at 129, 699 S.E.2d 380 (reversing a grant of summary judgment to defendant owner); see also Strauss v. City of Lilburn , 329 Ga. App. 361, 364 (1), 765 S.E.2d 49 (2014) (reversing a grant of summary judgment to defendant owner when there was "no evidence" that the plaintiff "had actually walked either up or down" the single step at any time prior to her fall). Our decision in Norwich , supra, is distinguishable on a number of grounds, including the mere "moments" between that plaintiff’s successful ascent of a step and her fall down the same, the unchanged interior lighting conditions, and the presence of a warning sign.

Id. (quoting Strauss v. City of Lilburn, 765 S.E.2d 49, 52 (Ga.Ct.App. 2014)). "A static condition is one that does not change and is dangerous only if someone fails to see it and walks into it."

Because a prior successful traversal of the hazard precludes recovery only where a hazard is “readily discernible, ” and there is an issue of fact as to the hazard's discernibility, this issue of fact precludes granting Defendants' motion on the basis of prior traversal as well. See Strauss v. City of Lilburn, 765 S.E.2d 49, 52 (Ga.Ct.App. 2014) (“[T]he rule imputing knowledge of a danger to a person who has successfully negotiated an alleged dangerous condition before applies only to cases involving a static condition that is readily discernible to a person exercising reasonable care for his own safety.” (quoting Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co., 699 S.E.2d 380, 383 (Ga.Ct.App. 2010))).

Plaintiff has produced evidence sufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether a person exercising reasonable care for her safety would see and avoid this curb. See, e.g., Strauss v. City of Lilburn, 765 S.E.2d 49, 52 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (reversing summary judgment for defendant where "the evidence shows that, although [plaintiff] was paying attention to where she was walking, she was unable to see the step down because the change in elevation was essentially camouflaged from her vantage point"); Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co., 699 S.E.2d 380, 383 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (reversing summary judgment for defendant where plaintiffs "presented evidence that the step down from the curb was difficult to see when approached from above due to lighting conditions, darkened surfaces and lack of warning"); cf. D'Elia, 839 S.E.2d at 721 (affirming summary judgment for defendant where, although plaintiff argued that the elevated curb upon which she tripped was camouflaged, there was no evidence or allegation that the curb was painted in a way that created an optical illusion, nor was there testimony from another witness that the curb's elevation was camouflaged). This is not one of the "extraordinary cases where the facts are plain and

(Punctuation omitted.) Strauss v. City of Lilburn , 329 Ga. App. 361, 364, 765 S.E.2d 49 (2014). It is a plaintiff's knowledge of the specific hazard that determines whether the plaintiff can prevail on a premises liability claim.

The rule imputing knowledge to an invitee of the danger posed by a premises feature is limited "to cases involving a static condition that is readilydiscernable to a person exercising reasonable care for his own safety." Strauss v. City of Lilburn , 329 Ga.App. 361, 364, 765 S.E.2d 49 (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original); see also Perkins , 305 Ga.App. at 128-129, 699 S.E.2d 380. Such a limitation "is simply a restatement of the truism, still applied, that a plaintiff is held to have knowledge of an open and obvious condition." Norwich , 332 Ga.App. at 162, 770 S.E.2d 357 (punctuation omitted); see also Wright v. K-Mart Corp. , 286 Ga.App. 765, 650 S.E.2d 300 (2007) (no error in granting a store summary judgment as to plaintiff's claim arising from a trip over store's shelf corner); Music v. Steamco, Inc. , 265 Ga.App. 185, 186, 593 S.E.2d 370 (2004) (plaintiff was held to have had equal knowledge of water on steps leading from restaurant).

They have pointed to no evidence that Card knew of the specific hazard of this particular hose falling. See Strauss v. City of Lilburn , 329 Ga.App. 361, 364–365, 765 S.E.2d 49 (2014) (whether plaintiff “had greater or equal knowledge of the specific hazard ” that allegedly caused her fall was a question of fact to be decided at trial) (citations omitted; emphasis supplied); Telligman v. Monumental Properties , 161 Ga.App. 13, 16, 288 S.E.2d 846 (1982) (“[I]t is a plaintiff's knowledge of the specific hazard ... which is determinative, not merely his knowledge of the generally prevailing hazardous conditions or of the hazardous conditions which he observes and avoids.”). Whether Card had equal knowledge of the hazard, considering he had witnessed other workers entering the building and the area was not marked off as dangerous, is a disputed fact question for jury resolution.c. Assumption of risk.