As to the issue concerning affecting the title of the property, the language of subsection 52-325 (b) (3) appears to be rather broad and the Court of this state have interpreted this statute in a very broad manner: As noted in Stratton v. Ward, 39 Conn. Sup. 195, 197 (1983), the language of subsection (b) (3) is extremely broad. Bielonko v. Blanchette Builders, Inc., No. CV-98-0581188-S (Feb. 2, 1999), 1999 Ct. Sup. 1125 (J.D. Hartford, Lavine, J.).
At such a hearing, the plaintiff is initially required to establish probable cause to sustain the validity of his claims. General Statutes 52-325b (a); see e.g. Stratton v. Ward, 39 Conn. Sup. 195, 474 A.2d 113 (1983). This probable cause hearing is not a trial on the merits, nor is it intended as such. The plaintiff need not establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
" Conn.Gen.Stat. ยง 52-325(b)(2), (3). Connecticut courts have interpreted ยง 52-325(b)(3)'s language as requiring the denial of motions to discharge a lis pendens where the courts' disposition of the main cause of action could affect in some manner an interest in property. See Garcia v. Brooks Street Associates, 209 Conn. 15, 546 A.2d 275 (1988); Stratton v. Ward, 39 Conn. Sup. 195, 197-98, 474 A.2d 113 (1983). The FDIC's fraudulent conveyance action is designed to enforce its interest in the Mill Road property as a result of the Isbans' guarantees. This interest is sufficient to support the filing of a lis pendens.
From the face of the statute it is clear that a notice of lis pendens is appropriate only where the pending action will in some way, either directly or indirectly, affect the title to or an interest in the real property itself. See Stratton v. Ward, 39 Conn. Sup. 195, 474 A.2d 113 (1983) (interpreting 52-325 [b] [3], where the court relied on the plain meaning of the statute). Where, as here, a party to a pending action seeks only monetary damages that will not affect the title of the real estate owned by an adverse party, a notice of lis pendens is properly discharged as it no longer serves its purpose, which is to put potential buyers of the real estate and creditors of its owners on notice that the real estate may be subject to pending adverse interests that may affect the title or right to the property.
At such a hearing, the plaintiff is initially required to establish probable cause to sustain the validity of his claims. General Statutes 52-325b (a); see e.g. Stratton v. Ward, 39 Conn. Sup. 195, 474 A.2d 113 (1983). This probable cause hearing is not a trial on the merits, nor is it intended as such. The plaintiff need not establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
Garcia v. Brooks Street Associates, supra, 209 Conn. 22. " As noted in Stratton v. Ward, 39 Conn.Supp. 195, 197, (1983), the language of [ยง 52-325(b)(3) ] is extremely broad." South Mill Village Assn. v. Still Hill Development Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-96-0563009-S (May 11, 1998, Lavine, J.) (22 Conn.L.Rptr. 154, 155).
Subsequent Superior Court decisions have seemingly taken a broad approach when interpreting the applicable sections of the General Statutes. See Bielonko v. Blanchette Builders, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 98 0581188S ("[a]s noted in Stratton v. Ward, 39 Conn.Sup. 195, 197 (1983), the language of subsection [General Statutes ยง 52-325](b)(3) is extremely broad"). This liberal approach has lead to courts holding that a cause of action to enjoin specific activity on an adverse party's land satisfies the affects "title to or interest in" requirement.
(3) actions which may affect in any manner the title to or interest in real property, notwithstanding the main purpose of the action may be other than to affect the title of such real property. CT Page 6178 As noted in Stratton v. Ward 39 Conn. Sup. 195, 197 (1983), the language of subsection (b)(3) is extremely broad. Section (b)(1) defines actions "intended to affect real property" to include actions whose object and purpose (emphasis added) is to determine the title or rights of the parties in, to, under, or over some particular real property. As the plain language indicates, the focus of (b)(1) is the objection and purpose of the action, not the likelihood of success.
From the face of the statute it is clear that a notice of lis pendens is appropriate only where the pending action will in some way, either directly or indirectly, affect the title to or an interest in the real property itself. See Stratton v. Ward, 39 Conn. Sup. 195, 474 A.2d 113 (1983) (interpreting 52-325 [b] [3], where the court relied on the plain meaning of the statute). Where, as here, a party to a pending action seeks only monetary damages that will not affect the title of the real estate owned by an adverse party, a notice of lis pendens is properly discharged as it no longer serves its purpose, which is to put potential buyers of the real estate and creditors of its owners on notice that the real estate may be subject to pending adverse interests that may affect the title or right to the property.
For example, an action on a lease agreement affects an interest in real property, although, not the main purpose of the action. Stratton v. Ward, 39 Conn. Sup. 195, 474 A.2d 113 (Super.Ct. 1983) (where the court held, in denying a motion to discharge a notice of lis pendens, that a lease is an interest in land which is intended to affect real estate). In the present action, the plaintiffs' main purpose is to have the court recognize and enforce an alleged partnership agreement.